


JPRS-UIA-88-016  
4 OCTOBER 1988



**FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

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***International Affairs***

# Soviet Union International Affairs

JPRS-UIA-88-016

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4 OCTOBER 1988

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**MFA Research Coordination Center Described**

18076008 Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 5, May 88 pp 130-143

[Article: "The Soviet Union in an Interdependent World"]

[Editorial report] Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 5, May 1988 publishes on pages 130-143 a report on a roundtable, sponsored by the journal, on the implications of perestroika for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The report quotes Vadim Udalov, second secretary of the USSR Foreign Ministry Research Coordination Center, as giving the following information on the recent addition to the Foreign Ministry organizational structure (p 143):

"The Research Coordination Centre has been set up at the USSR Foreign Ministry recently. It is headed by V. V. Shustov, a member of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry. It is our job to help the Ministry's sections and departments utilise what science has to offer, and to keep our diplomats who work in specific areas from closing themselves off in their own little practical worlds. Our goal is to establish regular feedback, from us to the scholars. We are in favour of vigorous cooperation between the academic community and Foreign Ministry staff members. This is important both for the scholars, because they will in effect be involved in the shaping of foreign policy, and for the diplomats.

"The Research Coordination Centre has already begun functioning. It is still small. But then this is not fortuitous, as we do not want to create unwieldy structures. The first steps have proved useful. Conferences and meetings are being held at the Foreign Ministry and at research institutes not only in Moscow but in the different republics. We place particular hopes on establishing cooperation with young scholars. I think that today's discussion will be a good impetus for further work in this sphere."

UD/331

**Soviet Peace Committee Presidium Member Recommends Open Financial Accounting**

18070203 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by SKZM [Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace] Presidium member and sector chief of USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations] Professor T. Tairov under the rubric "Viewpoint": "36 Mir Prospect"]

[Text] The antiwar movement expanded with new force and in forms not seen before at the threshold of the 1980s. New organizations appeared—teachers and religious figures, artists and physicians, women and youth—and they appeared unexpectedly and spontaneously. No one financed them. People tore themselves away from

their domestic affairs, spent their own money on travel and created funds to publish leaflets, placards and pins. Many elements of new thinking arose in the ranks of this movement, and the names of new leaders coming from among the simple and untitled people rose up on the wave of it.

And how about you in Moscow, many ask. They ask because the image of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace [SKZM] as a bureaucratic organization called upon to support directly any foreign-policy actions of the Soviet government, devoid of opportunities and not wishing to have an influence on the processes of formulating foreign policy has been reinforced in the West over the span of many years. And this has been aided both by the right-wing press and the tendency toward command management in the Soviet peace movement, seized by an itch to "unmask" those that do not share our ideological positions. Such conceptions of the SKZM have also been facilitated by the functional closedness and privacy practiced by its former leadership, as well as the imprint of the Brezhnev era, when everything was done so as to throw dust in the eyes. A regime of personal authority and caprice was essentially established in the committee. There were, of course, glimmers of hope—the march of the Scandinavian peace movements and Soviet activists from Stockholm to Minsk in 1982, the 800,000-strong anti-nuclear demonstration of Muscovites in the fall of 1983...

Today restructuring is eliciting great interest abroad in the activity of Soviet public organizations. At 36 Mir Prospect, where the SKZM is located, people come in, discard their old conceptions and try to be convinced with their own eyes of the changes transpiring in Soviet society.

Definite changes are occurring in the life of the SKZM as well. Peace marches and cruises, rock-music festivals for peace and "waves" and watches for peace have been used. Sessions of informal groups are held and fairs are organized. The regular sessions of the Perestroika Club are being transformed into a distinctive school of glasnost and democracy.

Do these changes, however, reflect the genuinely nationwide nature of the Soviet peace movement? Has the regime of personal authority been changed? Can it be said that nationwide participation in financing is reflected in the structure and forms of activity?

There are many creative workers on the committee who are striving to realize new ideas and initiatives. It is not felt, however, that the leadership and intelligentsia who have represented our movement abroad for many years have begun an open discussion of ways of democratizing and restructuring this public organization and the attracting new forces to its leadership, especially from among the simple people.



We became accustomed to having someone regularly speaking in our names during the years of stagnation. We seemingly delegated power to the elect-designate or designate-elect in perpetuity. Democratic procedure in elections and everyday life, openness and glasnost—those are the essence of public movements and the criteria of them. According to these criteria, in the majority of the public peace movements elections were for a national leader were accomplished, as a rule, via direct and secret voting at general conventions or conferences. In the SKZM, the election of a chairman has multiple stages. The conference selects a presidium, and the presidium selects a chairman, his deputies and the secretaries.

At the beginning of 1987, the former chairman of the committee retired—a commendable fact. The presidium was convened at once. It recommended just one candidacy in all. The open voting was a unanimous "aye." This procedure in peace movements, when it is not a nationwide assembly but rather the leaders that elect the main leader, has become a relic in Europe. Even more of a relic is a situation where the term of authority of the leader is not limited. Such analogues exist only in religious organizations. In public organizations this rule inevitably leads to stagnation and corporativeness that can acquire a cyclical nature. Over two thirds of the members of the presidium are representatives of public society, figures famous across the country and living in Moscow. A balance of geographical and national representation has not been observed. A definite elitism has taken shape in the presidium, where one frequently lands only thanks to one's position (as happened with me). The path there is still practically closed to simple people.

The last All-Union Conference of Peace Advocates took place in January of 1985, and the spirit of the pre-April times has thus still not been outgrown. The session of the presidium at the beginning of March of this year decided to return to questions of the new structure of the committee. Time is passing, but there are still no discussions in this regard.

The Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference state that "The adoption of decrees by party committees containing direct instructions for state and business organs and public organizations should be eliminated." This thought has an enormous relation to the activity of the SKZM.

The time has come for devising a new position on the election of leading organs in the Soviet peace movement that would reflect its new look and the new forces spontaneously included in it, including a series of informal associations and ecological groups. We have to hold elections of new leaders and activists in local and republic antiwar organizations the democratic way and in the spirit of glasnost. The leaders at all levels—including the chairman—should be elected on a competitive basis from among a number of candidates after debates with a limited time frame and unfailingly at general conferences. The participants in the Soviet peace movement

have a high enough level of civic awareness to elect for themselves worthy chairmen without directives from the outside. That is the essence of popular diplomacy.

Democratization in the Soviet peace movement is impossible without full financial openness. This principle is typical of almost all antiwar movements around the world. Needed therein are absolutely regular reports accurate to the last kopeck and cent on where the rubles and dollars come from and how they are spent. In short, restructuring and glasnost are awaiting their turn in the peace movement as well as the most conscious and morally lofty phenomenon of our times.

12821

**Ukrainian Paper Interviews Aleksandr Bovin on Foreign, Nationalities Policies**

18110062 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
23 Jun 88 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Bovin, political analyst for the newspaper IZVESTIYA, by Vitaliy Portnykov, special correspondent for MOLOD UKRAYINY; Moscow; date not specified. Article heading: "Third Attempt" under the rubric "Autograph for the Reader"]

[Text] ...On our streets, we normally have no problem recognizing famous actors, soccer players who have won the latest series of cup matches, or TV celebrities from the program "Rankovoyi Poshty"; and we might even be able to spot a well-known writer... Amazing! But I wonder how many people could say they know the name of an international journalist, who, for all practical purposes, has not escaped the attention of public television either? No matter what you say, we tend to regard the people in this profession as individuals who live in their own private world, who are accustomed to having interviews with foreign presidents, and who write about the evils of poverty from some luxurious hotel room... The "image" that was being projected onto the field of international journalism for the past 10 years greatly affected us, especially the time when the television camera operator suddenly aimed his camera at something white and the commentator said that it was "black"; and we believed it... Or when we turned our radios on, we would listen to them say that white is white; however, red was interpreted as black.

For some reason, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin never fit this "image"; well, that's because he would never substitute colors: white is white, black is black; nor did the phrase "let's talk about this another time" ever fit his image.

After our conversation, I realized this was no mere "image," but a genuine attitude toward life, which makes things more meaningful and more convincing to our readers and T.V. viewers. Indeed, we weren't the only ones surprised; people in the Western world where Bovin is considered the "grey cardinal" of Soviet international

journalism, were just as much affected. However, as some of the darkness surrounding our lives begins to fade opening up the most inaccessible territories, (to use a mountaineering term) Sovietologists are awaiting the moment of disillusionment: it is possible though that honesty could reveal itself to be genuine honesty, and nothing else.

[Question] I'd like to begin our conversation with a question regarding the present status of international journalism.

It's been said there are way too many stereotypes, which makes it difficult for the reader to know what's actually going on.

[Answer] Unfortunately, there is a lot of that right now. The thing that's happening today, first of all, is tied in with the way we present our material: discussions are opening up; our opponents are getting a chance to speak; and telebridges are being organized. But as to content, progress has still been minimal. There were lots of "blank spots" that I have frequently spoken of and written about, for instance, socialist countries and Third World countries on good terms with us such as Libya, Syria, Angola, Mozambique, and others are in this zone of silence. What are some of the complexities of life facing the people in these countries? How do they handle difficult situations? And how are they developing? Today, we can only hint at the answers to these questions. In the future our readers will be amazed.

We must learn to differentiate and refine our forms of analysis when it comes to making judgments about certain events, even in those branches that it would appear we had long since mastered. Let's take U.S. foreign policy. If we exclude the progress in Soviet-American relations, then U.S. policy is the same as before—fair game for everyone. But it is always necessary to fight? For instance, American ships fired on Iranian platforms in the Persian Gulf, and we immediately started reproaching the U.S. But why? Iran goes ahead and lays mines in international waters—this is downright banditism. An American ship was ripped apart by these mines. What if, let's say, one of our ships is ripped open by an Iranian mine? Then what are we going to do—thank Iran?

On the whole, and this is pleasant to note, we're getting a little smarter. Today, we're smarter than we were yesterday, and tomorrow we'll be even smarter.

[Question] To what extent does the term "analytical" apply to international journalism?

[Answer] All in all, I think it's more outline than analysis. My goal is to work in the analytical manner because I don't know how to write outlines. Perhaps my articles are a bit dry; they contain very little of my own personal impressions. The thing that I find important is to make an analysis, reveal cause and effect, and point out

tendencies. In my opinion, this is the dominant feature in the field of international journalism. Naturally, it's advantageous to travel and observe how people live in other countries; this enriches your experience. For example, I've traveled to Japan and America a number of times. Although you'll not find any of my own personal "impressions" in these articles, I trust you'll not find any nonsense either, which I could have written if I had never been in these countries.

[Question] In your opinion, what are some of the obstacles surrounding the field of international journalism?

[Answer] The things that have dulled people's minds are intellectual stagnation, dogmatism, and toadying. A person who thinks for himself and comes to his own conclusions has become quite a rarity. Instead, intellectual atrophy and mediocrity have become entrenched. It's quite difficult to overcome this inertia. And although there are a few journalists who have succeeded in doing this such as S. Kondrashov, V. Tsvyvetov, and V. Ovchynnyukov.

[Question] Do you have a favorite country or a special concern?

[Answer] Probably not. Global problems in the area of world politics, international relations—these are the things that interest me as a journalist and a scholar.

[Question] How would you describe the transition from journalist to scholar?

[Answer] For me, it's one and the same. I write an article the way I'd write a dissertation. The analysis is the same but on a smaller scale. I try all the time to do it this way.

[Question] Have you ever had to face any critical situations in your work?

[Answer] It's happened, sure. But I have strong nerves. This was one particular instance when I criticized the revolution in Iran. Khomeini protested and our ambassador relayed the protests to Moscow. The situation got tense, although it didn't come to a head. Here's another case. The military people were offended with what I wrote about the policy of nuclear war. I said it wasn't very smart to continue the policy, because there can be no winners. They even criticized me in the journal *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHONNYKH SIL*. I was asked to go to the Chief Political Administration... And now *L'HUMANITE* has tried to stop me, especially after the article I wrote expounding my reasons for the communist defeat at the presidential elections. And once again, a number of our comrades started getting nasty.

[Question] I saw the "headlines" of western newspapers; they all reported this conflict.

[Answer] Here's the problem: everyone seems to think that the things I write about, or any other Soviet international journalist writes about, reflects the Kremlin's line. We've gotten used to this and have schooled others to this line of thinking. The diplomats tell us: why speak ill of Khomeini, Mitterand, or Kim Ir Sen. Hence the restrictions. We say: Let's deal with analysis of Soviet government announcements, TASS announcements, newspaper editorials, or articles written by journalists and analysts. Theoretically, everyone agrees with this, but, for all practical purposes, nothing has been done yet.

[Question] If we could turn for a moment to your writings on the French communists, this is rather rare material with regard to the world communist movement; we hardly know anything about this movement.

[Answer] What can we do? Journalists are denied the opportunity to make any kind of objective evaluations regarding the situation on this front.

Today, the world communist movement is undergoing a crisis. Most all of the communist parties, except for rare instances, are no longer an influential national force. The masses aren't with them; they don't have broad social support anymore. Why this is happening must be explained. Interpretive writings have begun to appear in scientific journals, but this includes only a limited circle of readers. The rest of the people listen to "Voice of America"...

[Question] Today, many of our international journalists are starting to turn to internal political themes...

[Answer] For me, it's a thousand times more interesting to know what's going on in our country than what's happening in America. I have a strong desire to write about the complexities and contradictions in our own daily lives. On occasion, I do this. I simply couldn't exist without this—my life, my destiny are here, not in America.

[Question] I couldn't help but notice Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov's portrait.

[Answer] I have a lot of respect for this man. He was the first and best teacher I had in terms of political questions: a complex individual, with a contradictory nature, with positive and negative aspects, all of which reached back deep into his roots.

According to the talks we had, Andropov thought about definitive changes and was inclined toward them. Of course, compared with Gorbachev, Yuriy Andropov was from the older generation. It would have been hard for him to free himself from his background and probably his course would have been less radical, and more careful. Let me say again that in principle Andropov could see where we were headed and he understood the need to make some serious changes.

[Question] Today, talks surrounding the problems related to Afghanistan have intensified.

[Answer] Our political and moral obligation is to tell our nation the truth about Afghanistan. The Soviet people have never approved of the war, and the political leadership in our nation has taken the only possible step.

Our troops and our officers honestly fulfilled their military duties and fought the way you would have expected them to fight. But that's a whole other matter.

[Question] Do you think the young men who made it back from Afghanistan are likely to reject current policies?

[Answer] The psychological issue is a rather complex. To adapt oneself to a life of peace, when just a short time ago you were looking death in the face and when all of a sudden you are coming up against what's going on here at home is not a simple process. So our social obligation is to help these young men feel rejected, isolated, and misunderstood...

[Question] Today, many people are talking about Stalin's domestic policy, but hardly anyone knows much about his foreign policy during those years. I mean the roots of our mistakes and miscalculations of that not long ago period still lie buried...

[Answer] In my opinion, foreign policy was afflicted by Stalinism to a lesser extent. Our country was under siege and survival was the game. We fought for peace, for peaceful coexistence.

For example, at times there were intimations that we started a war with Finland in vain, and that we fought pretty badly. I'm sure Hitler took this into account...

[Question] What about the tendency toward half-truths? Let's talk about the non-aggression pact—we keep silent about the amoral friendship with Nazi Germany...

[Answer] The issue here is not the silence. The Treaty of Friendship signed 28 September 1939 was publicized at the time. The question is something else: Let the historians give us the answer...

With regard to the non-aggression pact (23 August 1939), Britain and France in refusing to help us set up a blockade against Hitler actually "pushed" us into signing this treaty. The mistake, as I see it, was not here. We made a mistake when we suddenly started talking about a friendship with Germany, when we compelled the Comintern to scale down the war against fascism, when we began looking at Germany as the "victim"; and England and France—as the "aggressors." We disoriented our society and the world communist movement...



[Question] Let's turn now to current problems. Maybe I'm wrong, but I've observed that younger people seem somewhat skeptical about the changes taking place; they believe less in success than the older generation.

[Answer] The younger generation feels strongly about extensive discussions; it wants every thing decided immediately.

I'm not a perfect optimist either. I've lived through two events when hope was crushed after the 20th CPSU Congress, and after 1965 when economic reform turned to naught. As far as I'm concerned, what's happening today is the 3rd and final attempt. During the war, there was an order No 227—"Never turn back." Those who did were shot. As I see it, this order has been issued today. We can't turn back; it's impossible. Otherwise, we'll become nothing more than a 3rd class provincial nation; and socialism will be transformed from a science to utopia. And this is why restructuring for me, is a matter of life and death. To the younger generation life is in the future. That's why they fail to see the internal drama of everything going on right now the way I and my generation do. This is why sometimes I've been disappointed with the manner of electing delegates for party conferences. In many places bureaucrats have prevailed over democracy. People have high expectations of the conference. If it follows the same old beaten path as before, the disappointment will be immense.

[Question] I would like to ask you what is your position regarding national problems inside the USSR?

[Answer] The national question is a very delicate and complex issue... As you know, the basis of our national policy hinges on two things; the development nations and their rapprochement. With regard to national development, we can't just sit being embarrassed. The situation with rapprochement, is even more difficult. For various reasons, synchronism was disrupted. Development is tied in with national self-consciousness. This is a natural, inevitable process. Again, without national development, rapprochement will become a fiction. As soon as you include accents and borders, development then begins to "operate" counter to rapprochement.

When I say I'm proud that I'm Russian (or Ukrainian, German, Jewish, etc.)—this is normal. But if I say I'm proud that I'm Russian because the "Russian soul" (or Ukrainian, German, Jewish, etc.) is better than a Chinese, Armenian, or Estonian, this is when national self-consciousness degenerates into nationalism.

Very often nationalism rises up as a reaction against the infringement of national pride, national sentiments. Furthermore, this infringement may be something that is not even perceived. I cite Lenin here. He wrote that you have to make a distinction between the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small nation. Lenin

believed that the actual inequality existing between them should be compensated 10 times more in favor of the interests of the smaller nation.

Let me give you a simple example. A Pole, a Vietnamese, a Bulgarian, a Mongol, a Frenchman and a Czech were on a space flight... but there was no Uzbek, Georgian, Latvian, Armenian or Lithuanian on the flight. Couldn't we have represented all of our republics in this groups of astronauts. Every launch would have positively been a celebration for them. But it didn't happen that way—and it wasn't because someone was against it. It simply didn't come to mind.

The second example is a little more complicated. For a number of years, many Russians have lived in the national republics working as managers but have not bothered to learn any of the national languages. This doesn't make a bit of sense—and it offends people.

I consider myself very fortunate to live in a multi-national state. From childhood, I have absorbed fundamentals and characteristics of various cultures. Becoming acquainted with different cultures gives you more of a stereoscopic view of the world and enriches the soul.

But one must know how and must learn how to live in a multi-national country. There's a lot here for all of us to think about. We definitely need glasnost—and open discussions on international problems.

Maybe the schools need to teach a course on the psychology of national integration. I firmly believe that we need to have a department within the CPSU Central Committee devoted strictly to national policies.

[Question] We have selected certain Policy with regard to the fight against bourgeois nationalism, Zionism and so on. Does this policy have the proper form, or to put it another way, is it leading us in the right direction?

[Answer] It seems to me that the term "bourgeois nationalism" has become obsolete if we are to apply it to the present conditions in our country. I know that the invocation "capitalistic holdover" has a calming affect and it makes it convenient for propagandistic explanations. It would make much more sense to look for the roots of nationalism in our own imperfections.

Now then, let's talk about Zionism. As an ideology it encompasses two fundamental elements: first, the demand for a Jewish national state; and secondly, confirmation of the belief that Jews are "God's chosen" people. The fact that Israel was proclaimed a state by a UN resolution is evidence that the world community acknowledges the right to Jews to have their own nation. With reference to the profession that Jews are God's chosen people, well, this is a racist view and not accepted in a civilized society.

Unfortunately, for us—you'll recall the well-known publications in Kiev, Minsk, and Leningrad—the fight with Zionism often served to cover up anti-Semitic sentiment. Today, in light of the restructuring program, it seems that we're starting to reconcile the fight against Zionism with the fight against anti-Semitism.

[Question] And now a few "personal" questions. What is a typical day like?

[Answer] I get up about 6:00 a.m. and get to work at 9:00. I sit down to read TASS materials and other informative papers. After that, I think and to write.

[Question] As an international commentator, do you have to have some type of inspiration to do your job?

[Answer] Most of all, you just have to work, to write. Maybe the inspiration will come and maybe it won't. Regardless, you still have to work.

[Question] And your outside interests...

[Answer] My hobby is my work. I don't know of anything more interesting. On top of everyday matters, I try to work in the more weighty genres. I'm just about to publish a book on peaceful coexistence. I'm presently working on a book with the tentative title of "World Politics and International Relations."

I read a lot of literature on the politics of organizations, sociology, and philosophy. I do it mostly to help me in my job, but also for personal enjoyment.

[Question] If you could speculate for a moment, what does the future hold for the field of international journalism?

[Answer] It will be a more youthful field, more diversified, much more interesting, more refined. It will be without all those "blank spots" and without the restrictions which endure after critical analysis. Also, I hope that external stimulus, as it were, will help us here. When the "Soyuzdruku" newsstands freely began selling Western newspapers, when our T.V. networks start airing "their" programs, then there won't be anyplace to hide—it's better to work...

Several days after the interview, I saw Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin at the press center for the Soviet-American summit. Serious, and dressed in a somewhat old-fashioned manner, he was easily distinguishable from our "international stars," that is, from the elegant Sturu, the impetuous Pozner, and the indulgent Kondrashov... It seemed as though he was bored with the bustling activity of reporting. Well, style dictates the character; but maybe this time the character dictates the style.

13006/12232

### **Need to Up-grade Translator Status, Equipment**

18070197 Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 28,  
11-17 Jul 88 p 6

[Article by TASS correspondents T. Suvorova and Ye. Berlin: "What Does the Translator Cost Us and What Does His So Modest Place in Our Lives Mean?"]

[Text] "Find a translator quickly. I give a week for everything, no more!" ordered the director. Within a few hours, representatives of the Kalinin Nuclear Electric Power Station headed by him set out on the search, which led them to the All-Union Center for Translations of Scientific-Technical Literature and Documentation (VTsP) of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Without going into details, the "messengers" stated the situation: a group of chief engineers from the GDR is installing equipment at the station. Delay in its installation is fraught with losses in the millions. But the "Atomenergohkспорт" association that entered into the contract does not have its own translators. "We request that you send a specialist who knows German."

"Send?" they asked at the VTsP, "no, that is not our practice." The words of the guests to the effect that the station is prepared to pay any amount of money for the translation did not produce the proper effect....

"In the first place, the center does only written translations," explains V. Ivanov, deputy director of the VTsP for scientific work. "And in the second place, although it would seem that we have enough personnel—about 5,000—they are all nonstaff workers and do translations under contract with us in their free time away from their basic work. This is why it is impossible to send anyone."

"But why did the people in Kalinin turn to the VTsP?" they asked with surprise in the directorate for translations of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry. "It is our job to provide interpreters for the work of the chief engineers. There is a special decree of the Council of Ministers on this."

"Meaning that if they turned to the right place they would be provided with an interpreter."

"No one can give a hundred-percent guarantee. For us in the chamber as well, just as at the VTsP, most of the translators have jobs somewhere. And although we have been granted the right to send them on a mission and pay them, no one is releasing them from their basic work! So they either have to take unpaid leave or utilize their regular leave."



The all-powerful instruction! You cannot argue with it: one cannot work just as a translator but only during free time away from his basic work. Although the reasonable question arises: To whose advantage is it to transform an independent occupation into a kind of hobby? But such is the system.

Well, it is not difficult to imagine a translator bent over a typewriter late in the evening, after the children have been put to bed and it is possible to work a little, giving up a few hours sleep. But what if it is a matter of an oral translation, as in the case of the nuclear power station? What then?

Where can one find the needed specialist? You learn, for example, that the neighboring research institute has such a person: he is sitting there without much to do. You ask him and he agrees but his superiors will not release him from his work. Not out of malice but because there simply are no legal bases for this.

A refusal here and there.... After wearing yourself out, you take the one who can go but he does not know the language so well, to put it mildly.

But the need for people with a good command of foreign languages is becoming more acute every day: this is the "linguistic coverage" of the expanding foreign economy relations and international contacts in different areas as well as the increasing scope of translations from foreign languages.

The world is experiencing an information boom: billions of bits are transmitted daily in radio and television channels and with the help of the press. And what is the share of translators in this entire sea? According to a study carried out by a group of foreign authors in 1983, the cost of written translations alone amounts to \$3 billion annually in Western Europe. More than 70 percent of this volume is scientific-technical, commercial and other literature. Artistic works occupy a rather modest position—0.3 percent (we are not talking about the number of copies printed, of course, which is enormous for fiction). One more figure: 10 percent of the books in the world and one-third in the USSR are translations.

The most modest estimates indicate that about 75,000 people in the country deal with translations professionally. But how? Most of them are employed in other jobs and therefore they are doing their favorite work almost illegally!

It is not surprising that it is difficult for a graduate of the Linguistics Institute, the new holder of the qualification "consultant-translator," to find work in his specialty, particularly if he is not from Moscow. Those who did not find work in central publishing houses or foreign policy

and foreign trade agencies either teach (that is, they do not do what they were trained for) or they are forced to work in a specialty that has nothing to do with the language and translation.

This situation, we were told by S. Goncharenko, vice rector of the Moscow State Institute for Foreign Languages imeni M. Toretz, is typical for many oblast centers of the RSFSR and even for some capitals of union republics.

On the one hand, there is a great need for translators. On the other hand, there is no public recognition of the status of this occupation, which leads to the treatment of its representatives as service personnel. At times, out-and-out bunglers are ousting real language experts. But this is a unique kind of intellectual activity with its own internal laws and trade secrets. Professional translators can learn from each other. What prevents them from uniting in a kind of creative union?

Such organizations exist in many countries. There are also international organizations—the International Federation of Translators (FIT) and the Association of Synchronists (AIK). We are represented in the first of them only by a council on artistic translation of the USSR Union of Writers. We are not part of the second at all, because there is no corresponding structure at the national level. And this means that we are losing additional opportunities to raise the professional level of our specialists and to obtain foreign exchange through the work of our translators in different international forums.

The Union could take on the defense of the professional interests and author's rights of its members, guarantee the conditions for the continuous improvement of linguistic training, elaborate the cost accounting bases of translating work, monitor the proper quality, develop cooperation with foreign colleagues, appropriate new technology, etc. All of the problems cannot be enumerated.

They are still unresolved today. Payment, for example. Let us present just two comparisons. An interpreter with Goskominturist accompanying a delegation receives 7 or 8 rubles a day. In the United States, as they told us in the department for market conditions and demand of the All-Union "Sovintsentr" association, the standard is \$20 an hour (USSR Goskominturist and other organizations of ours receive about that same amount from their clients but the translators get only crumbs from this money).

Here they pay a little more than 10 rubles for a Shakespearean sonnet. A page of a technical text translated into Russian from a European language is valued at 8 to 10 rubles. In Western countries, the average is \$30 to \$40. Clearly there is no need to prove that our system and norms for the remuneration of translators stimulates neither quality nor an influx of masters into this area.

Such a question as the differentiation of the payment for translating work in accordance with the complexity of the text has not yet been fully resolved. An article from a social and political journal is one thing but another thing is a monography, let us say, about plasma physics, the translation of which requires extraordinary efforts. But there is unwarranted leveling in their payment.

"Not wage leveling but robbery," specify some translators. The VTsP, being a mediator between the customer ordering the translation and the person executing it, receives a solid "commission" from the latter (in a year it collects more than 2 million rubles). For one printed sheet translated from a Western language, the customer pays the VTsP 80 rubles, of which the translator usually gets 50 rubles. But what if the translation is from some Eastern language? Then the "commission" is noticeably higher: of the 150 rubles received from the customer per author's sheet, the translator gets only 70.

"Why," we ask, "does the VTsP get 30 rubles for its mediating services in the first case and almost three times that much in the second?"

"Consideration is given to the significantly more complex work of our editor."

"But wait a minute: Why is the remuneration of the translator's labor not stimulated in the same proportion?"

"We will review the rates as we switch over to cost accounting."

This answer is not very encouraging. What can one expect from a departmental organization primarily concerned about its own interests?

Still another unresolved problem is that of the intensification of the translator's labor. It is no secret that more than half of his time is spent hunting for the necessary words in the dictionary. But here, as in no other occupation, efficiency is needed. For what good is a translation made a week after negotiations?

Translators in most countries have long since given up their typewriter and are making use of personal computers, word processors, automated dictionaries and modems.

We are taking only the first timid steps. The VTsP, for example, has just entered into an agreement with a production association for disk storage devices in the city of Stara Zagora (Bulgaria) on the joint development of an automated workplace for the translator. The series production of such devices is still so far off....

It is simpler to resolve the question with cooperative equipment.

"We serve foreign firms," explained V. Grabovskiy, member of the "Inlingva" cooperative that was recently established in Moscow. "We are performing the work jointly through the method of the brigade contract. Quality? Businessmen do not pay money for nothing. In just the first few weeks of the work, more than 10,000 foreign-exchange rubles were transferred to our share of the foreign-exchange account of Mossovietin the USSR Foreign Economic Bank. We can obtain 70 percent in ordinary rubles and 30 percent remain at our disposal. We intend to spend this foreign-exchange portion of the receipts to acquire imported office equipment.

And how about the tens of thousands of other translators? In the coming years, they will not have occasion to exchange the keys of a typewriter for a monitor keyboard.

Problems, problems, problems.... What does the lack of a unified translation policy in the country mean?

It means isolation of translating personnel scattered throughout the cities and villages and sitting in the wrong places (engineers, editors, consultants, etc.), deprived of the possibility of meeting each other and resolving their creative and professional problems. It means an unwarranted leveling of wages and, on the other hand, a total lack of coordination in the remuneration of translating work.

There is no center that would offer the most varied translating services with any given degree of expeditiousness and guaranteed quality.

There is no unified system of certification of translating personnel and no professional "ratings" have been formulated to reflect the qualifications and specialization of the translator. There is no barrier to the influx of dilettantes into this field.

The conclusion is obvious: it is time to reorganize translating work in the country. This is a problem of national importance....

The VTsP recently received another letter, this time from the city of Volzhskiy in Volgograd Oblast: "The collective of the pipe plant asks you to send eight interpreters to provide for contacts with representatives of the Italian firm 'Italoimpianti.' And again the request is misaddressed, either because of insufficient advertising or for other reasons. 'That is our client,' they assert in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 'We will try to meet their request,' the VTsP persists. So, unable to find a common language, they 'divide' the customers. What is needed is an interpreter of the interdepartmental language.

**International Problems Require European Input**  
*180°0207 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Aug 88 p 6*

[Article by Vadim Nekrasov under the heading "Views, Opinions, Assessments": "Europe: Different and United"]

[Text] Today, when the world is searching for answers to burning, difficult questions directly linked to ensuring the survival of mankind, successful resolution of the main international problems is impossible without Europe and its abundant historical experience and without the European intellectual and socio-economical potential.

This obvious fact is one of the basic principles in the modern structure of international relations. It rightly is at the center of attention of the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states united in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Parallel with expanding Soviet-American dialogue, comprehensive proposals are being made on our part to establish an atmosphere of good-neighbor relations, trust and cooperation in Europe. At a recent meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states, an entire program of measures to reduce the level of military confrontation in Europe was advanced which combines in a natural way plans for a radical reduction in USSR and U.S. nuclear potentials.

The uniqueness of the European peoples' historical experience, helping them both to plan their own future and contribute to the constructive processes throughout the world, undoubtedly is the result of the fact that long ago complex centers of inter-state relations ended up intertwined here on a relatively small area. Today, Europe, with a population of about 700 million, remains a complex of countries contradictory in political, military, economic and ideological respects. But can we, because of all the differences in the social systems, national characteristics and way of life, overlook what they have in common, resulting from the very fact of the long time European peoples have been neighbors? Their historical destinies have been closely linked for decades; the mutual influence of their cultures has never been broken; and intra-European cooperation has always existed in the most diverse areas.

Since the great geographical discoveries of the 15th-17th centuries Europe has been the most dynamic continent, leading material progress of civilization. The Renaissance, which occurred approximately during that same period, set the basis for the far-reaching humanism of the all-European culture. Researchers emphasize that art, science and world outlook in Europe were never limited by state boundaries. The same is true for conflicts in spiritual life—differences in schools of philosophy, religious views, social trends—they acquired inter-national parameters; diversity was accompanied by co-operation, not isolation.

But we must also mention another, dark side of European history. The endless wars, crusades, colonialism imperialism and, finally, fascist barbarism have blemished it. What happened happened. Understandably, it was not at all by chance that Europe—the citadel of capitalism in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century—ended up being the main theater of two world battles resulting in the upheaval and devastation of almost all European countries.

After Nazi Germany unleashed World War II, particularly brutal and devastating, it seemed to some that the peoples of the European continent would lose their very important role in world affairs. While on the other side of the Atlantic the offensive of the mercantile and egocentric "age of America" was being declared, West European "prophets of pessimism," like the especially popular during those years philosopher K. Jaspers, were convinced that all that was left for Europe to be concerned about maintaining the museum "holy places" of the civilization it created.

Of course, Europe's division into military-political blocs, which was accomplished by the leaders of the West at that time who were alarmed by the socialist choice of East European peoples, could not help but weaken its world influence. The fate of a "theater of military operations" of a new world conflict was prepared for the continent. European soil became the main area of concentration of the most powerful and modern military hardware, suicidal for all mankind.

Life, however, has shown the fallacy of the pessimistic views of Europe's future. In the decades that have passed since the tragic 1940s, the European peoples, without exception, contrary to a heritage of cultivated unfriendliness and the established cordons, have managed to discover the presence of many unrealized resources of mutual understanding, including those stemming from their historical commonality. Sensible political forces both in Eastern and Western Europe have turned precisely to this factor in order to oppose intensifying the split and, above all, increasing the threat of a military catastrophe. Thus, in particular, a slogan emerged on the commonality of Europe, "from the Atlantic to the Urals," advanced by the French leader de Gaulle.

The rapid rise in popularity of this slogan in the 1960s became a graphic indication that the "cold war" unleashed by reactionary imperialist circles could not suppress the awareness of European historical and cultural unity. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Final Act signed by its participants in 1975 became a tremendous achievement. A new situation in approaches to the task of ensuring peace on the continent has developed today.

But before talking in detail about this situation, we should perhaps ask: What is "Europe" as a concept from the point of view of our Western partners?



Corresponding literature published in various countries throughout the 20th century gives a clear idea about the changes in its content. In publications pertaining to the times before the Great October Socialist Revolution, say, when talking about Europe, their authors usually included Russia in it. During the period between the two world wars, it became a sign of "good form" in the West to exclude the Soviet Union from the European states. Finally, after 1945 other states of the eastern part of the continent were also subjected to the same ostracism, and the border of Europe began to be drawn almost along the Elbe. If you believe the politicians, scholars and journalists in the West, West German columnist P. Bender states, then what they call Europe is only the western part, the rest is "both Europe and sort of not 'Europe'; it is the 'East', that is, something different."

"The confused language arose from confused thinking," the author concludes. But is that the case? Is it not more accurate to perceive such terminology exercises as quite definite political sympathies and antipathies? It does not bother those who hold them that by their calculations they are actually "decreasing" the continent to one-fifth its true size and to one-half its real population, or that they are thus instilling in Western Europe not simply regionalism but even a certain provincialism of thinking. Is not this "politicalization" of geography costing the European peoples dearly?

We must not ignore another aspect of this "politicalization," namely, the attempts to justify counterposing Europe to the two great powers of today—the Soviet Union and the United States. This counterposing is quite one-sided. The aim of remarks about the need for Europe to "dissociate itself" from the "two superpowers" is to lay an "ideological" base for keeping the USSR, but by no means the United States, from participating in all-European affairs.

Numerous other attempts are being made to separate the Soviet Union and also socialism from Europe. But in the final analysis, none of them work out. "Europe is divided politically, but it is not divided spiritually and is indivisible," FRG President R. von Weizsacker admitted during a visit to Moscow a year ago. "We are linked by a common history, unity in the diversity of national cultures, and the indivisibility of our destinies and our future in a compact region." This and other similar statements he made are an admission of the fallacy of the hopes being nurtured in the West to preserve the "iron curtain" between European states with different social systems. But then, how are we to understand "divided politically?" In the sense of the social system of certain states—it is unquestionable. But what about in the sense of intellectual life?

"Socialism is an integral part of European political experience," writes G. Schopflin, professor at the London School of Economics, emphasizing that the socialist vision of the world long ago became a part of European tradition. In fact, if we talk about Marxism, say, was he

really dropped off on our continent from somewhere on the outside? As we know, his sources were in the classical political economy developed in England, the teachings of French social thinkers of the past, and in classical German philosophy. Thus, Marxism is not at all some kind of sectarian doctrine which emerged apart from the high road of development of civilization, as some in the West would like to portray it.

But here is what is important. The recognition of an immutable principle remains an essential condition of good-neighbor cooperation within the framework of the continent: Deciding questions about the essence and form of choosing the social path is the sovereign right of every people which must be realized without any interference from the outside. "It is our belief," noted M.S. Gorbachev, "that fairness, tolerance, openness and honesty are what is needed in international politics at today's historical stage. Dialogue, not mutual accusations, striving to understand the interests and arguments of the other side, not ascribing malicious intentions to it—that is how we understand civilized relations between states." All this applies completely to Europe.

Today, realism is making its way more confidently in international relations. There is no doubt that the high level of general education and political culture of the European peoples is promoting a rapid and better awareness of the new realities of today in the countries of the continent, regardless of their social system and location, particularly of the need to cooperate in countering nuclear and ecological threats and in preserving the cultural and spiritual values accumulated over centuries.

Perestroika in the USSR and the processes of renovation in other socialist countries are opening up fundamentally new opportunities to develop this cooperation. The new political thinking being proposed by the Soviet Union in international affairs is intensifying and directing the quest for a world toward precisely designated goals, a world in which every nation would maintain its philosophical, political and ideological views, its way of life.

An intensive quest for a political or, if you pose the question more broadly, a humanitarian and philosophical concept determining the possibility of establishing truly reliable security on the continent is characteristic of European consciousness today. Traditional views which come down to the need to strengthen national military might and conclude military alliances are opposed by the views of those circles which are gaining influence. They are becoming convinced that old ideas and prescriptions are no longer suitable for solving the problems of the modern era. They are coming to the conclusion not only that it is impossible to achieve any foreign policy goals in modern Europe by using weapons or the threat of force, but also that a system of ensuring peace which relies on a "deterrence strategy" or a "balance of fear" is fundamentally unstable. Hence, the idea of a joint guarantee of

security based on an understanding of the commonality of the fate of European and other peoples and their common goal of survival has broader and more decisive support.

The Soviet Union was guided precisely by these ideas in advancing the concept of an "all-European house" in the context of new political thinking. Concerning its humanitarian basis, speaking in Prague in April 1987, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee said: "The concept of an 'all-European house' means primarily recognizing specific integrity, although the issue here is states which belong to different social systems and opposing military-political blocs."

In essence, the question is posed in such a way that the countries of the continent represent a certain commonality, furthermore, not only geographic but also political, economic and cultural. It should also be used for the good of the European peoples according to their present needs and capabilities, taking into account the modern achievements of science, technology and culture based on the humanistic and moral potential accumulated during the postwar period both in the East and in the West of the continent. Establishing the commonality means that construction of this house is a joint affair of all European states and the broadest range of political trends and that only the ideas of equality, good-neighbor relations and cooperation can be the supporting structure.

It is clear from the Soviet Union's statement of the question that it is a question not of some starry-eyed wishes or speculative plans but the practical opportunities to make progress toward European security—the immediate task in ensuring peoples' survival. This task can be carried out, of course, only a course is taken toward continuity of the disarmament process—nuclear, chemical and conventional. The socialist countries' submission of a platform for talks on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, the proposal to hold a meeting of all European states to discuss the question of how to ensure moving from words to deeds at such talks, the plan to create a risk reduction center as a site of cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact—these are only some of our initiatives on this path.

At the basis of the political approach of the countries of socialism to the matter of arms reduction and disarmament is a clear and distinct idea: confrontational thinking and fierce counterposing of interests leads to universal catastrophe. Disseminating this idea throughout the continent and instilling it in the conscience of the peoples, in addition to expanding economic and scientific-technical cooperation and cultural ties here, are the basic prerequisites for all-European categories to arrive at thinking, that is, a final break with the narrow egotistical, militarized views and positions which predominate in certain Western circles.

In the past, each step on the path of all-European progress came with tremendous difficulty and took quite a bit of time. Today, when real disarmament has already begun, but has still not become irreversible, it is necessary to have a maximum intensification of overall efforts and good will in order to reserve the continuity of this process and deal with the further strengthening of security. Assessing the present situation in Europe fairly, the socialist countries are ready without delay to search for and find mutually acceptable solutions to all problems of vital importance.

### Motivations, Aims of New Social Movements

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[Article by Larisa Lvovna Lisutkina, candidate of philosophical sciences, research fellow of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute (IMRD), and Sergey Viktorovich Patrushev, candidate of historical sciences, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD: "Mass Democratic Movements: Current Character and Development Trends"]

[Text] It has become apparent in the 1980's that mass democratic movements, primarily the peace and environmental movements, have become an influential and ineradicable factor of the social and political life of countries of the nonsocialist world. Green and peace parties which have upset the traditional balance of political forces have taken shape on the basis of these movements in some cases. But mass (and nonmass, local) protests have continued together with the activity within the framework of the new parties. The sociopolitical character of this new subject of civic assertiveness has gradually shown through, original forms of its struggle (community action, for example) have taken shape and been put to the test and traditions with their roots in facts of as yet recent history (the annual peace demonstrations, for example, timed to coincide with 12 December as a sign of protest against the decision on NATO's retroarmament adopted on 12 December 1979) have been conceived. A specific political subculture has taken shape in the 1980's. While "open" in principle to all political forces, it has encompassed in the main, although not only, the left flank of the political spectrum regrouped anew and expanded thanks to the enlistment of groups which previously had been passive. A particular feature of this subculture is that it functions as an *opposition* in relation to the establishment and as an *alternative* in relation to the traditional organizations of the left, primarily the workers parties and the unions, but at the same time, however, all existing political groupings are regarded as possible partners for alliances and joint action.

A basic paradox associated with the phenomenon of the new social movements may be ascertained even now: the obvious disproportion between their unprecedented scope and the practical result in the achievement of



political ends. The peace and environmental movements of the 1980's have proven to be the most populous since the war, but neither the peace supporters nor the environmentalists have succeeded directly in accomplishing the tasks which they have set. Community action operating on a local scale and oriented toward a "small is good" outlook has been more successful in this respect.

The specific "depoliticized engagement" of the mass democratic movements, their endeavor to rely on the forces and mechanisms of the civic society and the renunciation of stable organizational structures (the greens, for example, call themselves the "antiparty party") and executive authorities are reducing appreciably their effectiveness in the arena of political struggle. The model in accordance with which they are constituting themselves into an independent political force and their organizational structuring is the antipode of the processes of the political and organizational formation of the workers movement: a cohesive party, disciplinary commitments, ideological consensus and an empowered leadership are rejected by the supporters of the new social movements. Such principles predetermine, they believe, a "development from the top" paradigm and turn the broad masses into an object of manipulation on the part of the party elite. In place of this they proclaim spontaneity, "value consensus" and "base direct democracy," and these concepts are defined not so much in the theoretical plane, what is more, as in the context of the practical tasks of the movement. For the success of "small concerns" and the accomplishment of local tasks of the movement this is no hindrance. But the enlargement of the scale of activity is highlighting the contradictions, negative tendencies and dead ends of their evolution, revealing the dangers inevitably connected with the populist nature of protest and posing a number of new problems and tasks of a theoretical and practical nature on whose accomplishment the prospects of this movement largely depend.

A key problem is that of the evaluation of the objective role of the new social movements. Its theoretical solution proposed in the latter half of the 1980's has been expressed in the description thereof as a principal driving force of contemporary social development. This approach has imparted new impetus to the debate concerning a profound and typological correlation of the mass democratic and workers movements. There has in parallel been an active search for versions of the accomplishment of a practical task—the establishment of cooperation, political interaction and allied relations between the workers and mass social movements and between parties of the working class and such new political formations as the greens, for example. However, with a few exceptions, scoring some in any way stable success in this direction has not been possible as yet.

The new social movements function politically as an independent force, interacting with the workers movement on the basis of the principle of "openness" equal to

all, but without any special strategy of alliances acknowledging a community of positions. The ineffectiveness of their own political actions is not always for the movements a telling argument in support of the need to "extend a hand" to workers' organizations in order to change the situation. The utopian principle of "transforming the consciousness" appears as the priority in respect of the political sphere. This is combined with understandable fears of losing their "political character" in close interaction with a more experienced and stronger ally.

The mass democratic protest of the 1980's in Western countries is a phenomenon of a far larger scale and far more contradictory than similar movements at the start and in the middle of our century. The reason for this is the qualitatively different state of the world, which, while remaining profoundly heterogeneous, has become immeasurably more integral. The reason is the new singularities of the relationship of objective and subjective and international and national factors of development and the specifics of the relations of the individual and society at the end of the 20th century. The reason is, finally, the changes which are occurring in bourgeois society in the era of the crisis of the "welfare state" and its party-political system and the attempts to adapt to the conditions and requirements of the S&T revolution.

In the two decades which have elapsed since the turbulent 1968 Western society has absorbed and digested much of what the young rebels of the 1960's were fighting for. Now their successors in the democratic tradition are confronted by other tasks and, what is even more material, other opponents, although at first glance it might appear that it is important, as before, to fight against the prejudices and inertia of the mass consciousness: in the 1960's the main topics of this struggle were the authoritarian upbringing in the family and society, hypocritical sexual morality and the ideological manipulation of the personality, in the 1980's, i. e. problems of war and peace, the environment and the establishment of a new world order. One further paradoxical situation may be ascertained: the addressee of the politically engaged protest of the 1960's was essentially the civic society; the addressee of the depoliticized mass movements of the 1980's are objectively national and international political authorities and institutions. The hostile attitude toward politics as a rational mechanism of the solution of social conflicts and an orientation toward base forms of protest coming from below, from the very heart of the people, are, despite all their democratic potential, reducing appreciably the effectiveness of the mass democratic movements. Much has been conditioned also by the fact that lines of the development of diverse sociopolitical and ideological currents have intersected, but by no means fully coincided in them, and for this reason not only requirements of further evolution determining the centripetal and centrifugal trends in their activity which are common but also specific for each of them have been revealed.

Although many of the new social movements pertain with good reason to the category of "movements with a single issue," toward whose solution the activity of their members is predominantly geared, a more attentive analysis shows that the intrinsic content of these movements is not exhausted by protest against individual negative aspects of contemporary bourgeois society. They contain tremendous potential for criticism of bourgeois civilization as a whole and lay claim to a broad-based search for a humanitarian alternative to the realities of modern capitalism, primarily for the purpose of ruling out war and violence as a method of settling international conflicts and overcoming the alienation of the individual within the framework of social relationships.

In terms of their ultimate goals the transformation potential of the new social movements is radical. If we look away from certain atypical doctrines and demands, it is geared to the nonviolent replacement of the social order which currently exists with a qualitatively different (albeit utopian) social intellect: without the dictatorship of any class, without representative democracy, without a machinery of state, that is, a decentralized community of free citizens providing for their requirements by voluntary labor and solving all problems by means of local self-government.

It is significant that leading sociologists in the West discern in these movements a product of the general and deep-lying crisis which has affected the very basis of social life. While recognizing this crisis, they nonetheless do not see it as a threat to Western civilization or a symptom of its collapse. The ideologues of the new social movements also consider the capitalist social system capable of radical transformation and lay claim to be able to control this process. They see the current period as transitional. However, not only they but also theorists of practically all other schools acknowledge that the world is experiencing a process of the birth of the foundations of a new form of civilization. The majority of them are speaking of a "change in the subject of history" (R. Dahrendorf)<sup>1</sup>; the development of a "second cultural revolution," in the course of which "the idea will become a decisive material force" (R. Bahro)<sup>2</sup>; of the start of a "new cycle" in the history of the West based on the formation of "post-industrial socioeconomic structures and values," whose exponents are representatives of the "new class" (D. Bell)<sup>3</sup>. Some influential neoconservative theorists, mainly American, ascribe to the West's intellectuals the presence of a "subversive design" aimed against the capitalist system and call them "hostile intellectuals" for criticism and denunciation of this system is "the main preoccupation of their life". M. Novak, R. Nisbet and P. Johnson (a work of the latter is even entitled "Enemies of Society") and others write about this.

In studying the new social movements scholars note their high intellectual potential, unconcealed discontent with the economic, political and cultural systems of bourgeois

society, interest in profound changes, concern for global problems and orientation toward "post-material values". Added to this, as a rule, is an aspiration to a break with the traditional system of party representation, a rejection of institutional forms and a desire to revive anarchist tradition, for example, the idea of base democracy and direct political participation. The ideologists of the new movements regard these and other demands not only as the program but also the method of "self-expression" of the new historical subject acting as the exponent thereof. This subject, in the opinion of the majority of experts, are the middle strata, which, thanks to their quantitative expansion, have acquired a new social quality.

These evaluations record very essential features of these movements and reliably grasp what "lies on the surface" of the new social phenomenon. But, nonetheless, they remain more theoretical prerequisites for research than the result thereof inasmuch as they fail to reveal the cause-and-effect relations between crisis processes and the changes in the social life of present-day capitalism, changes in the mass consciousness and the system of social values and the demands of mass democratic protest new in nature and forms of expression.

The new social movements are developing against the background of the end of a period of relatively stable economic upturn and under the conditions of the restructuring and modernization of the economy, when the latest technology is being introduced intensively, new centers of production activity are taking shape and whole sectors of production are being eliminated, many industrial regions are experiencing decline, the labor skills of many occupational groups are being devalued, static forms of mass unemployment are spreading, social programs are being wound down and military spending is growing. Many strata of the population are experiencing economic and social uncertainty. The hopes put in the future "technotronic civilization" cannot ease the negative trends, which are more obvious than the anticipated utopian effects: a deterioration in natural and social living conditions, the appearance of possibilities of greater control and regulation of the behavior of the masses and increased authoritarian trends.

The content and mechanisms of interaction of the basic structural components determining the mass consciousness and the social and political assertiveness of the population of the developed capitalist countries have been transformed in recent decades. Appreciable changes are occurring in the requirements, value orientations, principles, interests and motives of the activity of various social groups. The way of thinking and perception of surrounding social reality are changing and, consequently, new models of political behavior are taking shape.

And although the economic difficulties, which have increased as of the mid-1970's, have made their mark on these processes and the restructuring of the mass consciousness has embarked upon a phase of partial "stagnation" (but not recoil) and although in certain circles of

Western society the gravitation toward "stability"—economic and social—accompanied by the development of "protective" trends has increased, the scale of the changes which have occurred in the content and structure of values are such that they permit recollection of Hegel's words: "Great, striking revolutions must be preceded by a quiet, latent revolution accomplished in the very spirit of the age, a revolution invisible to the eye of everyone, least accessible to the observation of contemporaries and just as hard to express in words as it is difficult to comprehend" <sup>4</sup>

The distinguishing features of the new value system which is taking shape are an orientation toward qualitative, substantive aspects of life and a renunciation of a consumerist attitude toward the surrounding world. Of course, such value aspirations are not new. But their intensive growth "in breadth," formation into a system opposite to that which is predominant in society and their conversion into motivations determining the behavior and activity of significant masses of the population are undoubtedly a new phenomenon.

The socio-psychological aspect of the exponents of the "new consciousness" is characterized by concern for the situation which has taken shape in the world and in society, increased claims on life, dissatisfaction with their social position, a critical assessment of the activity of official institutions and denial of the need for and possibility of the intermediary function of parties in terms of representation of their interests and requirements at the political level. The growing incompatibility of the new values with the old forms of representation and decision-making is being reflected in a weakening and erosion of the party identification of the groups of the population which are aware of their increased capacity for independent political activity and are prepared to participate personally in the solution of social problems. Material also is the fact that, according to Western experts, at this stage "the main post-material factor... has become opposition to war—together with opposition to the hierarchically authoritarian model of the industrial society" <sup>5, p. 42</sup>.

The emergence of the new value orientations reflects objective changes in the social and class composition of society and, more indirectly, in aggregate social labor and in the structure of social production. As the S&T revolution has unfolded, there have been changes in capitalist countries in the relationships of its material and spiritual sectors, and a particular place has been occupied by the spheres in which the expanded reproduction of the social and spiritual prerequisites of labor is provided for. The development of these spheres of activity, which is occurring given the active and sometimes decisive participation of the state, and their subordination to wage labor-capital relations has meant development of the process of proletarianization in breadth and in depth and the enlistment therein of new strata of the population. All this has led to an augmentation of the zone of class contradictions.

The intervention of the state in social life, the intensifying centralization and bureaucratization and the high degree of "statization" of society are having dual consequences. *On the one hand* the structure of social conflicts is assuming a populist nature—the form of contradiction between "people" and "state". As a retaliatory response this is giving rise to "anti-statist" trends in the mass consciousness, of an anarchist persuasion included. "The people" in modern bourgeois society has qualitatively different characteristics than in the era which preceded the S&T revolution: it represents primarily people working for wages, in whose structure a growing role is performed by people working in nonphysical, brain work—engineering-technical personnel, the professional classes and a variety of office workers. As subjects of general (indirect) labor, they are isolated and counterposed to the participants in commodity-production activity. But at the same time under the impact of the S&T revolution the prerequisites for the removal of this counterpoise are appearing for the first time: the process of differentiation of particular types of labor is being accompanied by a strengthening of the objective relationships between them within the framework of aggregate social labor and the conversion of the new groups of wage workers into an integral part of the aggregate working class. However, in the plane of sociopolitical and socio-psychological self-identification this conversion of the new groups into a component of the working class has been marked by particular complexity and unevenness.

The intrinsic contradictoriness of aggregate social labor is manifested in the social sphere in group socio-cultural differences and in way of life, behavioral stereotypes and level of education and material support. These differences are felt as specific experience of life, as a direct given. Consequently, *on the other*, a different trend is taking shape: the confrontation of the ruling circles and the civic opposition is being supplemented by the competition and confrontation of various opposition groups advancing their own models and programs. As a result a kind of "pluralist political market"—by analogy with the commodity market—is arising. A "short-term," temporary conflict between the supporters of different development models here could be far more acute and painful than between the civic society and the central government: for example, the periodic intensification of the disagreements between the conservative-nationalist and liberal-progressist opposition arising, as a rule, at moments when it is particularly necessary to unite efforts in the struggle against the dangers threatening the development of the society itself, liberalization processes included.

An equivocal conclusion may be drawn from these contradictions: objective class polarization by no means always entails polarization in the structure of social conflicts. The "semi-conflict nature" of the social system creates, as it were, "equal tension" in all points thereof, and this leads to stabilization and disappearance of the "weak link" and "breach points". The fact that a large



volume of the conflicts is institutionalized, that is, is resolved on a legitimate basis, contributes to this. The comminution of the field of socio-cultural conflicts is supplemented by the complex influence of global, including transnational, factors actually influencing the life of the working masses of the West after production has assumed a developed international nature.

It is on this initial social basis, not only national but world also, that the current requirements of the masses are being shaped. Together with a search for new, more "human," "nonalienated" forms of labor and new relations between people these requirements presuppose the surmounting of the "crisis of the subjective and natural basis of society" <sup>6</sup> and the protection of life on earth itself. It is appropriate to recall here K. Marx's well-known proposition: "Man's alienated labor, alienating from him 1) nature and 2) he himself, his own active function, his vital activity, thereby alienates from man the *species*.... First, it alienates generic life and individual life, second, it makes the individual life taken in its abstract form the purpose of generic life, also in its abstract and alienated form" <sup>7</sup>.

The restructuring of the system of value orientations around values of a principally spiritual order occurs given the sufficiently stable satisfaction of material and economic requirements. This explains to a considerable extent why the representatives of the better-educated and better-off social groups are introduced to the "new" values more actively than the socioeconomically less fortunate categories of working people. "The gravitation toward a different way of life is to a large extent typical of the new middle strata, particularly the liberal arts and S&T professionals, and also of young working people employed in progressive sectors of production" <sup>8</sup>.

Individualist interests cultivated by the structure of capitalist society are coming into conflict in the production sphere with the objective tendency of its socialization. A reflection of this antagonism is "people's partial mutual identification" and the formation of mass community associations arising outside of material production on the basis of the adoption of a value system which is opposed to that prevailing in bourgeois society. This intensifying quest for community with other people is recorded by many sociological polls <sup>9</sup>.

The ideologists of the new social movements are disposed to sever the dialectical connection of material and spiritual values and the requirements behind them. "The old values persist as values of the producer, but the new ones are values of the consumer...." J. Huber, a leading theorist of the alternative movement, writes <sup>10</sup>. But labor and consumer activity represent different aspects of the common process of social reproduction and constitute in sum the most essential forms of the vital activity of the individual, which constitute his way of life. The fact that for brain workers these types of activity are not simply interconnected but mutually penetrate one another contributes to the perception of the contradictions of the

mode of production sometimes exclusively as contradictions of the way of life. Whence the interpretation of production as production in general, and of wage labor, as labor in general; the class individual of capitalist society is seen as man in general, as the representative of mankind. This has been brought about by the capacity of intellectual labor for creating a product which has a value common to all mankind.

The concept of industrialism elaborated by the ideologists of the new social movements which arises here is appropriate for a notion of production whose subjects are social individuals in general, people as beings creating contacts and relationships, as members of society without any distinction. This notion is "materialized" currently as a result of the appearance of such a specific social category, which has been expanding in recent years, as the marginals, who, being squeezed out of social production (or not incorporated therein), appear as a "nonclass" and members of society. Whence the formation of demands which appear in the form of demands of labor in general, and not the specific-historical form thereof, and which counterpose this labor to ownership (acquisition) in general. Such demands assume the form of the aspirations of an individual or the task of society as a whole, and not the demands of a particular stratum or class. In its deep-seated basis we are faced with a general trend of social progress, rejection of the exploiter and class-based society and the transition to *nonformational* development and the classless society, which under the specific social and historical conditions is expressed in attempts to go "here and now" beyond what is objectively possible. Individual groups of wage workers here are tackling the problem of the creation of a new social reality via the formation of local centers of the new way of life and cells of the new social relationships, which is not affecting the deep-lying foundations of the existing society.

Whatever the case, the political stimulation of substantial numbers of the masses and their orientation toward the direct expression of their opinions and the qualitative changes in the nature of the demands they are putting forward reflect the formation in capitalist society of a fundamentally new "base-democratic" political culture. Its nucleus are problems of the broadening of democracy and participation, attention to civil rights, questions of the ecology and way of life and tasks of the struggle for peace and nuclear safety. A new sphere of politics and new political thinking appropriate for it are emerging in society. Mass democratic movements have become an indicator of these deep-lying changes and new processes and features in the economic, social, political and spiritual life of Western countries.

"We are confronted," G. Napolitano writes, "by big social and cultural changes, in the course of which the phenomena of passiveness and a departure from politics are interweaving with the new experience of political actions and associations and phenomena of the right's political and ideological penetration of the traditionally

left electorate are the neighbors of constructive endeavors to define anew the values of socialism and 'incorporate' the new values in the platform of the left" <sup>11</sup>.

But as yet "the forces of the left are late in drawing the necessary political conclusions from the changes in society and the new forms of protest," and it is a question, what is more, "of a lag not only in analytical work but compared with the 'actual movement' of the masses also" <sup>12</sup>.

Grasping the essence of the forces and factors which are interacting with the mass democratic movements in the sociopolitical sphere is just as important as correctly evaluating these movements themselves.

The new social movements do not proceed from the enemy image. They regard all the forces operating in society as the given context, as possible partners and opponents, and not as "ours-others," "friends-enemies". None are spurned as possible allies, no prior conditions for joint action in tactical situations are put forward. The prerequisite of this position is not only the loyalty and "nonparty nature" of the mass democratic movements but also qualitative changes in the political context itself: the ideological and theoretical "divides" between different camps have shifted. For example, the exchange of values and valuations between conservatives and liberals has reached the point where experts frequently maintain that neoconservatism and neoliberalism are virtually indistinguishable in theory, but the liberal differs from the conservative in his mentality and behavior. Consequently, a "new wave" of mass democratic movements is rolling over the political landscape, where the "fortresses" and "border barriers" which once divided the traditional political camps are being demolished.

In sum these circumstances are imparting to the mass democratic movements a contradictory nature both in the sphere of ideology and in the sphere of political tactics. On the one hand they contain the romance of planetary unity and the utopia of general fraternity, on the other, they are characterized by a "new pragmatism" in the pursuit of actual policy. The new social movements, not limited either by a particular class basis or program-tactical commitments, are proving to be "open" to the maximum for interaction with any political forces at the time immediate tactical tasks are being tackled. Theoretical disagreements are not taken into consideration here. The condition of joint action is a value consensus, and not theoretical and organizational-disciplinary conformism.

This pragmatism does not repudiate the moral rhetoric of the mass democratic movements as a consequence of their renunciation of a struggle for power and the candor of pronouncements both about themselves and those who at a given moment are a target for criticism. The representatives of the new middle strata constituting the bulk of these movements—educated and endowed with a capacity for reflection and the independent expression of

their own political positions—endeavor to participate in political life not only as members of social groups but also as independent individuals. Owing to this fundamental orientation toward generality, the new social movements simultaneously do not accept class engagement of any persuasion and "overlie" it and incorporate in skimmed form class interests as a variety of particular human interests.

It is necessary when addressing the new social movements to proceed from all their actual singularities: sincere devotion to humanitarian values common to all mankind, disenchantment with existing political institutions and structures (including parties and ideologists of the left), a tendency toward spontaneity and independence, an unwillingness to participate in "rat races" of the struggle for power and openness and a readiness for an alliance with all political forces sharing their values—if only for a time and on a short section of the total path. On the other hand, emotionalism and an ideological vacuum (sanctioned by their theorists, but creating discomfort, nonetheless) make these movements vulnerable to manipulation on the part of power-loving political professionals—precisely those at whom their anger is addressed.

The contradictoriness of these movements is also expressed in the fact that they extend their critical attitude toward the "old" political establishment mingled with the idea concerning its incapacity for real changes and hatred of the present "political clergy" serving the system of party representation within the framework of the bourgeois-democratic state to the workers movement also and all its political currents. Confrontation with the workers movement and the counterposing of themselves thereto as a "third" force are embedded in the very fact of the emergence of the new social movements. Protest against the traditional political culture of the left determines their "political character" and constitutes them as an independent phenomenon to a far greater extent than a clearly expressed antibourgeois spirit. Their "actuality" is determined precisely by that "other alternative" which they advance as a counterweight to the workers movement, whose "old" revolutionary alternative they reject as bankrupt.

The ideologists of and participants in the new social movements do not accept all the fundamental principles of the theory and practice of the international communist movement: struggle for the interests of the working class for them is an "outdated front of the struggle," the "world-historical mission of the proletariat was an illusion," and parties are an unsuitable instrument of social transformations for they "are tired of themselves" (P. Kelly) and revolutionary changes should not be of a violent nature and lead to a predetermined goal for "history is always open and unknown" <sup>13</sup>. This list could be continued for the theorists of the new social movements have manifold versions of "alternatives" to classical, reformed and "dogmatized" Marxism. Although on many points representatives of the working class



support the new social movements and actively participate in them, their role within the framework of these movements is appreciably different from what it is in the ranks of the workers movement. Here they champion not so much class as general democratic interests common to all mankind.

The new social movements are "open" to contacts and cooperation, and the vast potential in the sphere of the mass base makes them a promising partner of the workers parties thanks to which the latter could broaden their electorate appreciably, and virtually without detriment to the movements themselves, what is more. In addition, the goals which they are advancing coincide in principle with the ultimate aims of the workers movement and even with the model of a harmonious and just society of the future which is present in socialist ideology.

It is important in the democratic struggle to take into consideration not only and not so much the differences in the interests of the social and class forces participating therein as the fact that they agree on certain, particular, albeit limited, common tasks<sup>14</sup>. A common idea uniting the workers and new social movements is the conviction as to the need for a radical transformation of the social basis of society. The depth of the conflicts born of the development of capitalism, the lack of adequate mechanisms of their settlement and the catastrophic nature of their consequences are reason for the conclusion concerning the impossibility of their being surmounted by way of reforms. The supporters and ideologists of the new social movements speak of approaching revolution based on a growth of consciousness and populist protest against all forms of oppression. It is essentially a question of an aspiration to a different type of participation in the functioning of the social system of bourgeois society, its restructuring and the introduction in this system of new coordinates, reference points and target principles. The theorists of the mass movements evaluate this aspiration as revolutionary. The alternative models of the solution of all the above-listed problems really do not fit into systems acceptable to the state mechanism which actually exists.

However, as distinct from the revolutionary concepts of the "new left" of the 1960's and also from the classical revolutionary strategy of the international workers movement, the "new revolution" theorists reject violence as a means of its realization, the party, as the organizational form of political protest and expression of political interests, and ideology, as the form of political target-setting. Not the expropriation of property and political power but the establishment of a "new lifestyle" and a new world order based on "post-material" values—this is the aim of their endeavors. "What is seething in modern society is revolution from below, the revolt of the vast majority against those who have deprived this majority of the right to responsibility, and a movement for the legitimization of commonsense and for the value of the ordinary man, which many theorists lost sight of long since"<sup>15</sup>.

The aspiration "from below" to influence policy far from always means a complete abandonment of traditional political forms, it is a question rather of a search for the most effective channels of influence. Substantial numbers of supporters of the alternative movements do not deny such methods of political expression of the masses as participation in elections, work in unions and activity in a party. Nonetheless, the vast majority prefers cooperation in community action or self-help groups.

Many Western experts discern precisely in the growth of the community action groups "the new political style of development of industrial societies, as, equally, the existence of unrepresented political interests"<sup>16</sup>, p. 131. They observe that protests within the framework of this community action or the other raise the "overall tone" of social activity and prompt participation in other political actions. It is emphasized here that a particular place in the structure of the new movements is occupied by "pacifist groups forming the densest network among the base groups of extra-parliamentary opposition" and counterposing to militarization and the arms race "constructive ideas concerning a general policy of peace and a fundamental democratic concept of social defense"<sup>16</sup>.

Obviously, the significance of the new movements is not shaped from the successes or failures of individual civic protest actions; the process of the "self-constitution" and self-generation of community action and the degree of influence on the molding of the social and cultural orientations of the masses and also the social action stereotypes within society in the long term is important in itself. Thus the development of the peace movement reflects the growth of the civic responsibility of broad masses of the population for the fate of their country, for the future of mankind, for history. In turn, it stimulates the process of the assimilation by the masses of the capitalist countries of new political, ideological and value reference points and the shaping of the new thinking corresponding to the demands of the era of the affirmation of mankind as a common, albeit contradictory, whole faced with global problems requiring the speediest solution.

For the communists cooperation with the mass democratic movements is of value not only as a method of expanding the electoral base. The set of problems at the center of the attention of these movements is of a long-term nature. For the communist parties these movements could act the part of a kind of "barometer," "early-warning system" and "training model" with whose help the emergence of new tasks and phenomena and trends in the development of new moods, organizational forms and theoretical orientations in the mass strata of society may be judged. In addition, they are becoming the generator of new democratic ideas, whose development could enrich the communist parties' theoretical activity.

The current historical situation demands new approaches to and methods and forms of solution of world and national problems. It makes obligatory a

search for mechanisms of equal international cooperation and countries' constructive interaction on a world scale on the one hand and the surmounting of the contradictions and disagreements which divide the social movements aspiring to progressive changes on the other. Progress along this path requires new thinking and new policy befitting the man of the nuclear age on the threshold of the next millennium.

The possibilities of the formation of such thinking signifying a qualitative leap forward in the historical process of elevation of the intellectual principle have a material basis and are rooted in the social existence of the modern world, relying on the common interest which, in K. Marx's words, "exists in reality as the mutual dependence of individuals" and the role which is performed today even in the structure of aggregate social labor and the social consciousness by cognitive-theoretical activity and science. The new political thinking and new policy are not nor can they be a product of abstract theorizing. They grow and are realized in practical action, via a combination of the ideals of the real humanism and democratic aspirations of the masses and via the united efforts of all who are responsible for history and are fighting to prevent a nuclear cataclysm and for the realization of interests common to all mankind.

#### Footnotes

1. See "Life Changes: Approaches to Social and Political Theory," Chicago, 1979 p 14.

2. R. Bahro, "Die Alternative: our Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus," Cologne, Europa-Verlag, 1977, p 375.

3. D. Dell, "The New Class: a Muddled Concept. Sociological Journeys: Essays 1960-1980," London, Heinemann, 1980, p 130.

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6. K.-W. Brand, "Neue soziale Bewegungen: Entstehung, Funktion und Perspektive neuer Protestpotentiale. Eine Zwischenbilanz," Opladen, 1982, p 150.

7. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 42, pp 92-93.

8. G.I. Vaynshteyn, "Socio-Psychological Sources of Mass Democratic Movements" in RK i SM No 5, 1986, p 64.

9. See D. Yankelovich, "New Rules: Searching for Self? A World Turned Upside Down," New York, 1981, p 251.

10. J. Huber, "Am Ende des Regenbogens: Zur Entwicklung der Alternativbewegung" in "Wohin denn wie: Texte aus der Bewegung," Bonn, 1982, p 53.

11. G. Napolitano, "Die Grenzen ueberwinden: Die PCI, die Sozialdemokratie und die Zukunft der Linken in Europa," NEUE GESELLSCHAFT No 1, Bonn, 1985, p 56.

12. K. Renar, "Creativity of the Revolutionary Masses," PMS No 6, 1987, p 15.

13. See R. Dahrendorf, "Konflikt und Freiheit: auf dem Weg zur Dienstklassengesellschaft," Munich, 1972, p 77.

14. See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 15, p 276.

15. E. Damman, "Revolution in the Affluent Society," London, 1984, p 12.

16. T. Evert, "Ziviles Ungehorsam von der APO zur Friedensbewegung," Waldkirch, 1984, pp 98, 43 [footnotes rendered as published].

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#### Historian Outlines Stalin's Destruction of Comintern

18700012 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by A. Latyshev: "The Tragedy of the Comintern"]

[Cross reference] Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 23 June 1988 publishes an article entitled "The Tragedy of the Comintern" on page 3. Author A. Latyshev, candidate of historical sciences, devoted his article to "the very serious damage that he [Stalin] caused to the Communist and democratic movement during the decade and a half after V. I. Lenin's death."

A full translation of this article can be found in the JPRS report SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS (JPRS-UPA-88-037 dated 2 September 1988)

UD/331

### History, Prospects for All-Europe Economic Process

18250064 Moscow *EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI* in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 92-97

[Article by Yu. Mikhaylov and N. Pomazkova: "The European Process: Myth or Reality?"]

[Text] The history of Europe is the history of relations between its peoples and countries, their rivalries and cooperation, their military conflicts, and the peaceful development in which the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community, with their revolutionary socialist ideas, have played a major part. Their initiative led to the historic Helsinki Conference (1975), which gave rapprochement on the continent a powerful boost forward. The impetus for this new movement toward detente and international cooperation came from the USSR communist party at its 27th congress. The documents from this sessions stressed the importance of discarding dogmatic interpretations of how international relations developed. Instead, they maintained we need to analyze the modern world on the basis of an approach that will permit us to see the "battle of the opposites" through which the "contradictory but interconnected and, to a great extent, integrated world" (1) develops. Based on this new thinking, the congress articulated the idea of a "common European house."

Guided by the scientific approach to world development, the USSR and other socialist countries base their views on the objective causation behind the acceleration of the European process. Several factors make it critical that we intensify cooperation on the European continent: the progress the industrial community is making; the globalization of economic, technological, and ecological problems; and the glaring need to keep these problems from leading us into war. Working together is the only way we can insure that Europe and its civilization will have more international importance and prestige throughout the world.

The socialist countries are participants in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and are actively involved in seeking new forms for the relations between the western countries to take, particularly the EEC member countries. It is no exaggeration to say the future of the European process and the effort to make it a reality depend to a great extent on the relations between the EEC and CMEA. The readiness of the socialist countries to develop these relations constructively was reconfirmed at the 43rd (special) session of the CMEA.

It is self-evident that strengthening relations between the two world systems in Europe is not possible without the necessary scientific foundation, and the scholars at the Moscow State University economics department are working to make a contribution to this cause. For years, Doctor of Economics L.I. Glukharev has led the department's research laboratory for the study of problems of economic integration among the countries of western

Europe, organizing seminars on critical problems of international economic relations and economic development. In May 1987, the laboratory organized a seminar on western European integration and the European process. Essentially a publicity event, its purpose was to focus the attention of scholars, economists, and others on solving pressing problems of European development. A broad range of issues was discussed, from the nature of the European process to the actual forms it takes and the institutional mechanism behind it. The participants stressed that economics had only just begun to work on these issues, even though progress in these areas is critical, not only to solve theoretical problems, but (and this is very important) for dealing with practical ones as well.

### The History of the European Process

The present is historical. We cannot understand what is taking place now without addressing history. The roots of the European process go back centuries, where, according to Doctor of Economics Yu.M. Osipov, it first took the form of Europe's historical consolidation and the development of economic, political, and cultural ties between the European countries (regions.) However, this is not an adequate description of the entire European process. Besides the structural and spatial dimension to this process, there is a material and subjective side to the development of Europe as a socio-economic and cultural phenomenon. Europe is much more than just a continent; it is also a unique civilization that we can feel, even though we are hard put to define it. What we can do is describe certain of its individual features. Nonetheless, finding the main one—the one that sums up the entire phenomenon—is a never-ending quest, albeit a quest made extremely difficult by Europe's heterogeneous make-up. If we proceed from the most important criterion (social differentiation), we can see that there are two Europes: west and east. If we use various other criteria, we find several Europes. The objective difficulties involved in attempting to identify the "European principle" do not prevent us from understanding the "European" process though. In fact, these difficulties make it easier in some respects to understand the nature of and trends implicit in the process.

Osipov also said that throughout its history, Europe has never encountered a situation in which it did not strive for unity, regardless of the continent's diversity. We can thus conclude that the "European process" has long been a factor on the European scene. Today this process is, on the one hand, the interaction between two social and economic systems, and, on the other hand, the consolidation of groups of countries within the framework of one or the other of these systems.

For most of the western European countries, the EEC is the most real and dynamic embodiment of consolidation, while eastern Europe bases its unity on the socialist character of the social systems in its countries. The CMEA is the embodiment of Eastern Europe's unity.



Thus, the main part in the European process is currently played by international organizations (the CMEA and EEC) and, depending on how these organizations interact, by economic ties. If we analyze the current situation, there is no reason to assert the existence of unity in the full sense of the word in Europe. But we are justified in speaking of the rapprochement of the two Europes, and of their coexistence and cooperation. There are many obstacles to this rapprochement, but they are not insurmountable. Both the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have shown this repeatedly, making many practical suggestions along the way.

According to Osipov, everything that has been said leads us to the following question: is it correct to assert that the European principle is gaining ground at the present time? I think it is. But at the same time it is gaining ground in the course of interaction and conflict between the socialist and capitalist principles. The future is with the former, and there will be a time when, in response to the will of the peoples on the continent, a European principle in socialist form will manifest itself as efforts to encourage peaceful coexistence reach fruition.

#### The Economic Foundation of the European Process

A key feature of the economic situation on the European continent is that countries are becoming economically integrated within the framework of their various social and economic systems, on the one hand, and through relations between these systems, on the other. For material, social and historical reasons, integration within a given system is advancing much more extensively and successfully than between systems. There are huge differences between the two Europes, but they are not the only factor involved. Over the last few decades, eastern Europe's rapid economic development has changed the entire shape of European economic relations, and western Europe has proven unprepared for the growing involvement of the socialist countries in the international division of labor.

As in the past, the leading western European countries (FRG, France, England, Italy, Austria) have been trying to position themselves as the main suppliers of modern technology and hardware to eastern European markets. But economic situation, needs, and capabilities of the CMEA member countries have changed. Ignoring this fact makes it impossible to create a concept of European cooperation that reflects reality.

Doctor of Economics L.I. Glukharev of Moscow State University has noted the importance of analyzing the "European process" and "western European integration" from a political and economic standpoint, and in the spirit of the new political thinking that has emerged from the economic conditions of the late 20th century. In his opinion, the two forms of economic integration are separate but interconnected components of an European process. They evolve on an integrated continent, but within various social systems and political blocs and

groupings. This integration, which exists side by side with socio-economic differences, determines how interdependent the countries are, and becomes a reality as the countries cooperate (this does not mean they converge by any stretch of the imagination) and work together to build their "European house."

In pointing out the deep roots of the European process that is unfolding in tandem with the scientific and technological revolution, industrial internationalization, the growth of economies, and growing utilization of the international division of labor, Glukharev stressed that "Pacific rim" integration and closer ties between Japan, the US, and the countries of SE Asia are forcing out the EEC as a primary factor in the global network of capitalist centers. This has aroused the interest of the EEC in the theory and practical aspects of the European process, the need to make EEC-CMEA relations a priority area in the Community's strategy, the issue of how "identical" and "mutually complementary" the economies of the two Europes are, and, conversely, the issue of how "unidentical" and antagonistic Pacific rim and Atlantic relations are. These factors are the source of their desire to expand scientific and technological cooperation in more promising areas, especially new technologies (nuclear fusion, for example), biotechnology, telecommunications, transportation, medicine, and others. It is also easy to understand the interest of smaller and medium-sized firms in expanding agricultural ties with socialist countries in light of the instability they experience in the face of monopoly dominance.

It will be necessary to overcome certain unclear points of theory before the problem of the European process can be solved. Doctor of Economics Yu.V. Shishkov (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of International Economics and Relations) has pointed out that the Soviet literature has long denied the existence of a "world economy." And he is right in noting the tendency to interpret the fundamental incompatibility of the socialist and capitalist economic systems in a one-sided way that impeded the development of relations between the systems and left theory lagging far behind reality. What do we mean by relations between systems? It is hardly right to adopt the stance of certain authors and treat them as "transitional" relations or "contacts." Much more logical is the view that they are management relations evolving on a market basis. We also need to understand what the economies of the socialist and capitalist countries do and do not have in common and what potential for commercial and market development they actually have. According to Shishkov, management relations, which are essentially a structure in which the industrial community can operate, can be the same in various social systems. These are much different from property relations, which are based on the nature of ownership and receive the full protection of the government of each of the countries.

The seminar noted how complex, conflict-beset, and needful of planning the European process was. Candidate of Economics Yu.I. Buzykin (USSR Ministry of

Foreign Affairs) feels that theory is lagging far behind practice and that scholars do not have a good idea of how to include the EEC and CMEA in the European process. In addition, scholars have not provided an adequate theoretical exposition of the problem of western European integration from the point of view of the Marxist-Leninist theory of sales and the need to determine the size of markets.

Doctor of Economics N.N. Liventsev (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) noted that western European integration and the European process are evolving parallel to one another, although the latter is lagging behind the former.

The discussion showed that there is an objective economic structure supporting the European process. According to Doctor of Economics Yu.A. Borko of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences, the keys to this structure are expanding ties between the two systems and utilizing the advantages of the international division of labor as production and the circulation of goods and money become more international and scientific and technological cooperation make further progress. These processes do not contradict one another, and to a certain extent are complementary, which makes it possible to look more hopefully at the prospects for EEC-CMEA relations.

#### Two Europes; Two Policies

The new political thinking has helped to establish the official dialogue between the EEC and CMEA. As M.S. Gorbachev has stressed: "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has given the signal to lower the bridges on behalf of all the European peoples." (2) The socialist countries have proposed equal and mutually beneficial relations for everyone who cooperates in the effort. However, the European process, and indeed the very concept of a "common European house" have become the target of various forms of political "interpretation" and ideological resistance (Glukharev.) The integrity of the European continent, its different social systems, and the need to deal with national, regional, and global problems together have led to the emergence of various "European" concepts. For example, FRG minister of foreign affairs H.D. Genscher has endorsed Pope John-Paul II's "daring vision for all Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals," as well as the "continental unity" and "solidarity" of Europe. At the same time, V. Betiza reported to the European Parliament that he supported the idea of a "European civilization" whose political geography extended to the western borders of the Soviet Union.

These divergent concepts of European development are becoming a reality through the political activities of integration-oriented groupings. Yu.A. Borko explained that one of the main political reasons for creating the EEC was to defuse the Franco-German antagonism.

Progressives also supported the idea of stabilizing international relations in western Europe, although subsequently the EEC showed a willingness to espouse anti-Soviet and anti-communist ideas. Currently, such attitudes contrast sharply with efforts to make the idea of a "European house" a reality. Nonetheless, we need to find ways make our relationship with the EEC a closer one and change the dogmatic attitude we have at times had toward such contacts. This is particularly important if we are to create a system of European security and cooperation and find a way to incorporate western European integration into the process of international detente.

Doctor of Economics Yu.I. Rubinskiy (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of International Economics and Relations) called the EEC a political wonder, noting that the process of western European integration affected many of the political prerogatives of sovereign states the moment it started, yet did not result in their unification. Until the mid-70s, the mechanism of political cooperation operated in strict isolation from the EEC organs. This began to change, however, with the creation of the European Council at the head of state and government levels. And when a United Europe Act goes into effect, political cooperation will also become part of the structure of the Rome Treaty. At this point, the Community's ability to solve the key problems of our time—such as peace, international security, and disarmament—will be greatly strengthened.

The integration of political processes in western Europe is objective in nature (Doctor of Economics V.N. She-nayev, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of International Economics and Relations.) We are concerned about the problem of European security. In order to solve this problem, we will need to be alert to any potential trend toward unification on the part of NATO, heightened activity on the part of any Euro-groupings within this bloc, and evidence of greater military independence outside the bloc. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind the growing complexity of relations between the US and western Europe and the reluctance of the latter to submit to a US mandate.

#### The Road to Institutionalizing the European Process

"Pan-European" relations are growing. Experience with economic cooperation is accumulating, and ranges from individual contacts to exchange information, scientific and technological advances, and licenses to long-term trade and economic agreements and barter agreements. The system of economic relations between eastern and western Europe is becoming more sophisticated, but its development is being held back by the absence of official relations between the EEC and CMEA. Efforts to establish such relations are encountering both political and economic obstacles. Exponents of "Atlantic solidarity"



are not only trying to obstruct normalization of relations with the socialist countries, but to torpedo them completely as part their effort to keep western Europe in the zone of Atlantic influence.

The EEC stance on issues of cooperation with the CMEA is also complex. A special Rome club report (given by A. Pousset) admits that economic cooperation between the European countries must be based on the utilization of natural resources, a substantial portion of which belongs to the USSR. This stance was criticized by Doctor of Economics V.V. Moylev (Moscow Finance Institute), who said the EEC's focus on the raw materials of the East did not serve the interests of the member countries of CMEA in any way, and was not reflective at all of the true state or potential of their economies.

A report to the European parliament (given by Seeler) reflected a different point of view: not only did he feel bilateral relations between countries would be advantageous; he also laid out actual forms of cooperation between blocs. These included energy, transportation, and environmental protection. In connection with this, Motylev adverted to the need for parallel development of relations between systems and between countries. He stressed that economic cooperation between the EEC and CMEA will be mutually beneficial only when partners with differing levels of potential become involved in these relations.

The participants in the discussion agreed that it was necessary to create a powerful economic "rear echelon" to conduct talks with the EEC on a parity basis. But the CMEA is still not entirely ready to embark on such cooperation with the EEC. The prerequisites to this are a fundamental reorganization of CMEA organs, more coordination of the activities of the member countries, and improved effectiveness on the part of the administrative system. The socialist countries stated at the seminar that they need to be more alert to objective trends in the world economy.

Doctor of Economics N.P. Shmelev (USSR Academy of Sciences ISKAN) discussed the potential for internal economic changes both in our country and within the CMEA. These changes represent the materials necessary for building mutually beneficial economic relations with the capitalist countries. First and foremost, we have to begin directing our efforts toward making our manufacturing industry more competitive. We also have to create a regional "common market" for goods within the CMEA, begin using convertible national currencies, establish ties between the transfer ruble and the ECU, and resolve pricing problems.

Not everyone who took part in the seminar agreed with N.P. Shmelev's proposals about updating monetary and financial relations. For example, Doctor of Economics L.N. Krasavina (Moscow Finance Institute) feels such

relations are premature, since perestroika and the economies of the USSR and countries in the socialist community are still shy of the point at which the transfer ruble can become convertible. At the same time, he feels the CMEA member countries have reached the stage at which they can use the ECU as a contract currency for settling accounts with capitalist countries. We should add that it will not be possible to use the transfer ruble and the national currencies of the CMEA member currencies in international accounts for some time.

Candidate of Economics Ye.D. Chebotareva (USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade All-Union Research Institute for Design) supports the idea of establishing an industrial goods free trade zone in the CMEA countries, stressing that in her opinion doing so will strengthen the CMEA's position in negotiations with the EEC by creating collective instruments on a par with those of the EEC. CMEA would also improve its position in negotiations with the EEC by establishing relations with the European Free Trade Association. This would involve subscribing along with the western European countries to certain international conventions under the aegis of the EFTA.

The extra-national character of the CMEA organs will have to be stressed in order to create the institutional system in which the integrated groupings will function. To this end, the experience of the EEC may have some value. It seems to us that the socialist community should look at the relation between national and extra-national organs in western Europe, the role of the European Court in Strasbourg, and the system for creating and implementing the scientific, technological, foreign trade, monetary, and agricultural policies of the EEC. Proposals for using the EEC's experience were echoed in a speech given by Candidate of Economics Ya. Blishak (International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Economic System.) V. Trillenber (International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Economic System) discussed the difficulty of realizing stable conditions for mutually beneficial relations between East and West, noting that when we create the institutional mechanism that will govern the European process, we must be aware of the political influence and economic might of the multi-national corporations, which determine the depth and breadth of integration in western Europe. Thus, the CMEA member countries must deal with the extent to which they want to be partners of MNC's, which have considerable experience in organizing cooperative, multi-industry production around the world.

The seminar discussed problems in the functioning of the institutional mechanism at the primary economic unit level. Several factors have contributed to make it more difficult to set up joint enterprises, develop direct industrial ties, and promote scientific and technological cooperation. These include: failure to resolve pricing issues; outmoded supply systems in the CMEA member

countries; and delays in using research and design advances in industry. These issues make it clear that the economic mechanism in the socialist community has to be updated.

To sum up the extensive exchange of opinions that took place at the seminar, we would like to stress the main theme of most of the presentations: the European process is a reality, but a reality that is still evolving and far from its final form. It is clear that cooperation on the European continent is the key to making positive changes in the relations between countries with different social structures.

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**Editorial on Common European Home, 'Second Reykjavik'**

1807016/a Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian  
No 29, 15-21 Jul 88 p 1

[Editorial: "For the Sake of Europe in the Future"]

[Text] "A common European home..." This concept, originating from a new political thinking, lies today at the center of discussions taking place in both East and West. Is it at all possible to bring the continent's inhabitants under one roof if they have not yet eliminated distrust of one another and have such diverse ideas as to the political and economic construction of society? Some political figures would answer this question in the negative. They prefer bunkers bristling with machine guns as a common home. But such an outlook is not attractive to many. There has been more and more discussion, therefore, not as to whether or not a "common European home" is necessary, but rather as to how to build it. During his friendly, official visit to the People's Republic of Poland, CC CPSU General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev called for working drafts to be drawn up, followed by erection of a building of the new Europe.

**A Time of Changes**

All of Europe has now entered a period of changes. In the West 12 member nations of the European community have decided to finalize creation of a "unified market" by 1992, i.e., to remove all barriers along the path of moving goods, capital and manpower. This is a contrary and complex process having diverse social consequences. Member nations of the community will hardly be able to achieve full economic integration within the prescribed time frame. But few doubt that it will come to pass in the end.

Still more radical changes are taking place in the East. The socialist countries are busy searching for new, more effective means of development. This of course takes place in the various countries in various ways. The forms and nature of transformations and the rate at which they occur depend on the specific conditions in one country or another, on what circumstances have been inherited

from the past, and on subjective factors as well. But we may speak in general terms about the renewal of socialism, its humanization, and its liberation from distortions and deformations which have occurred over the decades.

Along with internal restructuring in the socialist countries, a restructuring of relations between them is also taking place. There has developed a significant renewal in recent times of the foundations upon which cooperation in the socialist world is built. Sound principles were of course proclaimed earlier, but, unfortunately, they were often just proclamations. Today, as M. S. Gorbachev stated in Warsaw, equality, independence and joint resolution of common problems is becoming the immutable standard of our relations. They are losing their elements of paternalism and are coming to be based thoroughly and completely on voluntary common interests of partnership and comradeship.

The socialist countries are now faced with the necessity of making a technological jump, rising to a new level of scientific and technical progress. This question has important political significance as well, insofar as the manner in which it is resolved will lead to judgments on the capabilities of socialism. It will be easier, of course, to deal with this common task if a joint, combined effort on the part of our countries is applied.

At the recently convened 44th session of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid in Prague, results of cooperation during the period 1986-1987 were discussed in business-like and self-critical fashion. Noting the successes which were achieved, the session reached the conclusion at the same time that resolution of the socio-economic problems facing CMEA member nations will require greater use of the potential capabilities of economic cooperation and a new, more effective approach to deepening the division of labor. Responding to these requirements, the session adopted a collective concept of international socialist division of labor for 1991-2005. CMEA member nations (with the exception of Rumania) also confirmed an agreement reached earlier on the gradual establishment of conditions for free movement among them of goods, services and other production commodities, with the goal of forming a joint market in the future.

The question may arise—if CMEA creates a socialist common market and the European Community a unified market of 12 capitalist countries, will not such a development lead to a deeper split of the continent? Is this compatible with the concept of a "common European home"? Economic integration in Western and Eastern Europe is a natural process brought about by objective factors. But this does not in any way mean that the two common markets will exist in isolation, not touching one another. On the contrary, these large-scale economic organizations can and must cooperate and in so doing facilitate construction of the "common European home." The first step has already been taken—a

joint declaration has been signed on the establishment of official relations between CMEA and the EEC. But this is only the first step. Opportunities for cooperation are indeed unlimited.

#### A Second "Reykjavik" is Necessary

If cooperation between two economic organizations can be advantageous to the inhabitants of our continent, then the existence of military blocs can in no way blend in with the "common European home" concept. What kind of common home is it whose residents amass various kinds of armament in their apartments, fearing invasion from their neighbors?

It would hardly be realistic to suppose that the military blocs could be eliminated—today or tomorrow. The distrust in relations between East and West is already too great. Without a doubt, clearing away the obstacles of the past will take time. But we must not lose it by postponing resolution of the most urgent problems. The most important thing today is that we continue the disarmament process begun by the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles, insure its continuity and extend it to apply to all types of armament.

The West often sets apart the problem of conventional arms and conventional forces in Europe, pointing to the "overwhelming," as it were, superiority of the Warsaw Pact in this regard. The figures they cite here can, of course, be contested. But experience shows this would be useless.

The Soviet proposals M. S. Gorbachev brought up in Warsaw allow us to avoid any kind of dispute over the figures. A reduction is proposed to be carried out in three stages. The first entails identification and elimination of all unbalances and asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with regard to both numbers of troops and weapons. The second calls for reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strengths of 500,000 on each side—this after achieving the levels proposed in the first stage. The third and final stage provides for continued reductions in such a way as to impart an exclusively defensive nature, once and for all, to the military formations of both alliances.

Such an approach takes into account the interests of both sides. We have heard no serious objections of any kind. But the proposal has not received any support within NATO circles. What is the matter here?

Apparently the problem lies in the way the NATO governments traditionally look at conventional weapons—as a legitimate component of power politics—as they continue to build up their reserves. Society has still not fully thought through the misfortunes such a policy is fraught with.

In order to get things going M. S. Gorbachev proposed that an all-European "Reykjavik" be conducted, a meeting of all the European countries, to discuss one issue: how can we shift from words to actions in the sphere of reducing conventional armaments? Let us recall that the Soviet-American meeting in Iceland's capital effected a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament which comprised the groundwork for laying the path to the INF Treaty.

Two specific proposals were laid out in Warsaw which drew widespread interest: the removal of Soviet comparable air assets from their forward bases in Eastern Europe if NATO agrees not to deploy in Italy its 72 F-16 fighter-bombers Spain refused to base; the establishment of a European center for reducing military danger, a place where NATO and the Warsaw Pact might cooperate.

If a second "Reykjavik" is created and the hopes entrusted in it prove justified, a sound foundation will have been constructed for the common European building, providing stability for the structure as a whole.

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#### Central Europe: A Zone of Confidence, Security

18070161b Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian  
No 29, 15-21 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Central Europe: A Zone of Confidence, Security"; first paragraph is ZA RUBEZHOM introduction]

[Text] Delivering his speech in the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic, M. S. Gorbachev declared support for the recent proposal of a joint working committee of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to nation-state participants in the Helsinki process for the creation of a zone of confidence and security in Central Europe. His speech emphasized that only a lessening of the military confrontation would make feasible the development of a European system of joint security and all-encompassing cooperation. To this end it is particularly necessary to work out as quickly as possible a mandate in Vienna for conducting negotiations before the year's end on reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, and on eliminating all tactical nuclear weapons on the continent. He also proposed specific measures establishing greater confidence and strengthening security. We publish herewith the third installment of his presentation which deals with these matters.

We make the following proposals before the governments of the nation-state participants to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on creating a zone of confidence and security in central Europe and we recommend that the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic introduce appropriate initiatives.



In order to create such a zone of confidence and security, measures are necessary which would convince both sides that, in spite of the available potential, there is no intent to inflict a sudden attack.

The following conditions are necessary:

a) Expansion of what was achieved at the Stockholm agreement:

—by further decreasing the lower limits in numbers of soldiers and tanks employed during exercises required to be announced at least 60 days in advance;

—by including here matters concerning the announcement of independent air force and naval exercises, with information as to scope and regionalization—heretofore discussed in Stockholm without result—so as to further strengthen trust;

—by announcing exercises in which over 20,000 troops participate two years prior to their conduct;

—by not conducting exercises from this time forward in which more than 40,000 troops take part—this relates to series of exercises and the development of alert operations;

—by inviting observers to all announced exercises.

b) Additionally:

—the number of exercises conducted outside military training areas, which create problems for the civilian population, should be limited;

—maneuvers requiring mandatory announcement in the spirit of this proposal should not be conducted in the 50-kilometer zone, for example, up to both sides of the border between the alliances.

These confidence-building measures represent proposals which can be discussed and coordinated with all concerned nations.

c) The central European nations will establish permanent "confidence-strengthening centers" tasked with the following: the exchange of militarily significant information and observations, in order to enable participating nations to avoid the development of crisis situations in central Europe or settle their disputes using political means. All centers would be outfitted with the same technical equipment and would establish direct communications with one another. Their personnel must include representatives and experts from all participating nations.

d) Military experts of the nations concerned must be authorized to coordinate operational details for permanent combined observation posts at strategically significant points. Results of such observations must be conveyed to the "confidence-strengthening centers."

All concerned nations must exchange military attaches.

e) The proposal is made for joint European satellite-based observation, the results of which are to be transmitted immediately to all "confidence-strengthening centers." This could also become the common instrument of nation-state participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Results of these observations would be made available to all the European nations, the United States and Canada.

f) Direct bilateral communications links ("hot lines") should also be established between central European nations. In the event apprehension arises or incidents take place, these would provide swift attainment of understanding between governments.

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#### **German-Soviet Relations, Past and Present, Examined**

18070164 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jul 88 p 14

[Article by Leonid Pochivalov: "The Germans and Us"]

[Text] At night we were placed on alert—paratroopers had been dropped in the area! Small caliber weapons were issued to the boys of the first detachment. I was posted as guard for the water-pumping station. At dawn I heard shots coming from the edge of the village. I left my post and rushed over there. Someone screamed: "There they are! Shoot!" I got up on one knee and emptied my clip. Dark figures were appearing in the forest. I was firing at Germans!

The concept of "German" merged suddenly and clearly with the image of the enemy—war had begun. In my own experience I was convinced that the Germans were intent on bringing harm to me personally. Our column was hit on the highway by ground attack aircraft. A bomb struck the bus carrying our second detachment. God help anyone who has to look at a sight like that! A fragment of another bomb grazed my hand. Clutching my wound I watched as the plane flew off. The German wanted to kill me!

In our building there lived a solitary old man, Gustav Dietz, a German from the Baltic region. The neighborhood kids were friends with him—he used to take us to the circus where he worked. Not even then, when the bombs began to fall on Moscow, did we stay away from Uncle Gustav. But one day they came for him. That meant even he was—the enemy!

A picture of the enemy did not easily register in the mind. We understood the essence of fascism but were not prepared to display total hatred towards Germany and Germans. The confusion of those first days is explained not only in the suddenness of the attack, but in its insidiousness as well. Just recently the front pages of the newspapers had shown us the reassuring smiles of Molotov standing side by side with Ribbentrop. My brother was serving on the border, standing guard on a bridge over the Bug, on which our cargoes flowed carrying goods to Germany. That was back on the 21st of June, 1941. Stalin thought we could get along with Hitler. The hope lived in our people that they could be friends with the Germans. There were recollections of fraternization in the trenches of the First World War, revolution in Germany, the Bavarian Soviet Republic, the Weimar Republic. The glorious names of those stormy years—Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Klara Zetkin, Ernst Thälmann—remain in the street names of our cities and villages.

The prestige the Germans had with us during the initial period of Soviet Russia's existence was great. Thousands of "genossen"—engineers, technicians and other workers—helped us build the foundations of the first five-year plan. We sent our most capable and promising people to Germany for training—among them Tukhachevskiy. We believed in a new rapprochement between two great peoples, prepared by long-standing tradition. The Germans left an appreciable mark on Russian history over the course of several centuries. For more than one century the family of the Tsar was either German or German-related. But notwithstanding their origins, they ruled in the interests of autocratic Russia. They were Russian monarchs—one need only consider Catherine the Great.

The long association between our peoples was a blessing for Russia. Germans came to us not only seeking fortune and rank. Knowledgeable German people labored in the first Russian plants, in the first dispensaries; they worked at the construction sites of palaces and railroads. Their influence is recorded in geographical designations—Petersburg, Orenburg, Wrangel Island—and in words and ideas taken into the Russian language. Settling in our land Germans united with our history with our people. They became a part of it and in the future would become part of the Soviet people. Non-Russian names comprising our national pride are solidly entrenched in Russian history—the authors Fonvizin and Gertzen, navigators Kruzenstern and Bellingshausen, the artist Bryullov, scientists Dahl and Euler... Russian citizens of German origin have decorated our revolutionary epic as well—Pestel, Lieutenant Schmidt, Ernst Bauman... Yes, and the Soviet era has more than enough illustrative examples—Otto Schmidt, Ernst Krenkel, Rikard Sorge... On their forms they wrote "Russian." And, yes, they were Russian. The blood of diverse peoples and races flows in our veins, including German blood. And the ideological sources we adopted distinctly for ourselves also come from other places, from the West, including Germany.

The influence has not been one-sided. Both Old Russia and Soviet Russia have certainly had their effect on Germany. I found evidence of this in the present day Germanies. There was a German settlement in Moscow. There was—and still is, as a tourist attraction—a Russian village in Potsdam. The mutual penetration of our cultures has always been beneficial to both countries. It is well known that Russian classical literature of the 19th century, its classicists—Dostoyevskiy, Turgenev, Tolstoy—exerted a great influence on the development of German literature. In the building of the former Reichstag in West Berlin, I saw an old painting depicting Russian and German generals standing side by side in battle, allies in the war against Napoleon. West Berlin television recently showed "The Russians in Berlin." As it turns out, about 200,000 of our compatriots lived here in the 1920's, mainly intelligentsia who had a marked influence on German society. I was taken around the city—here is where Gorkiy lived, Tsvetayeva lived here, here is the editorial office of the newspaper where Bulgakov worked...

And is there any doubt that establishment of the Bavarian Soviet Republic was an effect of October? And was not the rescue of the Dresden Gallery a contribution on the part of our country to German culture?

There was no joy in the hostility. Hatred came upon us like a landslide. "Arise, vast land! Arise for mortal combat!" These were not bands of scoundrel-knights, detachments of soldiers for hire marching against us. This was a gigantic army on its way—almost an entire people. Historical digressions provide no assistance here. Here it was—who gets whom. There would not be any fraternization in the trenches. K. Simonov said in that horrible year: "...No one will kill him if you don't kill him." And there was killing and killing. We killed them, and they killed us. They called it a holy war—but there is no condensation here. We had no other choice—it is sufficient to recall the mad atrocities of the invaders we witnessed at Majdanek, Oswiecim, Buchenwald.

The heavy sweat of the war taught abstinence. More and more we understood that we were dealing with a powerful enemy. The disdainful "warriors" were forced out by a restrained "enemy." They learned to take qualities into account in their enemy which were deserving of attention, even understanding. The longing for humaneness rang out suddenly, so piercingly, in E. Kazakevich's "Star." The prisoner pleads: "Have mercy!" He extends his hands: "I am arbeiter, a worker, just like you. I am not your enemy. I was sent here ensnared in a trap!" And suddenly he shows sympathy for his enemy. At the height of the war! Even that, with all its incinerating, has not extinguished the humanness in us. Confronted with the horror of atrocities committed by the German-speaking enemy we feel we want to save inside ourselves that traditional respect for a people with a great culture.

I saw in '44 how the prisoners of war were led around Moscow. Moscow citizens stood in a solid wall. There were no cries, no cursing. Silence. Here you could see it

all—condemnation of the enemy, traditional Russian compassion for those who have been defeated, and endless, tired grief and sadness over the war and the misfortunes it begot—for us, for them, for people... At the end of 45 I was invited to a wedding in a village just outside Moscow. The new bride looked out the window and took a deep breath: "I cannot! God help me, I cannot! They are hungry!" She went outside and brought in two strangers. They were prisoners of war, here at the outskirts of the village laying pipeline for village heating. They shifted around nervously. "Sit down!" the hostess directed sternly, clearly ill at ease in her burst of emotion. She loaded their plates with potatoes and served them each a slice of meat: "Eat, murderers!" Suddenly one of the guard detachment soldiers appeared: "So here they are! And getting fed, no less! Okay, Fritzes—out of here! Forward, march!" The hostess cried out: "No, I won't allow it! Let them finish eating! These are people, do you understand?! People!" I was astonished at the hostess—her two brothers had perished at the front.

Entering the territory of Germany, the army was ordered to show tolerance and magnanimity. And here, in direct contact with Germans, we discovered more and more that they are just not all alike. More and more often we began to discern friends among them, so recently our enemies to a man.

Building relations with these people in the post-war years was not an easy matter. I remember when, at a mine in Wismut, a recent graduate of our institute in a foreign land for the first time was berating a German miner getting on in years: "Befel ist befehl!" ("An order is an order!"). The man obeyed without a murmur—even ridiculous orders. He was defeated. Yet in those first years of peace the victors noted more and more that military defeat had not emasculated the vanquished of their will when it came to work and orderly procedure.

Destroyed almost to its foundations, mainly in its eastern part, the country returned to life with astonishing speed. The dramatic profile of crippled Berlin acquired the aspect of completion it has today in just a few years. Recent enemies became partners, comrades in the shared, peaceful labor of restoration. Not just individuals who had survived the camps and prisons, but an entire people, especially the younger generations.

The West had no desire to create a single, peace-loving and democratic Germany, as we proposed. And so the land of the recent Reich was divided into politically isolated parts—GDR, FRG and West Berlin. Germans in the eastern part soon "came into their own" with us—in their social world outlook and political system. Of all the states in the socialist camp it is probably the GDR which has most astonished us with its vital durability. The Germans wasted no time on chatter—they worked because they were accustomed to working hard. In this way and that they broke loose and shot ahead of the victors. Of course we helped them a great deal in their formation, by refusing retributions, for example. But we

won't hide the fact that, during the first years after the war, we took a great deal out of Germany—plants, vehicles, equipment—although, certainly, all of this made up for only a very small percentage of what the fascist army had destroyed of ours. Germans are Germans, however. The most advanced technology was introduced, store shelves were filled with contemporary goods, efforts were made in education, health care, sports.

It is with different eyes that we look upon the Germans today, living together with us in this vast world—both nearer to us and farther away.

Stereotypes developed in bygone days, deeply imbedded in our consciousness, have always comprised an obstacle to establishing and improving relations. It is not easy to abandon them. There have been more of these stereotypes with regard to interrelationships with the present German states than with any other countries. And there are many reasons for reflecting on this. Have we abandoned, for example, the image of the German as the enemy? This is probably impossible to escape—a bitter memory for centuries. The subject of the past war remains solidly in our literature and art. Many of the best works are directly oriented on the war. "No one is forgotten, and nothing is forgotten..." What is this—is it still bleeding hatred? No, it is rather that inextinguishable memory of the triumph of national dignity. In the great fight with fascism, dignity became our main foothold—not blind faith in the wisdom of a generalissimo. Nothing other than a feeling of honor and dignity. Someone once cracked in devil-may-care fashion: "What's healthy for the Russian is death for the German." I think the boasting sprang from an unjustified feeling of inferiority in the presence of a wise and intelligent foreigner, a jack-of-all-trades. And how are you, German, when it comes to the important things? A lightweight, for sure! It turns out he is not a lightweight. And in the war it was a far cry from always being "healthy" for us and "death" for the German. During the first year it was more often the reverse. All the same, we arrived in Berlin the victors. How could one forget so great an ascendance?

In today's era of restructured thinking, we are reflecting more and more on the kind of mutual relationships we have with our neighbors, with the countries of our brotherhood and those of the system which opposes us. Do we know them? Do they know us? A great deal of what appears on the pages of history is cloudy information. And now is the time when we are delving into history, trying to ascertain who was right and who was at fault, that we must not depart from an honest evaluation of our own errors. But up until now we have been poorly equipped with the most irresistible weapon of progress—truth. An old communist in West Germany who miraculously survived one of Hitler's concentration camps once told me: "In a roundabout way you too helped bring Hitler to power. During the October Revolution, and especially after it, you rejected any kind of cooperation



with your Social Democrats. Your intransigence towards possible allies could not help but influence the disposition of Germany's Communist Party leadership as well. We also stayed away from any alliance with the Social Democrats, as did the Left Front. Hitler was able to take advantage of this." One can readily see how everything in history is intertwined.

When I was working on this article, knowledgeable people expressed their doubts: "What kind of a title is that? 'The Germans and Us'! What Germans? There are different groups of Germans living in different countries. Can you unite them like that?" Very true. The former German Reich was divided into three parts. But who lives in these parts? There are no such nationalities as "GDR-ers," "FRG-ers," or "West Berliners." There are just Germans. Are they different from one another? It is said they are. I. Shiren, a middle-aged Hamburg teacher, returned from Leipzig, where he had gone to visit relatives he had not seen in 20 years. He told me of his surprise: "They seemed to be the same Germans—in language and appearance. But they had a different psychology. They showed less of the businesslike efficiency we have, but more spiritual qualities. Well, what is better? I don't know." Have these West and East Germans become different peoples? I think the historical period of their separate development is too short to tell. And when we are frightened of using the concept "Germans" with respect to the populations of the two politically incompatible states—as if the use of this unifying word would play into the hands of revanchists who dream of a united Germany—do we not find here all that same conservatism that enslaves free thought and so impedes us from looking at the world with realistic eyes?

Could you place the Germans living in various states side by side? To some degree you could. They have the same origin, a common past of many centuries, a traditional culture, the customs of their forefathers, and a national psychology, including shared responsibility for the last war. You cannot extend the present state borders into the past. And in establishing relations with each German state as a separate entity, on its own merits, taking into account our different orientation towards their socio-political systems, and even taking into account all the more apparent differences in the thinking and life style of GDR and FRG Germans, we must always remember that we are dealing with Germans all the same. Our past touches theirs, all of theirs—of East and West Germans.

There are two German states, two different socio-political structures. This is the reality of today. And it is clear in many ways that, in the name of stability for the European family as a whole, that is the way things should stay. But we must seek the most sensible ways of cooperating with each. During a conversation I had with Herbert Krolikovskiy, GDR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, he made special note of the fact that relations between Germany and the USSR became more

and more promising in the 1920's. The GDR is strongly continuing this tradition at present. "There are people in the FRG, including some in the government, who are also in favor of developing traditional good relations. But there are people who, to this day, show no intention of acknowledging the post-war reality. This is why relations between the GDR and USSR will always be different from the relations you presently have with the FRG. This must always be taken into account."

A great deal must be taken into account—including the fact that, without FRG high authority, without an improvement in FRG ties with the USSR, peace in Europe is unthinkable. We are happy to see that an ever increasing number of West Germans is coming to understand this with each passing year. Favorable relations can be achieved only through understanding. But what does it mean for us to understand the Germans? Primarily this involves taking into account what is "German"—their past and their present. And the psychology that is specifically German. For example, the painful realization of responsibility for a bloody war and the bitter memory of what was lost, the memory of formerly unified lands and of territories considered German from time immemorial. These are all sensitive areas. But they exist, and the politician must keep them in mind. I reflected on this once again when one day I received an envelope from Kaliningrad in the presence of a friend from the GDR. "Do you know where this person lives?" I said. "On Schiller Street. Here—have a look at the return address." The German cast a sharp glance at the envelope, shifted it pensively in his hands and said: "Thank you!" "For what?" I replied with surprise. "For this street," he said softly. "There, in this city." Then, after a brief silence, he added: "My ancestors are buried in that land."

How can we further build on our mutual relations? I have had conversations with many people in Germany on this subject. This is natural. They are beginning to believe in us. But we might as well admit that years of arbitrariness, voluntarism and stagnation have undermined confidence in us, not only in the West, but in the fraternal countries as well. Our clumsy economics with its low level of labor productivity and poor quality output, not blending in with the laws of the international market, was hardly an inspiring example for the more dynamic, more advanced economies of some of our socialist neighbors, including the GDR. Moreover, it fairly often became a burden.

I was told with bitterness in West Berlin about our clumsiness. The USSR bought equipment there for the production of 600,000 fresh frozen meals per day. But contractual terms for construction of the enterprise are not being met, and so we are threatened with great losses. This is just another disappointment for the Germans. We are currently placing great hope on business dealings with the FRG, the country with the most developed economy in Europe. Maybe they will put up with our

noncommittal kind of partnership in some other country, perhaps in the GDR by virtue of old habit, but they will not tolerate it in West Germany. You have to know the Germans—our economists had better.

In Berlin I was introduced to an energetic 40-year old man by the name of Peter Glasnek. He had spent several years working in the scientific center in Dubna. Here are his observations: "We have long been presented with the idea that the USSR is something just short of paradise. That was the official propaganda. At first it was not difficult to conquer the psychology of the Germans in the GDR, for they had been disarmed after their defeat in the war. All the same, the influence of Soviet culture was not very significant. American culture was able to win a more solid position on German soil in the FRG. It began to penetrate the area with products, movies, television programs. This was commercial trade. And so the culture entered the West German environment organically. At first the difference between economic conditions in the two Germanies was not so noticeable. But it became clear in the 1950's that the economic level in the West was advancing. GDR residents were realizing more and more that everything was not all that great in the USSR, and interest in our country began to decline. This trend established itself over a period of years. Consider, for example, the German language. After the war, German language in the GDR adopted very little from Russian—a few words like "Sputnik," for example. A great many Americanisms, on the other hand, entered the language of the FRG. All the intelligentsia there know English, while in the GDR knowledge of Russian is a rarity. Realizing that official propaganda was embellishing the situation in the USSR, people started trusting it less and less. To the present day, the German in the GDR has no realistic concept of the USSR, its problems and difficulties. The West German knows far more about the United States through personal contact with Americans. A set of stereotyped concepts has been established with us concerning the USSR, and even now there are those who do not want to change them."

I asked Glasnek what he thought about GDR attitudes towards the restructuring which is taking place in the Soviet Union. He said: "A great deal of what you are only now achieving has already been done in the GDR. Therefore there is no hurry here to take after all the slogans on your restructuring. You must know the Germans. If a German grasps an idea attractive to him, he must see it through to implementation. This is a national characteristic. If you start a German going he will work stubbornly towards the goal, even if he does not perceive the final result very clearly. This is both a benefit and a danger. This is why people in the GDR are in no hurry to implement some of your new ideas. The GDR is on the "hot line" of confrontation with the alternative world. The West exerts a strong influence on us and takes advantage of the slightest mistake. Evaluating your slogans today, we must interject—do they blend into our situation?"

Kurt Leffler, GDR First Deputy Minister of Culture, spoke with me approximately as follows: "Exhibits, films, publications... That was the essence of the cultural exchange for years and years. Now we need closer personal contacts—in theater, scholar and scientists, youth, ordinary citizens." I asked: "Why do certain Soviet works of art which have achieved recognition not get published in the GDR?" Leffler replied: "There shouldn't be anything automatic about this. Not even all our own books and films are distributed here. Is it absolutely necessary to submit every foreign-published work to general readership debate? We should first consider whether it can play the same role here that it does in the other country. We have an expression—'Spring requires time.'"

"We see presently a noticeable increase in sympathies towards the USSR," Otto Rheingold, director of the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, told me. "But this support is tied to certain discussions with you. You produce books, articles and films which receive varying reviews in the GDR. For example, the film "Repentance" evoked a great deal of controversy. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND criticized it for sketchiness. A new flow of letters then arrived at the newspaper: 'How can you criticize what has been published in the USSR?' And so these times are the times of seeking, reflection, discussion."

They are not rushing to clap their hands in the GDR. Many people have told me: "Allow us to scrutinize what originates in your country. We fear your "all-national campaigns"—there having been so many of them. It is difficult to get in line with them every time and then have to share with you the experience of bitter mistakes. Of course we are in favor of your restructuring! Moreover, the future of the GDR depends on its success. God forbid it might fail—then it would be difficult to stand our ground before the NATO West."

My correspondents in the GDR looked at the problems of our mutual relations in different ways, but all agreed on one thing—relations must be fashioned as dictated by the time. You cannot get off with photographic displays. Directives on "inculcating" friendship are relegated to the past. We must create conditions for friendship—or rather, for the natural, personal contact people of the civilized countries can experience.

I became acquainted with Stefan Kurella, an ethnographer, son of the famous German writer. His father arrived in Russia in 1919 with a letter from the German communists addressed to Lenin. He worked in the Komintern as an assistant to G. Dimitrov. After the war Stefan lived with his parents in the Sukhumi area for four years. His mother is buried on Georgian land, and a mountain pass in the Caucasus is named after his father. Maintaining deep personal ties to Georgia, Kurella formed an informal Georgian club in Berlin. Its members included people who went to Georgia or who had

contacts there. It was not an easy matter for the club to legitimize itself. Officials in both the USSR and GDR shrug their shoulders: "Why specifically a Georgian club? There are other nationalities in the USSR. And then, of course, there is the GDR-USSR Friendship Society." The Georgia aficionados' initiative did not blend into the framework of bureaucratic thinking and therefore aroused suspicion. Finally the club achieved status in the GDR Union of Cultural Societies. But the matter of trips to Georgia for club members remains, as before, a difficult one—there is no end to the formal procedures required.

I became acquainted with Heinrich Krist on a journey by train into the FRG. He had left the USSR to reestablish himself in the land of his ancestors and presently lives in Hannover. His family has the well-being of the "average" German. But Krist understands that his motherland is there, in the East. Here he had made a second visit. He told me that Germans who emigrated from the USSR stick close to one another in the FRG and have formed a compatriot community. They gather in their own clubs where they converse only in Russian and sing Russian songs. "And do your children speak Russian?" I asked. "Of course!" he replied. "As will my grandchildren. We are Russian Germans."

So here is yet another thread which unites our countries and peoples.

Contact leads to mutual knowledge, and then to mutual understanding. Can we learn something from today's Germans in the GDR and FRG? Without a doubt. All those traditional aspects we have a need for—the businesslike efficiency that has become representative of their national way of thinking, their sense of discipline, conscientiousness and reliability in labor.

It would be difficult for me to say what the Germans could learn from us. They would better be able to judge. But here is some commentary from GDR scientists I met in Antarctica. Evaluating their winter stay in a Soviet collective they said: "What amazed us more than anything else is your constant readiness for selflessness, for stoic acceptance of difficulties and unpretentiousness under all circumstances." One of them concluded with a smile: "These qualities must have helped you create a superpower out of a backward Russia." And I thought: "...and win the war. Our victory has taught the Germans a lot as well."

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#### **Rodina Society Head on Emigration**

18070153 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 21, 21-27 May 88 p 6, 7

[Interview with Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. S. Yelisseyev, head of the Soviet Society for Cultural Ties with Compatriots Abroad (Rodina Society), by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Prokhorov: "Emigrants or Compatriots?"; date and place not specified; first paragraph is ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] ARGUMENTY I FAKTY interviews Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. S. Yelisseyev, twice Hero of

the Soviet Union, USSR pilot and cosmonaut. Serving as chancellor of the Moscow Higher Technical School (Imeni N. E. Bauman, he has, since last year, also headed the Soviet Society for Cultural Ties with Compatriots Abroad (Rodina Society).

[Question] Many of our letters to the editor ask if it is necessary to restore Soviet citizenship to emigrants even if they want to return to the USSR. For they have shown by going abroad how they feel towards the Motherland. How would you answer this?

[Answer] The emigration, which is referred to in the West as a "Russian" emigration, is of course completely heterogeneous—even with respect to ethnic composition. Among the emigrants, of course, there have always been renegades, war criminals and ordinary criminals, who despised the socialist structure and Soviet rule. They do not hide their views and they do not ask to come back, because they know they will not be accepted here. But for those people who in their hearts have remained our own—Soviets—the opportunity is granted to return, to again be reunited with their relatives in the USSR in spite of their lengthy wanderings abroad. We must therefore have a differentiated approach.

[Question] All the same we have formed a negative image of the emigrant over the years, in our literature and cinematography, and, consequently, in our minds. He is seen as a man without a country, who escaped the revolution and is prepared to sell himself and his own people for dollars. But if we digress from the stereotyped image?

[Answer] Yes, it is true there were times when the word "emigrant" was uttered as a serious condemnation. But the way, we in the Rodina Society refer to those who leave the territory of Russia and the USSR not as emigrants, but as foreign compatriots. In our view this phrase accurately reflects the nature of the problem.

But everything is not that easy. As I have already stated, there are enemies among those who have left Russia, but most of the people are friends. For a variety of reasons a certain portion of compatriots are not yet openly expressing their opinions, although they show a growing interest in the Soviet people, its history and culture.

Among our compatriots distributed all over the world who can consider the USSR their fatherland or the land of their ancestors, the majority now comprise people who were taken abroad by relatives while they were still small children and others who were born abroad. Do we have the right to reproach them for this? And must Soviet society maintain contact with these people? I think it must.

This includes those former Soviet citizens who left the USSR in the '70s, beginning of the '80s. For it is a fact that it is very difficult for a person who has grown up in a socialist society to adapt to the Western way of life. I



am not talking about children here—for them, departure for permanent residence abroad is accompanied by deep psychological trauma. It is difficult to part with our friends, our school, our Motherland. We should not turn our backs on these children. They are not guilty of anything. Some of them come to the USSR later on at our invitation (usually in summer), some study at Soviet higher educational institutions and receive a stipend from the Rodina Society.

But let us look more closely at those who emigrate consciously.

Even people alarmed by the revolutionary tempest, who have not been able to evaluate and assimilate the creative ideas of October, do not by a long shot always wind up in the camp of the enemies of Soviet rule.

Many people have reexamined their views with time and, up until the final hour, have remained sincere, honest patriots of their Fatherland. In just the first decade after the Civil War (1921-1931) more than 180,000 people returned.

These were basically peasants and Cossacks—soldiers of the White Army trying out for themselves the poverty and all the “delights” of emigrant existence. But there were also people who returned who did not experience any special financial difficulties while living abroad—authors A. Tolstoy, A. Kuprin, A. Belyy, S. Skitalets and I. Sokolov-Mikitov; sculptors S. Kononov and S. Erzya; artist Bilibin, performer A. Vertinskiy, composer S. Prokofyev. A few bourgeois political figures also returned—V. Lvov and Yu. Klyuchnikov—and even White Guards generals—Ya. Slashchev, A. Sekretov and Yu. Gravitkiy.

The patriotic moods of Russian emigres grew appreciably stronger in the years of the Second World War.

Do your readers know that it was our foreign compatriots B. Vilde and A. Levitskiy who gave the name “Resistance” to the anti-fascist movement in France? In 1985 they were posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, First Degree, for courage and bravery.

Even some of those who fairly recently related to Soviet rule with animosity—Milyukov, Dan, even General Denikin—have expressed sympathy for the struggle of the Soviet people.

[Question] We must admit that we still do not know enough about the history of emigration. There must be some basis for this lack of knowledge, is there not?

[Answer] Yes, a stereotyped—I would even say a superficial—impression of emigrants was created over a long period of time. For example, I do not recall any mention in the central press of the significant fact that the heaviest mass emigration out of Russia took place prior to the October Revolution, not after, as many believe.

Yet this kind of data is available. It has been published in the collection “Why We Returned to the Motherland: Testimony of Re-Emigrants.”

It turns out that from 1828 through 1915, 4,509,495 people emigrated from the Russian Empire. Together with their offspring these comprised the bulk of “Russians abroad.”

What we have is this. A long time prior to the October Revolution, citizens of the Russian Empire ran away from the yoke of autocracy and saved themselves from its tyranny. We remember the foreign “odysseys” of Russian Revolutionary Democrats and Narodniks [Populists], the dramatic stories of the Nekrasov Cossacks, Molokan and Dukhoborets religious sects, resettling on the American continent with the assistance of Lev Tolstoy, who still have not lost their ethnic distinctiveness, who have not dissolved into the Canadian people. We recall the Russian Old Believers who turned up in Bolivia. When the newspaper TRUD reported last year on their wanderings around the globe, the editors of that publication and the Rodina Society received hundreds of letters in reply from Soviet citizens which not only expressed verbal support for their countrymen abroad, but offered to establish a public assistance fund as well for Russian people living outside the Motherland.

And the waves of so-called labor emigration? From the western Ukraine, western Belorussia and the Baltic region they have spread around the world and come right back to be reestablished on these lands of Soviet rule.

[Question] And what about the war? How many Soviet citizens did it scatter around the world?

[Answer] More than six million people were driven to forced labor in Germany. True, the majority were repatriated. By January 1st 1953 more than 5.5 million Soviet citizens had returned to the USSR.

But imagine the tragedy for adolescents violently torn away from the Motherland, from their families.

They survived under the inhuman conditions there perhaps only because they found sympathy, aid and support from other young men and women equally destitute who were transported from other European countries to Germany to work. Together they managed to establish families and build their first nests—not entirely secure—and raise children. Then gradually they developed new roots, new bonds, which became impossible to sever with the passing of the years.

Or consider the Soviet prisoners of war. The majority of these died from hunger, were executed or tortured to death in fascist concentration camps. And those who were freed by our Western allies—for them the road leading back to the Motherland often turned out to be exceedingly difficult.

A great deal could be disclosed concerning human fortune, enough to fill novels. Generally speaking, the history of emigration is awaiting its chronicler and researcher. There are many unexplored areas here, many pages missing. In my opinion, there should not be forgotten names, deleted from Russian culture by history—names of writers, artists, composers, performers and scholars who found themselves in foreign lands because of personal tragedy, who ended up in the whirlpool of social cataclysm.

[Question] Restoration of the truth, historical justice, is one of the jobs of the Rodina Society. What other things does this social organization do?

[Answer] We are called upon to expand cultural and spiritual cooperation with foreign compatriots in the name of peace and the survival of mankind, to strengthen trust and friendship in every way possible

with the peoples of those countries where emigrants from the Soviet Union are living. We are actively supported in this work by social clubs and progressive organizations of our countrymen abroad established in most countries, on all continents. There are such friends of the USSR as Fedor Fedorovich Shalyapin, Nikita Dmitriyevich Lobanov-Rostovskiy, Eduard Aleksandrovich Falts-Feyn, Aleksandr Yakovlevich Polonskiy, offspring of notable Russian authors, poets, artists and musicians who have lived a long time outside the Motherland. With their assistance unique works of patriotic art, priceless documents, and personal artifacts of prominent figures of Russian culture have returned to us.

But our foreign compatriots also need help. Let them find faith in themselves and feel the warmth of ties with their native land, with their native people.

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**CEMA Cooperation in Foodstuffs Production**

18250075 Moscow MEZHDUNARODNYY  
SEL'SKOKHOZYAYSTVENNYY ZHURNAL in  
Russian No 3, May-Jun pp 5-8

[Article by Stanislav Smirnov, advisor to the CEMA Secretariat: "Collaboration Among CEMA Member States in the Production of Foodstuffs"]

[Text] The programs for socio-economic development and for improving the national well-being of CEMA member countries attach special importance to satisfying more completely the population's requirements for foodstuffs and for improving the structure of nutrition. The common character of such important problems has aroused interest among the Socialist Bloc countries in joining efforts for the purpose of solving them. Following preparatory work in each country and consideration of all of the possibilities and requirements, all-round measures were developed and adopted during a Council session (October 1983) for achieving collaboration aimed at improving the supply of foodstuffs for the populations of CEMA member countries. The importance of this question was emphasized during an economic conference for CEMA member states at the highest level (June 1984), at which time it was noted that the fraternal parties and governments of the CEMA member countries attach great political importance to providing reliable support for the population in the form of foodstuffs and consider the general development of the branches of the agro-industrial complex and collaboration in this sphere to be a priority task.

In conformity with the all-round measures, tense work is being carried out within the CEMA member countries aimed at achieving stable growth in the production of grain, meat, milk, vegetables, fruit and fish and also products obtained from their processing and an improvement in production efficiency in all elements of the agro-industrial complex. Importance is attached not only to obtaining the agricultural products but to processing them as completely as possible and delivering them to the consumer with minimal losses. The all-round measures call for the development of the food industry branches together with their radical technical re-equipping. The organization of the carrying out of these tasks, which are comprehensive in nature, was assigned to the Permanent Committee of CEMA for Collaboration Within the Food Industry and to ten other representative organs of the council.

The measures for collaboration which were developed during the 1983-1985 period by the Permanent Committee of CEMA within the food industry were aimed at increasing the production of foodstuffs and improving their quality. In the interest of achieving more complete use of all of the valuable components of agricultural food raw materials and secondary resources at processing enterprises, they began introducing resource-conserving waste-free technologies into operations which involved the use of highly efficient equipment. Scientific-design

collectives undertook to develop systems for the complete mechanization and automation of production processes, an evaluation of the quality of the food raw materials being made available for processing and the creation of economic containers and packaging materials.

During the course of carrying out the all-round measures, the programs for seven existing agreements calling for collaboration in the meat, dairy, sugar, butter-fat and canning industry, the fresh water fishing industry and others were supplemented by appropriate subjects. Sixteen contracts calling for collaboration based upon cooperation and international division of labor in the newly included subjects were signed within the framework of these agreements. Six new independent contracts calling for scientific-technical collaboration in the macaroni, starch-syrup, tobacco and fermentative branches of industry were concluded.

The joint efforts of scientific-research and planning-design organizations, production associations of the food industry and machine building of CEMA member countries led to the development of intensive resource-conserving technological processes. More than 110 types of experimental models of lines, machines and equipment, all of which are in keeping with the best international analogs, were created and tested under industrial conditions for the purpose of implementing these processes. Approximately 50 types of equipment will be prepared for production operations prior to the end of 1990.

Thus, in conformity with the program for the agreement on collaboration in improving technologies and equipment for the complete processing of meat, including the production of meat products and frozen prepared secondary meat dishes, a technology was developed for the complete utilization of blood, bones and sub-products for the production of sausage and other meat products. Industrial testing was carried out on equipment to be used for the temporary storage of blood and plasma (Hungary), a special unit for the separation of muscular tissue from bone (USSR) and others. Prior to the end of 1990, a complete set of equipment will be designed for the all-round processing of bone, which will produce bone broth (concentrated and dry), nutritional bone fat and feed meal and also protein and mineral substances obtained from defatted bone. The development of highly productive equipment for completely mechanized and automated enterprises for the storage and processing of fruit and vegetables is nearing completion. The introduction of new technologies for the production of tomato paste, apple and fruit and berry juices, vegetable and fruit semi-finished products and jams will bring about an increase in the output of products and a reduction in waste products. These intensive technologies include modernized methods for extracting fruit juices and purifying and brightening them with fermentation preparations in a continuous flow and effective methods for the



processing of fruit and berry husks for the purpose of obtaining semi-finished products (fillings, thickened puree, dry powders) for the confectionery and baking industry.

Following successful production tests, a complete line for the canning of cucumbers (Bulgaria), a set of equipment for the processing of machine-harvested tomatoes (USSR), a continuously operating press for the extraction of juice from apples (Bulgaria), an ultra-filtration unit for the purification of juice materials (Czechoslovakia), a set of equipment for the aseptic canning and storage of puree-forming products, a line for the production and storage of heterogeneous semi-finished products and also special motor vehicle and railroad tank cars for the transporting of canned goods under aseptic conditions were all recommended for series production. Prior to the end of 1990, design work will be completed on 27 more models of new equipment for the complete processing of fruit and vegetable raw materials and also systems of machines and mechanisms for the loading and unloading of such materials at storehouses and on the raw material platforms of canning plants and for the mechanization of operations concerned with the preparation of raw materials and operations involving the use of technological packaging materials and finished products.

Multilateral collaboration in the creation of highly productive equipment for completely mechanized and automated branches of the dairy industry has made possible the introduction into production of a unit for obtaining ethanol from whey (Poland), a technology for the production of non-alcoholic beverages from whey and a nutritional foam-forming preparation (Bulgaria) and also a medical-prophylactic preparation for young cattle stock (USSR). Machines for the production of cream butter using the method of continuous churning, with maximum use being made of all milk components and units for the fractionating of milk and dairy products using membrane equipment are being prepared for production.

In the European member countries of CEMA, the conversion over to a more economic method for extracting oil from oil-bearing raw materials—extraction instead of pressing, thus making it possible to increase the oil yield by an additional 3 percent—has practically been completed. A technology is being mastered for obtaining nutritional protein products (concentrates, isolates, meal and structured proteins) from oil-bearing products. These products, introduced in the form of additives to meat (stuffing, sausage meat), confectionery, baked goods and other food products, enrich them by supplying plant proteins. Through the joint efforts by specialists of the butter and fat industry and machine building in the GDR and USSR, an experimental-industrial unit was created for the production of nutritional protein products from oil seed meal from oil-bearing raw materials, with a productivity of 1,500 tons annually. During the period devoted to experimental operation, optimum

regimes will be worked out for the production of various types of protein products from the seed of sunflowers, soybeans and rape and the necessary data will be obtained for planning large-scale industrial enterprises. Experimental tests have been carried out in the USSR on an experimental-industrial model of a unit for the structuring of soybean concentrates (1986).

The completion of work concerned with the development of methods for the production of modified proteins having the desired functional properties will open up broad opportunities for enriching meat and dairy, confectionery products and others with an important nutritional substance. Experimental models have been obtained of modified soybean proteins having an improved solubility and fat-emulsifying and foam-forming properties.

In conformity with the programs of agreements calling for scientific and technical collaboration in the brewing, wine-making, alcohol, starch syrup and tobacco industry, tasks are being carried out in connection with achieving more complete and efficient use of secondary raw material resources. Thus the waste products obtained from malt and brewing production operations are being processed for food, pharmaceutical and feed purposes; the waste products of wine-making—for ethanol, tartaric acid, food dyes and protein feed for animal husbandry; alcoholic residue—for feed protein products, nutrient yeasts; secondary products obtained from the production of starch from wheat—for feed and food purposes.

Collaboration in the area of fresh water industrial fishing includes the development of a resource conserving technology for raising fish breeding stock and marketable fish through the introduction into operational practice of more efficient and effective methods for increasing the natural feed base of ponds and improving the structure and reducing the amount of concentrated and mixed feed per unit of increase in fish.

The scientists and specialists of CEMA member countries have not ignored one important question—the creation and introduction into operational practice of objective methods and automatic means for evaluating the quality of food raw materials being made available for industrial processing. This problem has been included in the program of existing agreements for scientific and technical collaboration in the sugar, butter and fat, canning and dairy industry.

Positive results have been achieved in connection with improving the use of express methods for evaluating the quality of sugar beets being made available for processing. Twenty experimental models of automated lines, a number of instruments and units for evaluating the quality of raw materials and also an automated system for maintaining accounts with suppliers, all of which were created during the 1981-1986 period, have undergone industrial testing and have been recommended for

series production. In particular, a semi-automatic line of the "Beta-Test" (1st generation) type for evaluating the quality of sugar beets has been produced and tested at sugar plants in the GDR and USSR. Express analyses of raw materials can be carried out using this line: determining its degree of contamination, sugar content and also the amount of sodium, potassium and alpha-amino acid in the beets. This line has been recommended for series production and has been included in the nomenclature for the specialized production of equipment for delivery to interested countries in 1986-1990.

At the present time, work has been completed on the "Beta-Test" (2d generation) automatic line for evaluating the quality of sugar beets being made available for processing, with use being made of instruments and units created in the USSR. It was tested in advance at sugar plants in the GDR, with complete testing scheduled to be carried out in 1988 at the Yagotin Sugar Plant (USSR). In addition, an all-round program has been developed in Czechoslovakia for the acceptance of sugar beets and for maintaining accounts with the raw material suppliers, using the "Beta-Test" (1st generation) line produced in the GDR and a miniature computer produced in the country.

The butter and fat industry has also been enriched by a new innovation—an automated system for the express analysis of the quality of sunflower seed, which provides for the selection of samples, transporting them and determining the oil and moisture content of the seed and the acid number of the oil in the seed. The system was produced in the USSR, tested in 1985 under industrial conditions at the Belskiy Butter and Fat Combine and it has been turned over for experimental-industrial operation.

Work is being carried out in the canning industry (USSR) in connection with the creation of automatic systems for the express analysis of the quality of tomatoes and for maintaining accounts with suppliers. Experimental models of units for the selection and processing of samples and for determining the quality indicators for tomato raw materials were produced and tested in 1985-1986. They are available for use in an automatic system or they can be employed independently. In 1987, acceptance tests were carried out on experimental models of a dosing apparatus for selecting samples of whole tomatoes, on the "Tomakolor" instrument and on a set of equipment for determining the proportion of unused waste products and in 1988 tests will be carried out in the USSR on the entire complex.

Specialists attached to the dairy industry are engaged in designing an infra-red analyzer for the quality of milk. Plans call for international industrial tests to be carried out on an experimental model in 1988. The mastering of production operations and the extensive introduction into operational practice of new automated systems are making it possible to accelerate considerably the acceptance and processing of raw materials and to reduce

losses in such materials. Extreme importance is being attached to the fact that a reduction in labor expenditures will release tens of thousands of workers who are engaged in manually carrying out numerous operations concerned with the selection of samples and the carrying out of analyses. Overall, production efficiency and the quality of the goods being produced will be raised. Since for the purpose of developing the food industry decisive importance is being attached to strengthening the logistical base for production, the representative organs of CEMA have launched considerable operations aimed at organizing collaboration in this sphere.

In accordance with a recommendation by the CEMA Committee for Collaboration in Machine Building, the machine building organizations of CEMA member countries have joined up with food industry organizations for the purpose of participating in joint works associated with agreements and contracts on collaboration, as drawn up within the framework of the CEMA Permanent Committee for Collaboration in the Food Industry. This made it possible to solve, in an efficient and complete manner, the problems concerned with the creation of technological processes and the equipment required for implementing them, including the international testing of experimental-industrial models, the organization of specialized production and mutual deliveries of this equipment.

Thus, as a result of collaboration in improving equipment, technology and output production in the macaroni industry, new experimental-industrial models of equipment for the storage and transporting of flour and other components, matrices for a press and an automatic unit for the packaging of macaroni products (GDR) were created and tested in 1985.

In 1986, a unit for the preparation and squeezing of dough (USSR) and equipment for the drying of macaroni products (Czechoslovakia) were produced. International testing of an experimental-industrial model for a complete line will be carried out in 1988 and its series production and delivery to interested countries will commence in 1989.

Thus, through joint efforts on the part of two CEMA organs in the production of equipment for the food industry, success was achieved in accelerating the process of moving a new innovation along the chain of events: science - equipment - production - market.

However, notwithstanding an increase in mutual deliveries of specialized equipment, the requirements of the food industry of CEMA member countries are still not being satisfied fully by means of internal production or through deliveries from other CEMA member countries. A great amount of work is being carried out at the present time in connection with expanding collaboration in this area.

The permanent CEMA committees for collaboration in the chemical industry, in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy and in construction are also participating in the work concerned with solving those problems associated with developing the logistical base of the food industry.

Thus, recommendations have been developed in the CEMA Permanent Committee for Collaboration in the Chemical Industry for increasing output and specialization in the production of the products of micro-biological synthesis, including for fresh water industrial fishing operations.

During the course of coordinating their national economic plans for 1986-1990, interested countries coordinated their objects for coordination on a bi-lateral basis. Food industry enterprises are being erected, modernized and supplied with modern equipment in Vietnam, the Republic of Cuba and Mongolia, with technical and economic assistance being provided by European socialist countries.

The introduction of the results of joint scientific-technical works into the food industry is making it possible for CEMA member countries to increase their food

resources and expand the assortment and improve the quality of their food products. However, if the population is to be ensured a stable supply of such products, the effectiveness of collaboration must be raised still further and solutions must be found for certain complicated inter-branch problems, particularly those associated with strengthening and developing the logistical base of food industry branches and the organization of international specialization and cooperation in the production of equipment and packaging materials.

The increasing economic potential of CEMA member countries and the results of collaboration thus far realized allow us to assume that further interaction among Socialist Bloc countries in the agro-industrial sphere will make a substantial contribution towards accelerating solutions for the problems concerned with ensuring that the populations of CEMA member countries are provided with an improved supply of food goods.

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### Prospects for Settling Regional Conflicts Positively Assessed

18070217[Editorial Report]Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 14 August 1988 carries on page 3 a 1400-word military-political review by M. Ponomarev about various regional conflicts, some of which are on their way to a political settlement and others for which no end is in sight. Ponomarev notes that a "deadlock situation is arising in the majority of these conflicts." He points out that, in recent years, the role of the United Nations has grown and contributed significantly to the political settlement of a number of crisis situations. He cites the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan and the UN role in mediating the Iran-Iraq conflict as examples. Ponomarev is optimistic about the prospects for a settlement in southern Africa. "Security should triumph in this corner of the globe." He states that security should also triumph in Southeast Asia. "It is still early to speak of a firm peace in Kampuchea. The prospects for its achievement are already visible (the Bogor meeting, Vietnamese plans for troop withdrawal) to the naked eye and this cannot but make one happy." Ponomarev describes the Somali-Ethiopian conflict as "already in a stage of settlement," citing as evidence the renewal of diplomatic relations and the exchange of prisoners-of-war (POWs). He then notes conflicts for which the end is not yet in sight: the Near East and Central America, particularly Nicaragua. "Israel continues to suppress the occupied Arab lands by force and refuses to recognize the Palestinian peoples' rights, proposing unacceptable conditions for convening an international conference to reach a regional settlement." Ponomarev claims that "the ruling circles of the United States stand behind Tel Aviv. In this way, they not only are making achievement of peace impossible in Central America, but are fanning out, in every way possible, armed conflicts. This relates primarily to Nicaragua." He cites continued U.S. support for the Contras and also notes Washington's unceasing attempts to overthrow the Panamanian government.

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### Methods of Studying Economic Condition of Afro-Asian Proletariat

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[Article by Sofya Iosifovna Kuznetsova, doctor of historical sciences, head of the Asia and Africa Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences Social Sciences Scientific Information Institute: "Procedure of Studying the Economic Position of the Afro-Asian Proletariat"]

[Text] In the recent past the Afro-Asian region was synonymous with the "world village," the peasant world, but by the start of the 1980's its socioeconomic character had changed fundamentally in the process of industrialization and urbanization. A multimillion-strong bloc of

urban classes and modern-type strata, incorporating a sizable "proletarian nucleus," has taken shape in the social structure of countries of the region. Thus there were here in 1980 some 506 million townspeople, including approximately 38-40 million modern-type industrial workers,<sup>9</sup> which constituted almost 40 percent of the urban population and 22 percent of the present-day industrial proletariat of the nonsocialist world.

The growth of the numbers and significance of the present-day proletariat of the developing countries is intensifying the ideological struggle in connection with questions associated with determination of its role and its class characteristics. A number of bourgeois and petty bourgeois concepts advances anti-urban and antiworker ideas as a counterweight to Marxist-Leninist theory. More often than not this means a counterpoise of the "rich city" to the "poor village" and the problem of the "privileged nature" of the urban proletariat. The "privilege" concept is propagandized simultaneously by bourgeois scholars, the "new left"—followers of Franz Fanon—and also statesmen and politicians engaging in populist phrase-mongering. Various versions of this concept are known in Latin America and in Asia, but the most developed has been based on material of Tropical Africa: the "new left" have united the "proletariat proper" (as distinct from migrants) of Tropical Africa with the elite and sub-elite into a kind of uniform social community which they call the "worker aristocracy". This concept is thus employed for combining the most heterogeneous categories of wage workers—from the top bureaucracy to regular urban workers.

As is known, the "worker aristocracy" concept was formulated to denote a small privileged stratum of the working class counterposing it to the main block. The founders of Marxism-Leninism revealed in depth the causes and nature of this phenomenon. It is important to note here that they saw the high pay of this stratum not as a consequence of high skills but as a privilege (a bribe, handout on the part of the bourgeoisie). And this privilege is itself born of privilege, what is more: the economic base of the "worker aristocracy" is the superprofit secured by the privileged position of a given country (industrial, colonial or any other important monopoly).

As a consequence of the general low level of development of their economy and subordinate (and not privileged) position in the world capitalist economy the economic possibilities of the separation of a highly paid stratum of workers are immeasurably fewer in Asian and African emergent countries. They exist partially at some major enterprises (belonging to the TNC, for example) and in individual sectors of industry. Skilled workers who originated in the former metropolises or white workers in South Africa remain a kind of "worker aristocracy" (but this is a temporary phenomenon); workers of indigenous nationality in the rich oil-exporting countries with a small population have been placed in privileged conditions (this also is the result of an exceptional situation).

The separation within the proletariat of capitalist and developing countries of a narrow "worker aristocracy" stratum does not alter the main socioeconomic characteristics of the proletariat as a whole as the class creating surplus value by way of the sale of its manpower. The proletariat is fighting for a general rise in the price of the latter, and within the framework of this struggle, for equal conditions of its sale. For this reason the most important demands of the workers movement include not only an increase in wages but also equal pay for equal work. The latter does not signify a call for the wage-leveling remuneration of any work but a demand for the elimination of both privileges and discrimination.

The procedural fallacy of the concept of the "privileged nature" of the developing countries' urban proletariat is precisely the fact that, first, its essence as an exploited class is glossed over and, second, it is counterposed to another exploited class—the peasantry—inasmuch as it is maintained that urban workers are in a privileged position compared with rural workers. In the version of the "privilege" concept propagandized by the "new left" the counterpoise of the proletariat to the peasantry is further intensified by the unification of the proletariat with the elite. Even the "worker aristocracy" stratum which actually exists remains part of the proletariat (while serving the bourgeoisie, it does not merge with it), but an entirely mythical combination of the whole proletariat and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is proclaimed here, however. The thus constructed "worker aristocracy" is declared an ally of the international monopolies. Whence the political conclusion that the urban proletariat is the junior partner of the ruling bloc in independent Africa and whence follows the demand that the "worker aristocracy's" consumption be cut. This demand coincides with the proposition of many bourgeois scholars and also the leaders of a number of young states proceeding along the capitalist path concerning the "egotistic nature" of the unions' struggle for wage rises.

Marxists and also many scholars of the radical school in political economy support the struggle of the working class for an improvement in its economic position and oppose the various versions of the "privilege" concept. Nonetheless, the debate has lasted a number of years now, and much attention is paid to these questions in a recent group monograph on the international workers movement<sup>1</sup>. The point being that, besides exposure of the general procedural fallacy of the "privilege" concept, it is essential to analyze the arguments of its supporters in detail, showing primarily the actual economic situation of the workers and peasants.

The most popular argument of the supporters of the "privilege" proposition is the reference to data on the appreciable growth of wages in Asia's and Africa's industry since the war. However, data on the dynamics of the nominal and real wage are not of identical value for study of different detachments of the international proletariat. In developed countries this indicator reflects the position of workers relatively fully inasmuch as it is a

question of a proletariat which has already won in stubborn struggle the family minimum living wage and is struggling to maintain it or improve its position. In the colonies, on the other hand, wage rates were determined on the basis of the solitary worker, and the very pronounced growth of real wages in the years of independence still does not signify the possibility of maintaining a family on it. Consequently, the identical growth of the index of real wages of French and Zairean workers by no means leads to the equation of the characteristics of their economic position. The young independent states should not flatter themselves unduly with the growth of this index—it needs to be known what living standard actually corresponds to it.

How is it possible with the greatest accuracy and objectivity to "measure" the living standard without being confined to individual examples (since for each fact or figure confirming the difficulties of urban life other facts and figures attesting the ease thereof may be adduced)? The most reliable method is to compare wages with the family minimum living wage. Calculations made per this method in respect of a number of Tropical African countries<sup>2</sup> showed that in the leading sectors of industry the average earnings of workers (with all additional payments) by the start of the 1960's did not exceed 45-70 percent of the highly modest living wage for a four-person family (husband, wife and two children). Only one exception was uncovered: in 1963 average earnings in Zambia's mining industry had risen to 102 percent of the said minimum. In other words, the workers have been forced everywhere either to leave part of their family in the village (then they could allow themselves enough to eat) or go hungry together with the family. Budget surveys testify unanimously to the latter, and a shortage of calories and protein was noted in the families not only of unskilled but also skilled workers, what is more.

A new family minimum living wage of the urban worker with regard for the rise in the average cost of manpower as a result of the development of modern industry requiring workers with a higher level of skills and general training and also the sociopolitical changes in independent Africa needed to be worked out in the 1970's. Until this had been done by competent specialists or unions, it was expedient to compare wages with the former minimum living wage increased not qualitatively but merely quantitatively—on the basis of a six-person family (husband, wife and four children, which corresponds more to the average size of the African family). The "record indicator" was once again recorded in Zambia's mining industry, where in 1973, per the same calculations, average earnings amounted to 120 percent of the said minimum for a six-person family. The improvement in 10 years of independent development was considerable, but this improvement was associated mainly with the rise in the proportion of skilled labor: by 1975 some 35 percent of African miners, whose wage rates had grown appreciably, as distinct from those of unskilled miners,

were considered skilled. Average earnings in Zambia's manufacturing industry grew in the period 1963-1973 from 69 to 76 percent of the minimum living wage.

In the latter half of the 1970's the rise in the cost of living had overtaken the increase in wage rates to such an extent that in 1980 average earnings in mining industry corresponded to 99.6 percent of the mining living wage for a six-person family, in manufacturing industry, to 64 percent<sup>6</sup>. Thus at the start of the 1980's urban workers were in a worse position than at the start of the 1960's.

Miners of Zambia's "copper belt" (a complex of modern enterprises for mining copper ore and smelting black copper) have always figured in literature as an example of the highest prosperity, about which other African workers can only dream. What, however, does this prosperity mean in reality? The possibility of living in the city with one's family under relatively normal conditions, no more. More specifically, earnings at the level of 100-120 percent of the minimum living wage ensure a relatively full (if only in terms of calories) diet, decent clothing and continuation of the children's education after elementary school, whereas 45-70 percent of the minimum living wage (the typical situation for urban Africa) means malnourishment, debt and the need for extra earnings or the acquisition of products from the country.

Thus whereas prior to WWII the earnings of the urban worker prevented him from living in the city with his family altogether (all rates were based on the solitary migrant, whose family lived off the land) and by the start of the 1960's supported it partially, a persistent struggle, in which there are victories and setbacks, is now under way in Africa for the creation of the conditions for the normal worker urban family. This task has not yet been accomplished for the majority of the proletariat in the making. Even the workers who, like the miners of the "copper belt," have in strike battles scored significant successes by African standards have won not a position characteristic of a "worker aristocracy" but the right to a family. Man's elementary right. The majority, however, has still to win it.

Thus a comparison of wages and the minimum living wage and also the material of budget surveys clearly show that in terms of its living standard the African working class cannot be attributed either to the "worker aristocracy" or to some "privileged" stratum in general. But the working class is, perhaps, despite the low living standard in absolute terms, relatively "privileged," for all that, compared with the peasantry? It is on this relative "privilege" that the defenders of this proposition insist most. From the premise that the wages of urban workers are two-three times higher than the income of the peasant they draw a conclusion as to the greater prosperity of the first in the same (or almost the same,

given an adjustment for urban expensiveness) proportion. The real living standard of neither is examined here, we emphasize, in accordance with objective indicators.

It would be expedient to arrive at the most accurate determination of "who lives better" as follows: comparing the correlation of wages and the family minimum living wage of the urban worker with the analogous indicator obtained as a result of comparison of the income and peasant family minimum living wage. However, as a consequence of the objective difficulty in computing both the income and the necessary expenditure of the peasant (specifically, considering everything that the land gives for sustenance "for free" is practically impossible) the concept of the peasant family minimum living wage has not been duly illustrated in literature. On the contrary, it is simpler to make calculations for the minimum living wage of the worker family, and they have been made in respect of a number of countries by scholars or unions for there is a direct practical need for this: the worker movement's demands concerning the introduction of or a rise in a legislatively determined minimum wage are associated with this minimum.

Owing to the absence of the necessary source data for a scientifically substantiated comparison of the living standard of workers and peasants, researchers have been forced to confine themselves to highly approximate "measurements" thereof. Use may be made of the information from budget and other surveys on the caloricity of the diet primarily since it is relatively accurate and directly comparable, and eating is man's first biological requirement. Whereas the urban worker usually obtains 60-70 percent of the calorie norm, spending over 70 percent of his budget on food, as budget surveys attest, how many calories would be obtained by the peasant with an income two-three times less, spending even 80 percent of his budget on food? The unemployed frequently have to be content with 50 percent of the calorie norm. But unemployment is a temporary condition. But could the peasant live his whole life content with 30-40 percent of this norm? A nonsense which is seemingly not spotted by specialists operating only with relative values and ignoring the real living standard of both the workers and the peasants. In reality the peasants' diet is not two-three times worse than that of workers, quite the contrary frequently, they eat better than them.

The worse diet of the urban poor, particularly the first generation of townspeople, including workers,<sup>7</sup> compared with the country has been recorded in a number of countries. For example, it can be seen from material of surveys of the end of the 1960's-start of the 1970's that in Indonesia and Pakistan per capita consumption of calories and protein in the cities was lower than in the countryside (in the cities of Indonesia 87 percent of the population consumed less than the minimum 2,000 calories per day recommended for the country, whereas in the countryside, 61 percent), in Tunisia and Mexico, on the other hand, the diet was better in the city<sup>8</sup>. In



Morocco a 1970-1971 budget survey revealed a lesser consumption of calories in the city (2,202 calories) than in the country as a whole (2,466 calories) <sup>9</sup>. Abundant material for a comparison of the situation in town and country is regularly provided by the National Random Survey in India. But the most comparable data on the amount of calories per person per day were adduced only for 1961-1962: in each of 14 states consumption in the city proved lower than in the countryside; in Kerala, where the diet is the worst, the difference between town and country here was slight—townspeople had 95 percent of the average norm of the rural inhabitant—in the states where the food situation was better, however, the gap was more pronounced: in Punjab the townspeople had only 70 percent of the rural norm, in Rajasthan, 78 percent. <sup>10</sup>

The data of the surveys of diet do not always coincide (for this reason a final conclusion cannot be drawn without material pertaining to the majority of countries), but more often than not they confirm the regularity noted above: townspeople, first-generation particularly, including workers, have an inadequate diet, as a rule. This deterioration in diet (compared with the country) under conditions of seemingly increased earnings is caused by the fact that it is through economies in food that the necessary urban expenses (rent, transport, a cheap transistor radio, European clothing) are met.

Foreign literature employs as another instrument of comparative analysis the "poverty line" ("indigence threshold") concept. As distinct from the minimum living wage, which caters both for man's physiological and social requirements, it pays the paramount attention to the first (which is necessary in order not to die and to maintain fitness for work). However, determining even such primary needs is more difficult, with regard for the difference in urban and rural levels even more, than the quantity and quality of nourishment which man needs from a medical viewpoint. For this reason there is no unity of opinion concerning the principles of determination of the "poverty line," and there is a huge difference in the calculations of the sum of money corresponding thereto. Thus a work prepared under the aegis of the World Bank proposed a common indicator for all developing countries. <sup>11</sup> The ILO went somewhat further than the World Bank and determined continental variants for a similar indicator. <sup>12</sup> But in both cases the use of a general (continental) "measure" prevents consideration of specific features of the situation in the city and countryside of individual countries.

Very few separate calculations of the "poverty line" necessary for tackling the latter task have been published (they have most often been made only for the city). According to the material of surveys of the mid-1970's, 44 percent of families in rural localities were below the rural "line" (270 Egyptian pounds a year) in Egypt, but in the city, where this "line" was drawn at two levels (250 and 400 Egyptian pounds), 32.5 and 65 percent of families respectively were below it <sup>13</sup>. In Pakistan the

situation has changed. According to the calculations of the Pakistani economist S. Nasseem, 70 percent of urban families and 60.5 percent of rural families were below the "poverty line" in 1963/64, but in 1969/70, 59 and 60 percent respectively <sup>14</sup>. Continuing S. Nasseem's calculations, Van Ginneken obtained for 1970/71 an even bigger advantage of the Pakistan town compared with the country: 55 and 65 percent respectively below the "line"; he noted the same trend in Mexico and Tunisia (40 and 60 percent) and, particularly, in Tanzania (20 and 65 percent) <sup>15</sup>. In respect of Indonesia the calculations of local specialists do not coincide but they also show a lesser proportion of families below the "line" in the town than in the country. <sup>16</sup>

If the results of the calculations of the "poverty line" and the calorific content of the diet are compared, it transpires that in a number of cases they contradict one another. Thus according to material of the work of Van Ginneken, in Indonesia and Pakistan, judging by diet, there is greater poverty in the cities, whereas the proportion of persons living below the "poverty line" is, on the contrary, greater in the country. This contradiction is explained by the fact that the calculations for the corresponding versions of the "poverty line" failed to take account of the reorganization of the entire structure of the budget of the urban family (many outlays are simply absent in the country) and that the adjustment in determination of the outgoings corresponding to the "poverty line" in town and country was made only on the basis of the higher price of food in the first.

The contradictory nature of the comparison of the scale of poverty in town and country is explained by the vagueness of the interpretation of this concept itself and the downplaying in the "poverty line" of the social component of man's requirements reflected more precisely in the minimum living wage devised separately for town and country. It is as a consequence of the lack of source data for the latter that it is necessary to use information on the calorificity of the diet. Although such comparisons are approximate, of course, they undoubtedly help to expose the proposition concerning the "privileged nature" of the urban working class as part of the urban population.

We would emphasize once again that procedurally this proposition is connected with the fact that researchers confine themselves merely to a comparison of indicators of the nominal wage in industry and the nominal peasant income, and the first value is calculated precisely, what is more, but the second, more than approximately, with a manifest tendency toward understatement. But a whole number of questions arises given this approach. Is it correct simply to compare certain monetary amounts, abstracting ourselves from what is purchased for this money? Is it correct generally to treat money as some abstraction, irrespective of whether this be capital (private, state) or earned income always earmarked (mainly, in any event) for consumption? It is clear, evidently, what scientific (or regular everyday) significance is

attached to the statement that an identical amount, say, is obtained: 1) by the worker of a developing country in which there is a system of social security and free social services and commodities in mass demand are sold freely at comparatively low prices; and 2) the worker of another developing country, where there are as yet neither pensions nor free education and health care, prices in the state-run stores are higher and much has to be purchased on the black market. In this case no one will argue that an identical wage secures a different living standard and, consequently, the purchasing power of the wage is different.

Why, then, in the event of a comparison of the wage of a worker and the income of a peasant are differences in their living conditions necessarily entailing differences in living standard, that is, a change in this actual "value" of the nominal wage or income, frequently not taken into consideration? Why is account not taken of the fact that foods products are not only more expensive in the town than in the country but that there is essential additional expenditure also? A large part thereof—on accommodation, transport, European clothing and footwear, watches even—is in a certain sense (or to a certain extent) "deductions" from the wage, as it were, for a city job cannot be held without them (in other words, what has to be purchased), and only a lesser part—spending on education above elementary level, the movie theater, a television receiver, newspapers and treatment at the doctor's and not by the witchdoctor, for example—really testifies to a broadening of the range of the worker's requirements (what may be purchased) and the increased cost of manpower. However, even now the latter expenditure occupies an extremely small place in the budget of the majority of workers (8-10 percent), and the range of satisfiable requirements is extended to a considerable extent thanks to economies in the diet. In short, earned income (wages) is realized in consumption, and, consequently, the living standard is the main determinant of the income's purchasing power. Income cannot be either measured or compared when "divorced" from this real ground.

No less important is another aspect: for what the income (wage) is obtained, that is, by what quantity and quality of labor it is earned. Such an analysis of the nominal wage (income) from the viewpoint of workmen's labor input (qualifications and duration of time worked) is made partially in the sphere of wage labor when the rates of pay of skilled and unskilled manpower are determined. Yet here also in each instance the labor expended on obtaining income must necessarily be taken into consideration for the sake of objectivity of the comparison of the situation in town and country.

Experts usually confine themselves to an affirmation of the sharp difference in productivity and the difference ensuing therefrom in pay between the modern and traditional sectors of the economy. One of the few attempts at a more specific comparison of the incomes of the worker and the peasant with regard for their labor

input was made by K. Hinchliffe, who calculated to this end the hourly earnings of peasants and city workers from the material of surveys of the end of the 1960's-start of the 1970's in villages of North Central State and the state of Kwara, in petty production in the city of Kano and at large textile enterprises in Kaduna (Nigeria)<sup>18</sup>. Comparing persons with identical qualifications, Hinchliffe employs as the measure thereof information concerning the level of education and compares accordingly illiterate peasants and illiterate workmen of petty and large-scale (factory) urban production. On the basis of a comparison of the hourly remuneration of unskilled labor (with the basic adjustments for the cost of living in the city) K. Hinchliffe concluded that "if we compare what is comparable, particularly with an adjustment for the difference in duration of work, level of education and cost of living, the differences between peasants and workers of the urban modern sector will not be that great anywhere, apparently. At the start of the 1970's, in Northern Nigeria at least, they constituted 5-40 percent. People working in petty production (in the city—S.K.), however, with regard for the appropriate adjustments, evidently earn less per hour than the peasant."<sup>19</sup>

K. Hinchliffe's article analyzed the data of the nominal wage (income) surveys not only from the viewpoint of the living standard which it secures but also from the viewpoint of the workman's labor input (in terms of its quantity and quality). This is its undoubted merit, and it is for this reason that reference to a work which is 10 years old continues to be made.<sup>20</sup>

Is use of hourly earnings as an indicator failing to reflect absolute annual income legitimate? As is known, the consideration and comparison of hourly earnings together with average annual data is widespread in all studies pertaining to the working class, but for peasant labor the average annual measurement is customary in order that its seasonal nature be taken into consideration. If when comparing the wage and income of these two detachments of working people we confine ourselves to average annual indicators, the labor input of both workers and peasants remains overshadowed in this case. Hinchliffe, however, comparing them per the "work (hourly) indicator," thereby demonstrated who obtains how much given identical qualifications (level of education) for identical work time. This is a very important indicator. It makes it possible to take into consideration on the one hand the non-year-round employment of the peasant and, on the other, intervals in the course of the year as a consequence of the unemployment of the regular worker and the irregularity of the labor of the temporary worker both in large-scale and, particularly, in petty production (the more so in that this irregularity and part-time employment are prevalent in cities of developing countries).

The proponents of the idea of a lowering of the wages of workers in the name of "social justice" in relation to peasants with a poorer lifestyle forget that there is another social justice also—equal pay for equal work.

This principle demands that in an identical interval of time (given the identical intensity and complexity of the labor) earnings be identical not only for men and women but also in different sectors of the national economy, that is, if the factory worker has in a year worked twice as many hours as the peasant, he should, consequently, receive according to his labor for it is equal pay only for equal work and, consequently, unequal pay for unequal work.

It follows from this that, first, justice consists not of a reduction in the wages of the worker but in ensuring the year-round employment of the peasant, second, as the Soviet economist A.Ya. Elyanov observes, social inequality in all its forms, property included, differences in qualifications and so forth are not always regressive. He emphasizes that highly developed production makes "higher-than-usual demands on the physical condition, general training and level of practical skills of the work force, which, in turn, needs a considerably greater sum of vital resources for its compensation than persons employed in unskilled or semiskilled labor in the traditional sector of the local economy. The inequality which arises in this soil reflects to a certain extent, consequently, movement away from a state of socioeconomic stagnation and progress in the development of the productive forces, which ultimately correspond to the interests of all of the inadequately developed society" <sup>20</sup>.

So the advantage of the city with its large-scale and medium-sized machine production is not the higher rate of pay but the possibility of working more (in terms of quantity and quality) and thereby earning more. In other words, there is in the city simultaneously an increase in the average annual number of work days (compared with farming or stockbreeding under the conditions of the nonintensified traditional farm) and the concentration of skilled highly productive labor (in the country there is simply no room for a number of occupations) with an immeasurably higher value of added product than can be produced by traditional agricultural production.

The task of a comparison of the level of skills of town and country types of labor is no less complex than a comparison of the corresponding income. The level of education has to be deemed the sole common "measure" suitable for tackling it, although the specific skills of a person working in crafts, agriculture and traditional services acquired by way of the assimilation of the experience of generations and not by school instruction is, of course, discriminated against, as it were, here.

The higher level of education of the urban compared with the rural population, just like the direct connection between income and education, is a world trend. This is one of the reasons for the average indicators of urban income (but by no means of each occupation) exceeding rural indicators. This regularity has been ascertained in Africa also. "Only a few townspeople who have gained access to more skilled and better-paid work, not all, of whom the majority are unskilled workers, may live better

than the peasants," "The African City," which analyzed the works of J. Woddis, G. Knight, K. Hinchliffe, Samir Amin, G. Pfefferman, R. Cohen, R. Sandbrook, (A. Pis), A. Luebeck and other authors who reject the popular viewpoint (W. Lewis and others) that the wages of the unskilled urban worker are two-three times higher than the peasant's income, emphasized. Nominal average statistical data on the excess of even urban over rural income are not thereby "repudiated"—it is simply that they are not comparable for the imaginary superiority of the "city generally," the "worker generally" is in practice the natural advantage of more complex and highly productive labor.<sup>1</sup>

So the main thing is not only the living standard which the wage secures but also that for which it is paid. A comparison of urban and rural income and earnings in the contemporary and the agrarian (noncontemporary) sectors on average would seem incorrect in the light of this approach.

New studies have been conducted recently confirming the fruitfulness of the abandonment of a comparison of such averaged data. Thus the first world report on labor problems prepared by the ILO communicates the results of its study of differences in income between town and country in 14 sub-Saharan African countries. The analysis is conducted in three stages. At the first stage the general indicators concerning income were assembled, at the second, an adjustment for differences in the cost of living in the city and the country was introduced, at the third, an attempt was made to compare the income of workmen with identical qualifications.

According to the results of the first stage, the size of the gap in average income between the country and the city fluctuated from 1:2 to 1:4 and in Lesotho amounted to 1:8 even, and these fluctuations were connected, what is more, with the level of urbanization and the nonagricultural employment of the peasants. A certain lessening of the said gap was revealed at the second stage since city prices were higher than rural prices in different countries by 10-40 percent. Finally, at the third stage (with regard for qualifications) it transpired that "in the Francophone countries the average agricultural income is similar to the earnings of persons employed in the urban non-formal sector or unskilled workers of the modern sector paid at the level of the minimum wage. In Kenya the gap remained considerable—1:2.9—in Nigeria and Tanzania, on the other hand, the ratio approached identity" <sup>22</sup>.

Thus if the comparison is made at the level of average nominal indicators (it is to these that many of the "exposers"-of-the-city researchers confine themselves), the discrepancy in incomes between city and country will be universal, an adjustment for urban expensiveness mitigates it somewhat, but the most accurate comparison with regard for the difference in qualifications confirms the proposition concerning the urban advantage as "the natural advantage of more complex and highly productive labor" and also the proximity of the remuneration of



unskilled labor in factory industry and agriculture. The survey noted the latter in 13 (including Nigeria) of the 14 countries. The sole exception—Kenya—proved short-lived. By 1980 even, as a consequence of the decline in the real wages of unskilled urban workers, "there was virtually no difference between the income of small farmers and unskilled workers (considering the higher cost of living in the city)" <sup>23</sup>. Procedurally the said ILO survey once again calls attention to the danger of general conclusions based on the material of one-two countries (if the data pertaining merely to Kenya and for a particular narrow interval of time had been taken, for example).

Surveys in a number of other regions of the world have confirmed the trends recorded by the ILO. Thus referring to the data of surveys in Brazil, India and the American South which showed that the gap in the pay of town and country is rather "a reflection of the difference in qualifications, age, sex and employment than a gap in pay in pure form," American economists reached the conclusion concerning a reassessment of the advantage of urban life since "the lion's share of the gap in nominal pay is explained by the difference in qualifications and cost of living" <sup>24</sup>.

In Soviet literature various aspects of this problem have been studied in detail by Ye.S. Popov <sup>25</sup>. He has assembled and collated valuable material on the differentiation of pay in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Without taking issue with some of his critical remarks leveled at "The African City" monograph, we will dwell briefly on his general concept. It consists of the fact that in Europe the formation of an industrial proletariat was slow and gradual, but in the developing countries, rapid and spasmodic, and that the counteraction, what is more, of the factors of backwardness and the traditional environment reminiscent of a coiled spring has been overcome "by the strongest pressure of the factors of progress". Tropical Africa was chosen as an example, and Ye.S. Popov dates the start of the process of the formation of the industrial proletariat, what is more, only from the period since WWII. Its driving forces are said to be "the powerful forces of attraction" of industry and the city as a whole, among which pertains the more appreciable discrepancy between earned income in the modern sector and in the country than in Latin America.

What this discrepancy is in reality has been mentioned above. Furthermore, the creation of mines, transport and factories began in the majority of Tropical African countries prior to WWII. And the regular workers for them were secured not by "forces of attraction" but by a system of forced labor and also the imposition of taxes in monetary form, which forced the peasants to leave for the city in search of earnings. There could have been no question even of any high wages in this period: the entire system of the remuneration of migrant labor was based on the pay of the solitary worker. Only in postwar years

(prior to independence, in individual sectors, in independent Africa, on a broad scale) did the process of transition to the use of a permanent work force, which had to provide for wages permitting the upkeep in the city of a family, begin.

Consequently, in reality the "coiled spring of factors of backwardness" was initially overcome with the aid of coercion—there was no substitution therefor of "factors of progress" (that is, happy specifics of Tropical Africa). "Powerful forces of attraction" of industrial labor and urban life in postwar, particularly in independent, Africa have, as in other developing regions, really existed. They are quite strong and represent factors of progress. But the effect thereof by no means amounts to "pressure" on the traditional environment in order to wrest workmen from it for the country supplies mainly unskilled manpower, but the city lacks primarily skilled manpower. The latter is only partially formed from migrants with an education "pulled" into the city, the other source thereof—increasingly important in recent years—has been the growing indigenous urban population. The situation is not all that specific compared with the general situation in the modern world.

Ye.S. Popov adduces a number of examples of the insignificance of the discrepancy in the remuneration of unskilled industrial and rural labor in Britain and Russia at the initial stages of industrialization in order to show that in the developing countries, where the discrepancy is immeasurably greater, he believes, this process is proceeding differently. In fact the situation is strikingly similar when it is a question of unskilled labor. The discrepancy in average data, on the other hand, between the modern and traditional sectors depends on the proportion of skilled (naturally, better-paid) labor.

At the initial stages of industrial growth of the now developed capitalist countries the proportion of complex production was lower, special demands were not, accordingly, made of the basic work force and the youth of the working class of these countries was marked, as is known, by superexploitation, poverty and harsh conditions of existence. At the initial stages of industrialization of the developing countries, on the other hand, the equipment and technology of the 20th century are being employed to a certain extent, and for this reason high demands are immediately being made of part of the work force—skilled and semiskilled workers and also office workers of the modern sector. It is as a result of their higher wages that the average indicators pertaining to all of factory industry, for all of the modern sector even more, are increasing. On the other hand, this increase is the result of the influence of world progress and the victories of the international working class. The level of intensification of agriculture, however, and the introduction of capitalist relations in the countryside of developing countries is incomparably below the analogous indicators in the developed capitalist countries. For this reason the gap in pay in industry and agriculture in the developed capitalist countries is currently, of course,

appreciably less than in the developing countries—Ye.S. Popov is absolutely right here, but his conclusion that 150-200 years ago "the difference in the remuneration of unskilled labor in machine industry and agriculture was in Europe less than in the present-day developing regions" <sup>26</sup>, p. 122 is not borne out by the actual facts.

Our differences are in all probability connected with the proposition concerning the need to "pay for" accelerated development, which is propounded by the author consistently: "The more rapid the process of industrialization and the attendant break with rural structures, the more appreciable should be the rise in real wages in factory-plant industry" <sup>27</sup>. As an example of such "payment for the acceleration" of the formation of an urban industrial proletariat the author adduces the Tropical Africa of the 1950's-1960's, finding therein a "spasmodic growth" of workers' real earnings and declining to see the real living standard which they secured, which was discussed earlier. Unfortunately, the working people have always "paid" for their country's accelerated development both by concentrated labor and reduced remuneration therefor (if the increase in its quantity and intensity and also the increased demands on the complexity and quality of labor are considered), and the proposition concerning the increased recompense of the workers, on the other hand, is in this case in the direct meaning of the word (that is, a rise in living standard, given an invariable level of labor input) not corroborated either in the history or in the current position of the working class of the developing countries.

Ye.S. Popov avails himself of data on pay in the modern sector as a whole and employs as equivalents the concepts "wage of all persons employed in this sector" and "wage of unskilled factory-plant workers" <sup>28</sup>. Yet in our time these values differ appreciably. In other words, studying the situation in Britain at the end of the 19th century and Russia of the 17th-19th centuries, Popov was perfectly correct in comparing the wages of unskilled workers of city and countryside. However, when it is a question of developing countries of Asia and Africa of our day, he compares values which are not comparable: average data on the pay of all workers (that is, included skilled also) of the modern sector on the one hand and the income of peasants of the traditional sector on the other.

It is the confusion of different concepts and the comparison of noncomparable values which lead to certain scholars, although rejecting the "privileged nature" of the working class concept, actually repeating, unfortunately, the argument of its defenders concerning the sharp surfeit of the remuneration of unskilled labor in the modern compared with the traditional sector, failing to make the further essential analysis thereof (for what quantity of labor it is paid and what living standard it secures).

Not the "privileged nature" of the proletariat as a class or of the city as a whole but the economic advantages of the city and the modern sector (we shall not concern

ourselves now with the appreciable sociopolitical advantages of the city, much has already been written about this)<sup>29</sup> can be seen distinctly in the actual reality of the developing countries. These advantages amount primarily to the greater opportunities for securing employment compared with the peasant traditional activities and, partially, more skilled, highly productive, complex and intensive labor within the framework of this employment. Such labor should, accordingly, be recompensed not only in the name of justice (equal pay for equal work, and unequal pay for unequal work) but also in accordance with the "purely economic" factors of securing manpower and maintaining it in the proper condition—the high cost of work training and the need to compensate for the workman's "energy and nervous expenditure". It is still a long way to such remuneration in cities of the developing countries. Unskilled labor, on the other hand, with the minimum weighting for the difference in living conditions, is recompensed at approximately the rural level, it being a question here of a countryside with a sufficient quantity of land for peasant farming traditional for this zone, without sharply expressed class stratification making it necessary to consider separately the income levels of the rich and the landless.

In conclusion we would emphasize once again that from the viewpoint of choice of scientifically substantiated procedure of study of the economic position of the present-day urban proletariat the analysis of wages must incorporate descriptions of their actual purchasing power on the one hand and the quantity and quality of labor input of the work force on the other. Accordingly, no comparison of the earnings of workers of the modern sector and the earned income of the traditional peasantry may be confined to a simple comparison of nominal income. It is necessary to correlate these incomes on two levels. The first is their comparison with the minimum living wage of the worker and peasant family, which will show the living standard of both.

The second level—consideration of the quantity and quality of labor input—determines whether the wages and income are economically justified from the viewpoint of the labor theory of value or testify to the "privileged nature" of this social group or the other. Regarding earned income as a certain use value earned by a certain quantity and quality of labor, we see that urban workers of the modern sector are not "privileged" in terms of either absolute (living standard) or relative (comparison with the country) indicators.

Inasmuch as the present-day urban industrial proletariat of Asian and African countries is not a "privileged" part of society (a "worker aristocracy"), it is characterized by the basic socioeconomic features of the other detachments of the international working class (questions of the sociopolitical character of the proletariat manifested in various forms of the worker and communist movement have not been broached here as there is a vast amount of literature on this issue). Study of the partial question—

the economic position of the Afro-Asian urban proletariat—hereby shows that the specific feature of the latter exists within the framework of the community of the international proletariat. This demonstrates once again the world-historical nature of the regularities of the development of mankind. The specifics of their action and the singularities of the proletariat of any country or region should be studied only with regard for these common regularities.

#### Footnotes

1. "Estimates and Projections of Urban, Rural and City Populations, 1950-2025: the 1982 Assessment," United Nations, New York, 1985, pp 86-91.
2. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 6, 1985, p 2.
3. See the chapter "Critique of Anti-Marxist and Non-Marxist Theories on the Role of the Working Class in the Developing Countries" in "The International Workers Movement. Questions of History and Theory," vol 7, Moscow, 1985, pp 499-560.
4. See "The African City. Critical Outline of Foreign Concepts," Moscow, 1979, pp 115-147.
5. C. Perrings, "Premise and Inference in Labor Studies: a Zambian Example" in AFRICAN AFFAIRS, London, January 1982, vol 81, No 322, p 96.
6. Estimated from S.I. Kuznetsova, "Social Structure of the African City," Moscow, 1972, pp 253-254; "Yearbook of Labor Statistics 1984," Geneva, 1984, pp 606, 663, 723.
7. Quoted from "The African City...," Moscow, 1979, p 125.
8. W. Van Ginneken, "Rural and Urban Income Inequalities in Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Tanzania and Tunisia," Geneva, 1976, pp 32-33. Data on town and country are not distinguished separately for Tanzania.
9. J. Laure, "Nutrition et population en vue de la planification alimentaire," Paris, 1983, pp 26, 27.
10. Quoted from "Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy," New York, 1975, pp 11, 15.
11. "The Assault on World Poverty," Baltimore, 1975, pp 19, 79; B. White, "Political Aspects of Poverty, Income Distribution and Their Measurement" in DEVELOPMENT & CHANGE, The Hague, vol 10, No 1, 1979, p 106.
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13. B. Hansen, S. Radwan, "Employment Opportunities and Equality in Egypt," Geneva, 1982, pp 99, 130.
14. S.M. Nasseem, "Mass Poverty in Pakistan" in PAKISTAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Karachi, No 12, 1973, pp 322-325 (quoted from M. Qadeer, "Urban Development in the Third World," New York, 1983, p 53).
15. Van Ginneken, Op. cit., p 37.
16. Quoted from B. White, Op. cit., p 94.
17. Van Ginneken, Op. cit., p 37.
18. K. Hinchliffe, "Labour Aristocracy—a Northern Nigerian Case Study" in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES, London, 1974, vol 12, No 1.
19. M. Peil, P. Sada, "African Urban Society," Chichester, 1984, pp 133, 263.
20. "The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress," Moscow, 1983, p 374.
21. "The African City...," Moscow, 1979, p 134; D.F. Luke, "Labour and Parastatal Politics in Sierra Leone: a Study of African Working Class Ambivalence," Lanham, 1984; J.Z. Parpart, "The 'Labour-Aristocracy' Debate in Africa: the Copperbelt Case, 1924-1967" in AFRICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY No 13, Madison, 1984, p 174.
22. "World Labour Report. 1," Geneva, 1984, p 124.
23. P. Collier, D. Lal, "Labour and Poverty in Kenya, 1900-1980," Oxford, 1986, p 212.
24. A.C. Kelley, J.G. Williamson, "What Drives Third World City Growth?" Princeton, 1984, pp 6, 7, 30.
25. RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR No 6, 1983; No 1, 1984; NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 2, 1984.
26. RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR No 6, 1983, pp 120-121.
27. NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 2, 1984, p 21.

\* As distinct from the developed capitalist countries, where the urban proletariat incorporates not only industrial workers but also the commercial and office, "engineering" and government official proletariat, in Asia and Africa office workers and government officials are not as yet part of the working class. Inasmuch as the Afro-Asian urban proletariat is at the present time equal to the industrial proletariat, these terms are employed in the article as equivalents.

The numbers of townspeople here and subsequently are estimated in accordance with UN data (1). The estimate of the numbers of the industrial proletariat was made by L.A. Freedman (2).



<sup>b</sup> Considering the low elasticity of spending on the diet, the average urban and average rural data on the latter (as distinct from analogous income indicators) may be used to characterize the position of workers and peasants. For example, a wide-ranging 1969 survey in Kinshasa of Africans' living standard (from middle-tier government officials through the unemployed) revealed that among different groups of workers indicators of the calorific content of the diet and protein consumption was 5-20 percent below the average urban level (7).

<sup>c</sup> Indian scholars who prepared material for the United Nations on the situation in Kerala believe that in the 1961/62 survey the data on consumption are understated: according to their own calculations, not 85 percent of the state's population but 47 percent of rural and 54 percent of urban inhabitants receive less than 2,000 calories per day (p 34), that is, the advantage of the country remains at the higher overall level (10).

<sup>d</sup> Absolute poverty is equated with a per capita annual income of \$50 and less, the second poverty line, \$75 (in 1969 prices). These data are sometimes taken as international standards of poverty in the country and the town, but there are no grounds for this (11).

<sup>e</sup> Two "poverty lines" were determined also: the poorest—in Africa—\$59 annual income per person and less (in 1972 prices), in Asia, \$50; the very poor, \$115 and \$100 respectively (12).

<sup>f</sup> According to the calculations of (Kh. Esmara i Sadzhogyo), in the town this indicator declined in the period 1967-1976 from 86 to 64 percent, in the country, from 89 to 80 percent (16). Availing himself of the data of (R. Sandram), Van Ginneken calculated for 1969-1970 some 30 percent in the town and 55 percent in the country (17).

<sup>g</sup> From the viewpoint of an analysis of the living standard it is necessary to take into consideration the entire complex of urban and rural expenditure, that is, the corresponding minimum living wage. Hinchliffe lacked such data and he confined himself basically to deducting from the earnings of townspeople rent as the biggest additional expenditure compared with the country. Because of this he even overstates the advantages of the city to a certain extent (18, p 65).

<sup>h</sup> Specifically, M. Peil and P. Sada support K. Hinchliffe's principle of "comparing what is comparable" and adduce his calculations (19).

<sup>i</sup> The argument has continued in the 1980's without having introduced anything appreciably new to the parties' reasoning. The list of opponents of the proposition concerning the "worker aristocracy" has been reinforced by the authors who studied the position of workers in Sierra Leone and Zambia (21).

<sup>j</sup> We would note merely that K. Hinchliffe's article, which is evaluated positively in "The African City," is unjustifiably presented to the Soviet reader by Ye.S. Popov as a "pile of absurdities" (26).

<sup>k</sup> "Advantage" and "privilege" are concepts which are close in Russian and English. But the first contains more the nuance of "a preponderance in respect of good qualities, in respect of worth" (Dal), whereas the second has always been employed in the "privileged groups" and "classes," that is, emphasizes superiority to someone or other or the use of this advantage "in the infringement of common rights" (Webster). Therefore in opposing the concept of the "privileged nature" of the proletariat (or city) we speak of advantages of the city, large-scale production and the contemporary working class. In other words, as distinct from privilege, which may be both won and acquired by inheritance, advantage is what has been "earned".

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**Foreign Economic Factor in Uzbek Development**  
*18250073 Tashkent OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI*  
*U'ZBEKISTANE in Russian No 4, 1988 pp 3-12*

[Article by A.M. Alimov under the rubric "Party Decisions Realized!": "On the Foreign Economic Factor in the Development of Uzbekistan's Production Forces"]

[Text] The 27th CPSU Congress emphasized the need to actively use foreign economic ties to accelerate the USSR's socioeconomic development. Today the problem of expanding and deepening the participation of the country's economy in international division of labor is going far beyond the confines of the narrowly restricted economic task of obtaining foreign currency resources to pay for import purchases. The role of foreign trade and other forms of international cooperation as an external factor of economic development means above all that "by entering socialist and international division of labor, countries gain the opportunity to mutually supplement their production potential and enrich themselves with aggregate scientific-technical know-how and on this basis raise the level of their development."<sup>1</sup>

The major tasks posed by the party and the government in the area of developing foreign economic ties, fundamentally improving the management of the foreign economic complex, and intensively increasing the country's export potential using output with a high degree of processing require maximum attention toward this question at all levels of the economic hierarchy.

In recent years because of the rapid growth of our foreign economic ties, the strengthening of the socialist integration of the CEMA countries, and the development of new progressive forms of international economic relations, among them those with the industrially developed capitalist as well as the developing countries, opportunities for international division of labor to have a more active impact on the regional development of the USSR's economy have especially increased. On the other hand, regional conditions and factors to an ever greater extent also influence the further development and increased efficiency of the USSR's foreign economic ties. Increasing the role of particular regions in these ties is becoming an important element of optimizing the development and distribution of production forces and performing the complex of socioeconomic tasks on their territories. This trend is an objective one and in the future this interdependence will obviously increase. Therefore, the traditionally used geographic aspect of the study of the USSR's foreign economic ties, including the analysis of foreign trade with individual countries and groups of them and with the study of world trade market conditions and the like is already becoming insufficient.

In the present stage of development of the Soviet economy, consideration of the foreign economic factor of the distribution of production forces is becoming important.

Analysis of the regional problems of economic construction in the USSR for the long-term perspective should necessarily take into account the various forms of impact of this factor.

The refinement of the economic mechanism of management which is now taking place in the country's foreign economic complex is also focused on insuring a close interrelationship between the interests of certain Union republics and high efficiency in carrying out their foreign economic activity. The measures adopted open up broad opportunities to activate their participation in foreign economic ties and substantially expand the rights, increase the material incentive, and intensify the accountability of territorial organs for insuring the comprehensive development of regional economic complexes taking into account the foreign economic factor. The correct solution of this problem on the basis of the best combination of sectorial and territorial principles of planning and management in the foreign economic sector of the economy will make it possible to do the following:

- expand the country's export base in a more comprehensive and interrelated way by closely coordinating the planning of the development of sectorial export lines for particular Union republics;

- increase the efficiency of the use of natural, material, and labor resources of the Union republic for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of all social production and, as a result, increasing the efficiency of the country's foreign economic ties;

- reach the optimal level of concentration and specialization of export production locally and on this basis increase the quality and competitiveness of the output being produced;

- better substantiate the republic's import needs and achieve a rational correlation between all-Union and international specialization.

As a component part of the country's economic complex, the Uzbek SSR is significantly involved in the system of international and particularly socialist division of labor and uses foreign economic ties to mobilize additional opportunities to successfully perform economic tasks, intensify regional production, and accelerate scientific-technical progress. Uzbekistan's experience in participating in USSR foreign economic ties attests to their positive influence on increasing the efficiency of the republic's entire economic complex, improving its structure, and increasing the UzSSR's role in the system of all-Union territorial division of labor. According to our estimates, in the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan the increase in the republic's national income through the foreign economic factor alone amounted to more than 8 percent. The general trend is toward a continuing increase in this factor's role in increasing the republic's

national income and in turning foreign economic ties and factors which improve them into one of the important conditions of continued efficient development of Uzbekistan's economy.

Foreign economic ties also have a substantial impact on accelerating introduction of the achievements of scientific-technical progress into the republic's economy. High standards for exported output make it necessary to produce it with the best technical parameters on the level of international standards. This in turn sharply increases demands on the organization of export production, on its planning, and ultimately on the entire sphere of social production in the republic.

Foreign economic ties are highly profitable and serve as a major reserve for increasing the efficiency of social production in the republic. Carrying out certain major projects of regional economic development (for example, comprehensive development of large masses of virgin lands, construction and reconstruction of irrigation structures, and others) requires very large initial expenditures. In these conditions foreign economic ties can serve as an important source for enlisting financial capital, highly efficient equipment, machines, and mechanisms for the construction of production, transport, and social objects. The participation of the involved foreign countries on a treaty basis within the framework of integrated agreements or compensation transactions and the creation of joint international enterprises and associations will also help accelerate the process of high-quality training of particular categories of engineering-technical personnel and work cadres in the republic. And a double gain is being achieved: the strain on the investment program for development of the republic's economy diminishes and regional production is saturated with progressive equipment and technology and highly qualified specialists.

The following main areas of impact of the foreign economic factor on the development of Uzbekistan's production forces seem possible now and particularly in the future:

—deepening of the republic's production specialization in producing output not only of all-Union but also international (above all within the framework of the CEMA countries) importance;

—improving the sectorial structure of the republic economic complex with the organization of extensive processing of local and imported raw materials and comprehensive use of natural resources;

—intensifying the process of the economic development of Uzbekistan's territory with rational use of new deposits of fuel and energy and mineral-raw material resources as well as land, agroclimatic, and water resources;

—improving the distribution of the republic's production forces with the formation of industrial centers and rayons and territorial-production complexes;

—strengthening concentration, specialization, and cooperation in the leading sectors of material production of the Uzbek SSR;

—developing the republic's production infrastructure, especially mainline transport and power engineering;

—balancing the levels of economic development of the republic's oblasts and rayons.

Thus, the impact of socialist economic integration on deepening production specialization and refining Uzbekistan's sectorial structure had an effect, for example, on developing the electrical engineering industry in the republic. The high rate of development of this sector is a result, on the one hand, of the accelerated rate of electrification of the economy and the formation and development of nonferrous metallurgy which insure a strong raw material base as well as the opportunity to effectively use rapidly increasing labor resources and, on the other—the republic's active participation in satisfying the needs of certain CEMA countries for this sector's output. The products list of enterprises of the republic's electrical engineering industry includes about 2,000 types of equipment and items, many of which are on the level of the best foreign models. The output of the republic's electrical engineering enterprises is exported to more than 30 countries, among them all CEMA countries. For example, the Sredazkabel Production Association supplies more than 2,000 standard sizes of cable output for the most varied sectors of industry and agriculture to all CEMA members. The association is the only enterprise in the socialist community which has incorporated the production of a complete set of cable products for power stations, coring cable for geographic exploration work, contact wiring for electrifying transport, and the like. At the same time the technical modernization of the Sredazkabel Production Association is being carried out to a significant extent through deliveries of complex technological equipment from the European socialist countries (Hungary and the GDR).

The impact of integration processes and other forms of foreign economic ties on the development of the republic's cotton economy complex is particularly significant. Uzbekistan's specialization in cotton growing and the great efficiency of the use of natural and labor resources in the production of cotton insure and will continue to insure the republic's leading role as the main raw material base of the textile industry of the countries of the socialist community. Uzbekistan is the only supplier of equipment for cotton gin plants and spare parts for that equipment, machines, and cultivating equipment to the socialist countries where cotton is cultivated (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Cuba). The republic is in first place in the socialist community in terms of production of technological equipment for the textile industry. Within the



framework of Inlegmash, the international economic association of the CEMA countries, textile machine building enterprises of the Uzbek SSR are taking part in some agreements on specialization and cooperation of production of textile machines, particularly continuous lines to manufacture cotton and cotton-type thread, including nonspindle spinning using robots. The creation by the joint efforts of Uzbek and Czechoslovak machine builders of the first models of machines with nonspindle spinning was the result of international socialist division of labor and scientific-technical cooperation. Dozens of the largest textile enterprises of the CEMA countries are equipped with machine tools made at the Uzbektekstilmash Production Association. In coming years the association expects to raise the proportion of export output to 30-35 percent.

The possibility of direct or compensation deliveries of natural gas to the European CEMA countries using the resources of Uzbekistan and the other republics of Central Asia emerged with the creation of the transcontinental gas line "Central Asia—Center" and then its connection to the USSR's unified transport system.

In connection with the discovery of deposits of natural gas, the existence of other types of valuable chemical raw materials and nonferrous metal ores, and the construction of new petroleum refineries and powerful thermal and hydro power plants, the integration importance of Uzbekistan's economic complex as the producer of some energy-intensive products of nonferrous metallurgy and the chemical industry is increasing.

In this way, a certain group of production facilities and enterprises (more than 200 of them) which supply output to the outside socialist market and economic and production ties and relations which arise in the process of international socialist division of labor between Uzbekistan's enterprises and the enterprises of some CEMA members can be discerned in Uzbekistan's territorial-production structure.

The direct impact of integration processes on the distribution of the republic's production forces appears in various forms: industrial complexes of primarily export specialization (the group of enterprises of the electrical engineering, textile, and porcelain industries, and others) are being formed; certain industrial rayons and centers with a high concentration of production are being developed (the Tashkent, Fergana, Angren-Amalyk, and Navoi-Kyzylkum industrial rayons and the Bekabad, Chirchik, and other industrial centers), some of whose output is sent to the socialist countries; and the necessary production infrastructure is being created (the gas line system "Central Asia—Center").

The integration processes of the interaction of the Uzbek SSR's economy with the economies of the socialist countries has and will continue to have a marked influence on the development of the republic's production forces and intensifies the comprehensive character of the

use of its natural and economic resources. They are constantly being refined along the path of cooperation in the area of cadre training, the exchange of production know-how and planning and technical documentation, joint formulation of scientific and technical problems, and mutual assistance in doing planning, surveying, and experimental work.

The Uzbek SSR is participating in the USSR's technical-economic cooperation with the industrially developed capitalist countries and because of this is able to use their latest scientific-technical documentation, licenses, and industrial equipment. For example, supplies of full sets of industrial equipment from France have helped greatly to develop large-panel housing construction in Tashkent. Soviet-Italian economic cooperation had a favorable effect on the development of the chemical, food, and other sectors of industry in the Uzbek SSR. Some of the republic's large enterprises, the Chirchik and Navoi chemical combines and the Tashkent Plastics Plant for example, are furnished with modern Japanese machines and equipment. Machines and technological equipment delivered from Austria, England, the FRG, and other capitalist countries have been installed in many of Uzbekistan's light industry enterprises.

Further growth in imports of machines and equipment from the developed capitalist countries will have a definite impact on the Uzbek SSR's economic development: first, the modernization of production capital in the republic's old industrial rayons, the incorporation of new sources of natural resources on the basis of modern equipment and technology, and the creation of new local territorial-production complexes with particular export functions are being accelerated, and that will result in the future in improved territorial ratios of development of the republic's economy.

At the same time it must be noted that of the republic's total volume of export commodities, more than 27 percent are delivered to such developed capitalist countries as England, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the FRG, France, Japan, and others. In addition to the traditional raw material commodities—cotton fiber and karakul sheepskins—machine-technical items, chemical products, fabrics, china, and other commodities of the republic's manufacturing industry are extensively exported there. The export of output, especially ready-made items and above all machinery, which is carried out in conditions of severe competition on the capitalist world market, has a stimulating effect on regional production from the standpoint of its higher technical level, greater labor productivity, and improved output quality.

Increasing the volume of the republic's export deliveries to the markets of the developed capitalist countries presupposes activating the Uzbek SSR's participation in new progressive forms of foreign economic ties with priority development of them in the modern sectors of manufacturing industry.

The participation of the republic's economy in the USSR's technical-economic cooperation with the developing countries has a certain impact on that economy. Analysis of the commodity structure of the republic's export deliveries to these countries attests to the fact that machines and equipment occupy the dominant place in this structure. Agricultural machines and equipment for the chemical and textile industries, diesel engines, compressors, excavators, movie equipment, cable output, and other items of the machine building industry with the mark of the plants of Tashkent, Chirchik, Kokand, and other cities of Uzbekistan are being extensively exported to the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries.

However, presently the proportion of the developing countries in the total volume of the republic's export deliveries (in the last 10 years it has fluctuated at an average level of about 5 percent) is substantially lower than the similar indicator for the USSR as a whole. Both political and economic prerequisites speak of the advisability of increasing the output of export commodities in the Uzbek SSR above all for the developing Afro-Asian countries. The foreign economic orientation of Uzbekistan's sectors of specialization toward the broad region of adjacent and nearby developing countries is of special importance.

All-out development of the USSR's foreign economic ties in such an important and dynamic region as the Near and Middle East is of primary importance in maintaining the stability and extending the influence of the country's socioeconomic achievements in this region. Broader participation in those ties by the Uzbek SSR will make this process more concrete, taking into account that the republic has some similar features in natural, ethnic, and historical conditions with many of the countries of this region.

Uzbekistan is even now and especially in the near future capable of substantially increasing exports of construction services (surveying, planning, joint construction, and operation of economic objects at the initial stage, initial economic evaluation of the preliminary plan, and the like) for the developing countries of the Near and Middle East. The great potential for expanding the volume of the market for exporting construction services both in hydroeconomic and in industrial-civil construction in conditions of further activation of the interrelations with these countries and their territorial proximity, which facilitates developing direct production ties and jointly incorporating natural resources in the border zone, creating international infrastructure systems, building hydraulic engineering projects on border rivers, and organizing border trade, as well as their growing import demands will help substantially increase the volume of exports of construction materials—cement, sheet glass, ceramic tile, metal construction design elements and pipe, and others—from the republic.

Uzbekistan's participation in the USSR's foreign economic ties with the developing countries in the future will play a significant role in providing the economy with scarce types of fuel, raw materials, foodstuffs, and certain items of light industry, as well as in improving Soviet export since the proportion of machines and equipment in the republic's exports to these countries is to be substantially increased.

At the present time ministries, associations, and enterprises of the republic through the MVS [Ministry of Foreign Ties] are giving technical assistance to 34 developing countries, which is helping form their national economies. The Uzbek SSR's participation in erecting industrial and other projects in the developing countries will increase the export of power engineering, road construction, transport, and other types of equipment to these countries. Thus, the republic's expanded assistance in creating the power engineering base in Afghanistan stimulates demand for various types of power and electrical engineering equipment; the need for agricultural machines and mechanisms and the like arises as a result of building hydro engineering projects and carrying out irrigation work. Increasing the production of these types of machine building output in Uzbekistan with due regard for the demand of the neighboring states will make it possible to locate the centers of their production more rationally as well as involve the republic's growing labor resources in these (for the most part labor-intensive) sectors. Also very promising is the establishment of production cooperation ties with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in an "iron ore—metal—machines" system. According to this system iron ore would come to the USSR's metallurgical centers—in Kazakhstan or Western Siberia, and there be processed into metal and metal items of the grades which Afghanistan needs. From this same metal machines and equipment for the needs of the Republic of Afghanistan would be manufactured in Uzbekistan. All this will insure greater export specialization of the republic's machine building industry. In turn, increased import deliveries from Afghanistan and the other nearby developing countries of bauxite, nonferrous metals, phosphorous raw materials, fine-fiber cotton, and other types of scarce raw material commodities<sup>2</sup> and the creation on their basis of processing enterprises in Uzbekistan will help substantially increase the efficiency of the corresponding sectors of industry as well as increase the employment rate and introduce changes in the distribution of the republic's production forces.

In addition to this, it will be important to organize in Uzbekistan continuous servicing of international transit and export of transport services. Even now the port of Termez is becoming an important freight-handling point of the transcontinental transport system.

The construction of a bridge crossing on the Amu Darya in the region of Khayraton with mixed motor vehicle and train traffic and the start of its operation made it possible

to substantially increase the efficiency of hauling freight across the Soviet-Afghan border and thereby increased the significance of Termez as an important freight-hauling point even more.

At the present time freight from many countries is shipped transit across the territory of Central Asia to Afghanistan and partly to Pakistan. Both the developed capitalist countries and the countries of this region are very interested in expanding transit shipment through USSR territory to Afghanistan, Iran, and further through their territory on Transasiatic railroads and highways to Pakistan, India, and other countries of Asia and back. This route is becoming more and more important to the USSR and the CEMA countries. It is no accident that Sovavto-Termez, the first motor pool in Central Asia, was set up in Termez in 1980 and services international shipments.

Comprehensive analysis of the present condition and prospects of developing Uzbekistan's production forces and of the structural specifics of the development of its export production as well as of the process of deepening the inclusion of the country's economy in the system of international division of labor is making it possible to identify some important regional problems whose solution may be accelerated as a result of the broad participation of the republics in the boundary economic cooperation of the USSR with the adjacent developing countries:

- a greater proportion of industry to produce ready-made export output (machine building output in particular), formation of new sectors and structural improvement of existing sectors of industrial production, achievement of the optimal commodity and sectorial structure of export production in the republic;

- positive changes in the structure of investments, development of scientific-technical progress, and inclusion of Uzbekistan in the USSR's scientific-technical cooperation with other foreign countries;

- comprehensive socioeconomic development of promising small and medium-sized cities with simultaneous solution of the republic's employment problem;

- rapid industrial development of Uzbekistan's southern rayons;

- improvement of the republic's territorial infrastructure, including that serving foreign economic freight flow;

- comprehensive utilization of the Uzbek SSR's border position through substantial expansion of sectors specializing in producing export output or involved in their all-Union specialization (agricultural machine building, production of land improvement equipment and ready-made textile items, the canning and other subsectors of the food industry, and the like);

- development of uninterrupted transit service and a powerful specialized transport complex (automobile in particular) as well as a recreational system and foreign tourism;

- expanded imports of industrial and agricultural commodities for the needs of production and consumption.

In this way, in the near future under the influence of the foreign economic factor new sectors of industry and industrial centers will emerge on the republic's territory and will in turn represent major Union export bases with a broad list of export output.

In this connection the republic's economy is facing a number of problems whose solution will help further refine and deepen the USSR's foreign economic ties and intensify the republic's role in their development.

The formation of a Union export base in the Uzbek SSR and broader supply of the output of its economic complex to the outside market presupposes first of all fundamentally improving the structure of the republic's export deliveries by substantially increasing the share of semimanufactures and ready-made output which meets the best world standards.

Research shows that if the present structure of deliveries is preserved, the rate of growth in exports and their efficiency decline. Such an export orientation will not help increase the republic's economic potential but, on the contrary, will impede the further development of its production forces. This makes it necessary to gradually replace raw material commodities in the republic's exports with output manufactured from them. Performing this most important task will be one of the directions of the intensification of export activity, reduction of the materials-intensiveness of exports, conservation of scarce natural and above all water resources, and rational utilization of the republic's labor resources.

Based on these tasks of long-term strategy for refining the USSR's foreign economic ties and the regional-economic tasks of future development, the problem of creating a major export base in Uzbekistan should be resolved in two main directions: through stabilization or even some reduction in the volume of deliveries of cotton fiber for export with a sharp increase in its qualitative characteristics and an increase in food-gourmet exports, including fresh vegetables, fruit, melons, and dried fruits and through diversification of export production to produce semimanufactures and ready-made output, including machine-technical items.

Although it has highly valuable taste and nutritional qualities which at times are unequaled in the world, the output of the republic's fruit and vegetable complex presently occupies a very modest place in export deliveries. Let us note for comparison that in the last 10 years the volume of nuts and dried fruits exported yearly from neighboring Afghanistan on the average exceeded 80,000



tons, and the proportion of them amounted to about one-quarter of the value of all Afghan exports.<sup>3</sup> And it is useful to note that the currants, pitted dried apricots, small dried apricots with pits, and other dried fruits produced in Uzbekistan are as good as the Afghan ones. The republic grows varieties of apples, apricots, peaches, grapes, pomegranates, muskmelons, and some other fruits and melons which are unique in terms of taste, appearance, keeping quality, transportability, and suitability for drying and processing. They invariably win the highest evaluations at many international exhibits and inspections. With the proper formulation of the question and solution of pressing economic and organizational problems and broad orientation to the introduction of the achievements of scientific-technical progress in the republic's fruit and vegetable complex, many types of melons, vegetables, and fruits and output processed from them can be supplied for export, including to the industrially developed capitalist countries for freely convertible currency, without reducing domestic consumption in the republic and deliveries to the all-Union fund.

The increase in the exports of machines and equipment from the republic makes greater demands on the scientific base, the skill level and habits of labor resources, and the traditions and level of sophistication of production and possibly also requires developing cooperation ties with other foreign countries, above all with the CEMA countries, and organizing on Uzbekistan's territory production of assembly components and assemblies based on utilizing the resources of nonferrous and rare metals which are there.

Accelerating the development of export machine building in Uzbekistan by virtue of its higher labor-intensiveness (1.8 to 2.0 times higher than the similar indicator for the domestic market) can be a kind of regulator of the unemployment level in the republic. At the same time, in the regional conditions of Uzbekistan export machine building as a sphere which especially requires a significant amount of skilled labor force can be developed in stages. A substantial increase in the export of the output of those production facilities which have already been fairly highly developed in the republic or have all the necessary prerequisites for it (electrical engineering items, the output of agricultural machine building, transport machine building, and the cable industry, technological equipment for light and food industry, and others) is possible in the first stage. Deliveries of the output of complex, high technology facilities (electronics, instrument making, radio engineering, the instrument industry, and others) should more and more supplement the structure of the machine-technical items being produced for export in the subsequent stages.

An important condition of the development of Uzbekistan's export base is insuring high quality and achieving and maintaining the proper international competitiveness of all commodities the republic offers to the outside market.

A major increase in the quality of export output as the basis of intensive development of the export potential requires targeted distribution of capital investments for expanding, reconstructing, and technically reequipping enterprises with developed export sectors of production, a sharp increase in the export production quota at enterprises, and creation of specialized export enterprises, shops, and technological lines which produce output in accordance with standards and technical levels which satisfy the demands of foreign buyers. Additional expenditures to carry out these measures will be paid for by profits and the increased scientific-technical level of production in particular enterprises, which will inevitably have an effect on the republic's socioeconomic development as well.

Increasing the quality and competitiveness of output, reducing resource-intensiveness and energy-intensiveness and finding other ways of increasing the efficiency of production are among the most complicated tasks of regional development. Consequently, the process of creating the republic's export potential on the necessary scale (in the sense of the correlation between resources and the republic's needs) so that it is competitive in terms of quality and structural indicators will be fairly long and will not allow us to abandon extensive methods of boosting exports in the very near future.

Expanding the export base in the Uzbek SSR and deepening the specialization of its economy in this direction should be based on maximally utilizing the advantages of the all-Union territorial division of labor which has taken shape and of the potential for production cooperation of the republics of Central Asia within the region as well as with other, above all Eastern, regions of the country—Kazakhstan and Siberia.

With the proper organization of occupational training of worker cadres Uzbekistan's high labor supply makes possible and useful locating the most labor-intensive (but not water-intensive) export production facilities in the republic. That presupposes strengthening cooperative ties in some sectors with other regions of the country, especially with labor-short Siberia by moving a significant part of the labor load for bringing raw materials and semimanufactures to ready-made export output to Uzbekistan.

The problems of further developing the regional export base and strengthening the republic's role in the USSR's foreign economic ties are complex and multifaceted and demand that sectoral, territorial, and departmental interests be coordinated and combined, and that makes it necessary to resolve those problems on the basis of the development of a comprehensive target program.

The formation in Uzbekistan of a major export base will help further develop production forces and increase the republic's role in the all-Union division of labor and raise its contribution to performing state-wide tasks.

### Footnotes

1. M.S. Gorbachev, "Speech at the Rumanian-Soviet Friendship Rally," PRAVDA, 27 May 1987.
2. This includes repaying USSR credits for creating industrial enterprises in these countries.
3. See: BYULLETEN INOSTRANNOY KOMMERCHESKOY INFORMATSII. 1987" Appendix No 2, pp 48-66.

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### Ukrainian Official on Joint Venture Problems 18250072 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 12 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by V. Urchukin, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers: "Joint Ventures: Problems in Their Formation"; first paragraph is PRAVDA UKRAINY introduction]

[Text] A little more than a year ago, legislation was passed permitting the establishment of joint ventures between Soviet organizations and firms of socialist and capitalist countries in the territory of the USSR. At the present time, there are already more than 150 such ventures in operation in the USSR, 7 of which are in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

By way of example, one can name the Odessa enterprise "Kranlod" for the production of self-propelled jib cranes with a lifting capacity of 40 to 250 tons on a motor-vehicle chassis with an increased cross-country capability. It was established by the Odessa Production Association "Plant imeni Yanvarskeye Vosstaniye" and the Swiss-West German firm "Liebherr." The efficient flow of deliveries of component products by the "Liebherr" firm and the new design decisions and materials form the basis for the prestige and high competitiveness of the output of the joint venture. Its profit, distributed proportionally to the invested capital of each of the sides, is not subject to taxation, which stimulates high rates of increase in production. As early as 1990, "Kranlod" will produce several hundred cranes (including on special motor-vehicle chassis available after the dismantling of the medium and short-range missile launchers).

It is understandable that now, when the first steps are being taken in the establishment and work of joint ventures, it is essential to have a clear idea of what objectives are thereby being set and how to resolve the problems that arise.

The bringing in of the foreign partner and his capital in the formation of joint ventures makes it possible to achieve a number of goals. Among them should be named supplemental investments, the acquisition of new

markets, and rapid access to progressive technologies and new methods of organizing labor and management. It is especially effective to organize joint ventures with the scientific and technical priority of the Soviet organization. The short-term delivery of automated equipment for technology developed by the Soviet enterprise will make it possible to supply output to the world market at the very highest prices through the foreign partner.

The foreign partner is attracted by the possibility of the duty-free importation of equipment into our country and less expensive electric power, fuel and rolled metal. At the same time, however, we must keep in mind that many foreign firms are counting on our ignorance about questions having to do with world market prices for equipment and the rental value of land, water resources and the industrial infrastructure. Thus, for example, the Odessa Production Association "Plant imeni Yanvarskeye Vosstaniye" did not include the rent for land and water in the statutory fund of the Soviet participant, which artificially increased the share of the "Liebherr" firm in the joint venture and accordingly led to our country's losing part of the profit and freely convertible foreign exchange.

I would especially like to stress that the inclusion of the rent for land and water in the statutory fund of the Soviet participant does not presuppose the granting of the legal right to land and water to the foreign partner. The land and mineral resources thereby permanently remain the property of the state. In this way, the establishment of joint ventures differs fundamentally from the practice of granting foreign firms concessions for land and mineral resources. As a rule, the participation of the foreign partner in the joint venture is not stipulated in time but it can also be limited. Legislative provision has been made for his free withdrawal from the association with guaranteed compensation for his invested capital in freely convertible currency.

The established joint ventures have not yet resolved in a standardized manner the participation of oblast soviets of people's deputies or of city soviets in individual major cities, which diminishes local interest in their effective functioning. Under the existing rules, the establishment of joint ventures by allied organizations is not coordinated in the stage of the development of the technical and economic bases with the oblsposkoms and councils of ministers of the union republics, which clearly does not correspond to the accepted directions for the restructuring of the economic mechanism.

To be counted among the very largest joint ventures in our republic are the international scientific-production association "SELTO" established by the Cherkassy scientific-production association "Rotor," the Electric Welding Institute imeni Ye.O. Paton, and the Bulgarian economic combine for welding inspection equipment and the international association formed by the Novokramatorskiy Machine Building Plant and the combine for heavy machine building in the Bulgarian city of

Radimir. Also in operation are more than 20 joint scientific-technical collectives established by the institutes of electric welding, problems of materials technology and superhard materials of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences and science centers of Bulgaria, the CSSR, Hungary and Poland.

Except for "Kranlod" and "SELTO," the established joint ventures are still in the initial stage of formation. One of the reasons for this is the superficial elaboration of the technical and economic bases for the establishment of such ventures without investigating the prospective needs of the world market for the future output, the progressiveness of technology, the interplay of prices, the dynamics of the rate of exchange, and the level of production profitability.

The chambers of trade and industry of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR are still not performing their mediating functions satisfactorily in the establishment of joint ventures. It is apparent that here it is necessary to have a system to stimulate their mediation with payment for services in the form of a share of the profit of the Soviet participant in the joint venture.

Mediating functions in the establishment of joint ventures can also be performed by the republic's foreign economic bank and its branches.

The question of the establishment of another 20 joint ventures this year is currently in the stage of preliminary study or the preparation of statements of intentions. Especially promising is the organization of joint scientific medical centers: a traumatological center in Simferopol based on the research of Prof A.I. Bliskunov and a center in Kiev for microsurgery on the eye, the treatment of children's poliomyelitis and drug addiction (on the basis of the research of the temporary creative group "Otklik" and the well-known psychotherapist A.M. Kashperovskiy).

The beautiful natural resources of the Carpathians, Crimea and Dnieper Basin create interesting preconditions for the development of foreign tourism with the involvement of Austrian and Finnish tourism firms along with the existing system of hotels of USSR Intourist. It seems that the idea of establishing an association for international tourism under the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers with the involvement of republic ministries and oblispolkoms and the Kiev gorispolkom as equal partners is worthy of serious attention. This will make it possible to build first-class hotels, camping areas and a commercial center in Kiev in a short time by bringing in foreign capital. But in carrying out this idea, of course, it is necessary, in diverting land for the construction of hotels and other tourist complexes, to preclude the use of parcels in national parks, reservations and historic monuments.

Such a "parallel" development of foreign tourism and the establishment of joint therapeutic centers makes it possible through foreign exchange receipts to begin the technical reequipment of public health, agricultural biotechnological centers, and enterprises for local and light industry. The establishment of joint ventures for the production of personal computers and new high-tech consumer goods is also worthy of full support.

Doubtless certain inhibiting factors are hindering the important and necessary work of organizing joint enterprises in our republic. The inability of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Construction to build new high-quality facilities should be considered one of them. Another inhibiting factor is the nonprogressive thinking and the fear of risk being demonstrated by some economic managers. Incompetence and ignorance are also showing up here, in particular ignorance of the legal difference between a joint venture and a concession.

Nor is the effective establishment of joint ventures promoted by excess haste, when economic managers and the mass media issue a bill of exchange for the future contract in the stage of preliminary negotiations with foreign partners, thereby limiting the possibility of choosing the most suitable participants. The apparent advantage of the future contract without the appropriate development of the technical and economic base can lead to an infringement of state interests. The following example can be presented in this connection: a number of foreign firms, raising the cost of equipment by a factor of three to three and a half and having offered obsolete technology for the processing of granite from Kapustinskiy Quarry, sought to impose their own opinion and to attain a monopoly right for the sale of granite by appealing to union directive authorities and the central press, knowing very well the sharp reaction that cases of delays in making decisions now evoke in our country.

The further development of the republic's foreign economic ties requires a restructuring of thinking and a more in-depth and specific study of the experience of socialist countries and advanced professional knowledge of marketing and international law not only from the leadership of economic and soviet authorities but also from workers in the mass media. Reports on the development of foreign economic ties must be accurate and balanced. I would also like to point out the fact that the appearance of information on the future joint venture while still in the negotiating stage may scare away the foreign partner. For it is usually a matter of new technologies and foreign firms guard their secrets carefully.

The extensive development of the production cooperation of industrial enterprises and the Ukrainian SSR Gosagroprom primarily with socialist countries as well as with the firms of Austria, Finland and Turkey in the scope of existing intergovernmental agreements can be an effective means of overcoming incompetence and a certain fear on the part of economic managers with



respect to the establishment of joint ventures with foreign partners. The organization of joint ventures and the development of production cooperation with foreign firms require new forms and methods of retraining the managerial staff of all levels and workers, the practical mastery of marketing theory, and the transition of the means of production to wholesale trade. The greatest effect in the work of joint ventures will be achieved only in the event of the broad introduction of the lease and family contract with the complete democratization of the management system.

As you know, the 19th All-Union Party Conference considered it advisable "to perfect the economic mechanism and to restructure the central and local organizational structures and the system of foreign economic ties

in the framework of the current five-year plan." It seems that it has become necessary to resolve in union authorities the question of granting to the republic or to oblast soviets of people's deputies the right to participate in the establishment of joint ventures regardless of the departmental subordination of the founding organizations.

#### Footnotes

\* PRAVDA UKRAINY already informed about this enterprise in the report "How Are Things Going, 'Kranlod'?" published on 22 June.

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### Soviet-Greek Youth Friendship Week in Siberia Plagued with Problems

18070180 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in  
Russian 26 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Ye. Kalyadina under the rubric "Frank Discussion": "The Unhappy Adventures of the Greeks in Siberia"]

[Text] The idea was grandiose.

"Imagine," a staffer of the USSR KMO [Committee of Youth Organizations] excitedly told me, "we gather together a hundred or more Greeks and bring them... to Siberia. The children of sunny Hellas—to Siberia! Unusual! That is first. Second, all the rest has grown old—Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic... That's enough of showing our country to foreigners as if copied right out of an Intourist advertisement. Time for restructuring here as well. Let's have a look at our interior. They will find out the whole truth of life..."

The idea was inspired. I therefore accepted with pleasure an invitation to take part in the 4th Friendship Week of Soviet and Greek youth on the route Bratsk—Irkutsk—Kemerovo. And when I saw my old Athenian acquaintance Mary Belbu, a correspondent for the most popular newspaper in the country, ETNOS, in the Greek delegation, I asked her to keep a diary of our trip so as to publish it in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Mary gladly agreed. Alas, the anticipated reporting did not follow. For a single and vexing reason: the expected positive impressions did not result. And in my notebook remained these words of Mary, spoken with genuine passion: "I dreamed of coming to your country so as to see and understand your restructuring and then relate it to my countrymen. Unfortunately, I was able to see and understand annoyingly little."

It was annoying for me as well. As for the majority of the members of the Soviet delegation. This annoyance has forced me to take up the pen.

I want to define the situation at once so that it can be understood correctly. The 4th Friendship Week was far from a sad exception. It is the sad general rule. A distinctive "breakthrough" in those misfortunes that still hinder us from holding a multitude of weeks and friendship meetings similar to them so as to help us acquire new friends in deed rather than just in words. Let us then extract the lessons together without getting offended.

So then. *Day One* Bratsk. Right from the airport, after a five-hour flight from Moscow and loaded down with suitcases, bags and knapsacks, we rush to the Bratsk GES [Hydroelectric Power Plant]. Why in such a rush—no one knows. It was not explained later, when we were welcomed at the riverbank—just admire the might of the hydro structures! The might was impressive enough. Inasmuch as this admiration was not accompanied by

any narration on the main sight of Bratsk. We then take pictures next to an enormous sluice-gate with the inscription "Photographs strictly prohibited!" and left. That's all.

*We arrive at the hotel. Along with the keys to our rooms, we receive "dry rations." And we all wait for dinner. Not so much to eat as to sit at a common table and get acquainted. We had still not been introduced to each other. And to see who was who on one side and the other. The Greek delegation included the leaders of ten youth organizations, activists from the Greek-Soviet Society and journalists, people with interesting fortunes and views of life. The Soviet delegation included representatives of all the union republics, deputies of the republic supreme soviets, internationalist soldiers...*

*I don't deny it. Communion should be unforced and unorchestrated. But this does not rule out, but on the contrary directly assumes, that it, like anything impromptu, should be prepared. The elementary rules of good atmosphere ultimately demand that people unknown to each other be introduced at an evening affair.*

*Splitting up among our corners with our dry rations, we take our leave of Bratsk from the windows of the hotel. Everyone asks himself the same question: Why did we come here?*

*Day Two* We take the "rocket" boat up the Angara to Irkutsk. That is 10 hours of travel without a stop. Beauty all around. But it remains a mystery for us. I ask the staff representatives (Komsomol workers from Irkutsk and Kemerovo) if they could at least tell us a little something about these blessed regions. They show us a cluster of storks and the little village where Valentin Rasputin was born. And that is all. Everyone gradually dozes to the hum of the motor and the splash of the Angara waves.

At sunset we dock in Irkutsk. The hotel. A hurried dinner—happily not rations. Greeks come up to me, politely interested in whether a cultural program or a get-acquainted party are envisaged. I cannot cheer them. We try to organize something similar through our own efforts without resorting to the services of the local staff of ten people. But unfortunately we learn that a two-bed hotel room is not adapted to mass friendship parties. There is a spacious restaurant hall. But we are not happy there. Then we find a way out—an entrance to the local Intourist hotel. Fortunately, it is open. But unfortunately only for foreign tourists, not Soviet ones. We thus have to have two separate parties for Soviet-Soviet and Greek-Greek friendship.

The thing we most especially expected of the Irkutsk program was a trip to Baikal. Alas, we did not see Baikal. No, no, they took us to the famous lake. And they proposed that we become acquainted with it... from the

exhibits of the limnological museum. There's no disputing that the museum itself and the tour guide made an impression. But we wanted living impressions and not museum ones.

*We stood on the shore of Baikal and watched with envy the tourist boat that was gliding along its transparent smooth surface... I do not think that the organizers of the weeks needed to take special pains to envisage a similar pleasure for our Greek guests. I think that something a little different from traditional "museum" schemes was all that was needed. Why not, for example, report the same information on board a boat instead of in a museum? Why not there, and not in the stuffy hall of a tourist base, carry on the same discussion with an academician about ecological problems? I have no doubt that then the reaction to the speech of the respected scholar would have been other than the concerted sleep of the listeners.*

*By the way, about ecology. It became the leitmotif of our visit to Irkutsk. They talked about ecology on each of the three days we spent there: the soviet and Komsomol workers, academicians, and even the "informals" brought us "ecology." There is no dispute: ecology today is a most important problem, it troubles everyone in the world. And it was thus undoubtedly worth talking about. But not to such an extent that in all the ecological furor it was not even recalled that our week coincided with the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The interest in it was very great among our Greek guests. And they went around our country chiefly in order to see our restructuring. And not in newspaper pages and not in official offices. But in life—such as it is, with all of its problems. So why, in composing the program for the week, were its organizers unable to restructure? Why were office and podium discussions preferred to immediate vital communion with people—at enterprises or simply in the street?*

*However, I will not sin against the truth. Such communion took place in Irkutsk anyway. The Greeks were invited to visit an Irkutsk family. Everyone was ecstatic about the visit. But only ten of the seventy participants in the week were able to experience this pleasure.*

*Day Six* We left Irkutsk for Kemerovo. A heavy rain was falling. We were accompanied to the railroad station. Officially. A meeting. A picture worthy only the pen of a great satirist. The speakers under great black umbrellas. Those to whom they were addressing their oratory art without umbrellas, since their hands were occupied with suitcases. Soaked to the bone, bewildered and frightened, absolutely unable to absorb anything.

How heavy a downpour is needed to wash away without a trace the monstrous web of bureaucratic meetings just for show that we are tangled up in?

The 26-hour trip from Irkutsk in a train berth could serve as the plot of a separate satirical story. But there was no laughter in Kemerovo. Not when part of the

Greek delegation (and moreover the representatives were from organizations far from close to us in convictions) was put into a 3rd-class hotel with, pardon the detail, a single toilet for the corridor. This was an emergency. Since after this reception these representatives refused to go and meet with delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference that same night.

Later, when passions had cooled and the incident was, as they say, exhausted, one of the participants in the "protest," who, by the way, despite his rightist views, has a very objective and amicable attitude toward our country, acknowledged to me that "The idea of showing us your life without make-up, with all of its problems, was excellent. And I think we are able to understand correctly the problems that restructuring is called upon to solve. But can elementary norms of hospitality really be problematical?"

And this is what the problem consisted of.

*"As early as March," related Aleksandr Kretsan, the secretary of the Kemerovo Komsomol Obkom, to me, "we submitted to the oblast ispolkom an application to book places for the participants in the week at the best city hotel. But the paperwork was... lost. And when we found this out, it was already too late: they had put those coming in the tour of Katya Semenova with the ensembles and artists of two theaters. It was unseemly to evict them, you can understand that. We tried to take extreme steps, negotiated with the authorities, but they did not meet us halfway."*

Today we talk a great deal about what the Komsomol can and cannot do, what is within its authority. The Kemerovo "incident" is food for thought on this plane.

*By the way, to the credit of the Kemerovo organizers, they were able to give an "instructive lesson" of how to conduct such meetings. "Outstanding!" was the unanimous opinion of both the Greek and the Soviet participants after we, on the eve of our return to Moscow, visited mines, an MZHK [oils and fats combine], a kindergarten and youth centers. Without podiums, simply, frankly talking about all problems—about restructuring in the Komsomol, events in Afghanistan, the national question, "informals" and rock.*

*This was, alas, perhaps the sole instructive day of the whole week. It is acknowledged that the day of parting was a sad one for me. We had to hear many bitter words from both the Greek and the Soviet participants. Here is one such declaration as made by Costas Psomiadis, who had just received his diploma from the journalism department of MGU [Moscow State University]: "I have lived in your country for 6 years, and when I say that it is a second homeland for me, I am not going against my conscience. Over these years I have been able to see a great deal, including life without embellishments. But the main thing I have understood is that the Soviet Union is an excellent country in which live people able to create wonders. It is*



*offensive to me that my countrymen have missed an opportunity to understand this. It was painful for me when the representative of one of the Greek youth organizations participating in the week tossed out with malice, 'And you intend to bestow such socialism on Greece?'"*

The same evening, a worker from the USSR KMO was trying to convince me that the week had political pluses nonetheless. I will not delve into political niceties. In my opinion, one such statement about "socialism" is enough to keep you from jumping to conclusions about "political pluses."

The point is not only what was shown: the center or the interior, Kemerovo coal mines or fashionable Baltic resorts. The point is sooner how they are shown. The point is worthy organization.

I will not conceal things. I was also able to hear not a few positive opinions. But when I asked our Greek guests what they specifically liked in the Soviet Union, the answers I received were roughly along the same lines: you have much green space; it is amazing how you have been able to assimilate such a harsh region; the Soviet people are very amicable and hospitable. Such declarations were undoubtedly flattering. But they were distressing at the same time. After all, you would agree that they are essentially not far from the dense "discoveries" of the foreign tourists who are brought into raptures by the fact that they do not see bears on Red Square.

Yes, it is undoubtedly important to convince our guests that we are amicable and cordial. But now, when thanks to restructuring the reputation of our country is growing in the world, we must think about the quality and depth of conceptions about us. So that, leaving the Soviet Union, foreigners can objectively judge the processes transpiring here. So that they see restructuring in specific palpable facts, in specific people, ultimately in the specific attitude toward them. There is no need to prove that the very idea of the weeks and similar friendship meetings incorporate excellent possibilities for this.

But an idea is one thing. And so is a decision to work in a new way as well. A real "plus," and not a dry "political" or "human" one—a different matter and ultimately the chief one.

Many questions must be put to the organizers of the 4th Friendship Week from the USSR KMO and the Sputnik BMMT [International Youth Tourist Bureau].

*It is good, of course, that the holding of meetings in the oblasts is completely entrusted to the initiative of the obkoms without excessive "guardianship." But how can it obtain that over the six months of preparations for the week, they were not called upon once by the "commanders-in-chief" from Moscow? And all of their official written recommendations, as acknowledged by Aleksandr Kretsan, were of an extremely vague nature? How can it obtain that a delegation of a hundred people is accompanied by just one representative of the USSR KMO? What were the functions of the staff if our guests were constantly complaining that they plainly did not know the program? And how should we regard the fact that the members of the Soviet delegation did not comprehend the sense of their participation in the week right up until the last day? How could it obtain that many of them only found out in Moscow namely to what week they were coming? Why were they told nothing about Greece or the Greeks before the meetings? Why did one of the participants—an Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet deputy—arriving in the capital and not finding anyone to meet him, get to the hotel at night as an "amateur" for his own hard-earned 25 rubles?... There would be more than enough such "whys?" to fill another page. And these are not, I repeat, personal questions at all.*

I understand perfectly well how difficult an affair, including from a political point of view, the organization of this week was. But it is hardly worth experiencing satisfaction only from the fact that such a major "function" was held at all. It should either be done in worthy fashion or not done at all—such, in my opinion, is an axiom of professional duty.

The last, Moscow, day of the week began thus. In the morning our Greek guests were asked to... free up their guest rooms (?). They had to put passengers from a friendship train that had just arrived into those places at any minute.

One thinks: couldn't the hurried movement of these "trains" be slowed down a little bit? Couldn't the flashing of the calendar pages of "weeks," "fortnights" and "months" be slowed down? After all, one has the right to stop and reflect on something without hurrying...

### **Hungary's 'Socialist Pluralism' Seen as Model for USSR**

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[Article by Oleg Germanovich Rumyantsev, scientific associate at the Institute for the Economics of the World Socialist System: "Hungarian Restructuring"]

[Text] The Hungarian People's Republic is entering a new stage of its development, a stage of serious sociopolitical renewal. Only in this manner is it possible to resolve the accumulated economic difficulties and the exacerbated contradictions in the system of political institutions and relations. The strategic directions of this new course are being worked out by all the society including the party, scientists, politicians and representatives of the public. In terms of its conceptual aims, this course is very close to our restructuring and to the changes in a number of other socialist countries.

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Hungary was one of the first in the socialist camp to break with the "Stalinist model" of socialism. By the 1980s, an unique Hungarian model of socialism had assumed its general outlines. Its main trait, in the opinion of Hungarian theorists, the abandoning of voluntarism in politics and total state socialism in the economy as well as a transition to realism and pragmatism on the question of socialist construction.

Of course, many difficulties befell the reformists as until recently far from all the experiments were approved in the fraternal countries, including in the Soviet Union. The possible social and political costs and conflicts in the conceived restructuring were not investigated. Nevertheless, the nation succeeded in creating a social model which might conditionally be termed "moderate state socialism." This is characterized by a relatively flexible combination of a planned commodity economy regulated with the aid of market mechanisms, with a real pluralism of the forms of ownership and management, with an activation of competitiveness and entrepreneurship, with a significant decentralization in the distribution relations and greater independence of the enterprises, regions and so forth. The touchstone in the policy of economic reforms was the concept of reconciling diverse interests. Precisely due to this it was possible to create a limited symbiosis of the state, cooperative and private farms in the agroindustrial sphere, having established a foundation for increasing the standard of living, obtaining additional capital and increasing confidence in the reform policy.

The economic restructuring was accompanied by certain political changes which prepared the grounds for a comprehensive political reform. In the "Kadar era" there was the democratizing of social life, economic and foreign policy became more open, greater attention was paid to humanitarian problems and to the embodiment

of the rights of man, the prestige of knowledge and professionalism was increased, and conditions were established for free scientific and creative search. Party activities themselves were largely renewed and with good reason the political leadership for a long time benefited from broad authority in the people as the "pacesetters" of change. Indications began to appear of a diversity of ideas, opinions and forms of representing interests. Socialist pluralism began to assume real traits.

All the same, the Hungarian reform initially carried with it a series of inner weaknesses and contradictions which little by little prepared a crisis. An integrated conceptual ideology of renewal was lacking. Sacrifice to technocratism was the idea of a linked execution of fundamental changes in the economic, social, political and cultural spheres of life and a conscious and purposeful transformation of the mechanisms involved in managing the economic and political processes. Thus appeared a tendency which is internally inherent to pragmatism, that is, an inclination for caution and a desire to avoid conflict. But it has long been known that pragmatism is effective only when it is based on a sound concept behind which stand real interests and driving forces. In Hungary, the upper hand was gained by a position according to which the conscious risk of economic reforms should be "compensated for" by stability in the domestic political institutions.

In the 1980s, more and more clearly one could trace a linkage between the difficult situation in the economy and the impotence when confronted with the urgent need to decisively carry out economic and political reforms. Subjective errors became one of the factors in the crisis. A paradoxical situation developed in that the reform was impeded by the force which should have carried it out, mainly, the cadre center.

All of this also explains the indecisiveness, the halfheartedness and "zigzag nature" of the restructuring. In actuality, in 1983, it was announced from above that there would be no second reform and in 1984, an attempt was made to carry out a program of economic revival which was not backed up by resources and was based on the unproven thesis of the succession of the new economic policy and the former one. In 1985, the 13th Congress of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] simultaneously advanced both a concept of acceleration, the tasks of increasing capital investments into the economy, a growth of consumption and a reduction in inflation and the achieving of equilibrium in the balance of payments. In other words, the Seventh Five-Year Plan had been constructed on development vectors which actually headed in different directions. The fact that the development resources within the previous model had been depleted was confirmed by a whole series of factors: by the return of once "solved" economic problems, by relapses into theoretical and ideological control from above, by the bureaucratization of the party and state apparatus and by the evermore

constraining role of "production relations" vis-a-vis the free development of the productive forces. The prestige of the nation's leadership began to be devalued.

Thus, it was becoming evermore apparent that the main misfortune for the socialist reforms was in the preserving of the formed political system without any changes. Its preservation or cosmetic overhaul was a historical dead end or stalemate. Such a statement had long ceased being a heresy in Hungary or even a "intellectual breakthrough."

Precisely in this situation, in May 1988, the Hungarian Party Conference was held. The party openly recognized at this forum the responsibility of the Central Committee and its personnel as well as the government bodies for the existing state of affairs, for the unsound assessment of the situation and for errors in carrying out the reform. The characteristic opinion which was heard at this forum was that the crisis had arisen not out of economic difficulties, but, on the contrary, the economic difficulties were a manifestation of a protracted sociopolitical and ideological crisis. The conference recognized that "the reforms commenced in the economy were not promptly extended into other spheres of social life." The way out of the crisis was seen by the MSZMP as seen "in the necessity of the coordinated continuation and acceleration of the reform process in social and economic spheres." Political reform was the task the Hungarian communists set for themselves.

In the party documents this reform is viewed as the simultaneous process of the renewal of the party, the successive continuation of ally policy and the adding of a new content to it, the strengthening of the power of the people on the principles of socialist pluralism, the increased activity and independence of the social organizations and movements as well as the broadening of glasnost in the sociopolitical process. The tasks, as we see, are completely comparable to those confronting Soviet restructuring. There is the natural question of what then is the intrinsically Hungarian feature to the reformist process?

It can be definitely said that the distinguishing feature of that methodology of renewal which has prevailed in Hungary is the conscious turning of the "restructuring" to the entire diversity of the collective political thought in society, and an interest in all weighed formulas to eradicate the detected pathologies in national life. Such an approach has proven effective. Hungary has been the witness of the appearance of a whole bouquet of ideas, ordered concepts and elaborated programs which have matured in different strata of society and these strata, in pursuing the same goal, see different and at times alternative paths to it.

*The old problem of aims and means is solved effectively: the democratizing of society also requires strictly democratic means for its realization. The citizenry themselves and their immediate communities should be the subject of*

*the political reform. The problem of the irreversibility of restructuring is also solved in this manner as the guarantee for renewal consists in the multiplicity of its subjects working toward the same goal on the basis of common values.*

...

What is political reform in the Hungarian style? It, in the opinion of many social scientists in Hungary, is a desire to achieve an effective combination and functional coordination for the following elements: social democracy; an effective administrative bureaucracy operating strictly within the limits of the law; technocracy aimed at high profitability and logocracy, that is, science as a force capable of predicting and actively participating in the preparation and adoption of political decisions. In our view, a mature socialist society should provide a harmonious combination of these four "cracies" each of which represents an unique regulator and limiter for the others. The only "cracy" which is inadmissible under socialism but which has taken firm root in it is ideocracy, that is, the dogmatic pressure of ideological manipulations on all spheres of society's activity. It is precisely the uncontrolled dominance of the "interpreters of sacred texts," they feel in Hungary, that jeopardizes the attractiveness of socialism as an historical alternative.

It is indicative that the main areas of the reform are seen generally in the same manner by the different forces. These are: a) the strengthening and broadening of effective market mechanisms for the socialist commodity economy; b) the establishing of a democratic system of rule by the people and representation of interests and in conforming to the ideals and values of socialism; c) the embodiment in the nation's domestic life of an ally policy based upon a political union and social consensus of different social forces and movements which cooperate constructively with one another and are united in their desire to assist in strengthening socialism and democracy in the nation; d) respect for common human standards and values, the consistent realization of the constitutional rights of the individual and society in practice; e) loyalty to Hungary's allied obligations as a member of the Warsaw Pact and socialist commonwealth and nonwithdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

At the same time, with a unity—to one degree or another—in the goals, the views prevalent in Hungary on the means to achieve them are far from identical.

These differences become comprehensible in an analysis of those conceptual documents which have made a major contribution to the trove of political reform in the nation. Among such documents are the programs "Turnabout and Reform" (1986) and "The Social Contract or Conditions of Political Development" (1987), the materials of the Szeged Theoretical Conference of the MSZMP (1987), the document "Reform and Democracy



(Diagnosis and Program)" (1987) as well as the Decree of the Hungarian MSZMP Conference "On the Party's Tasks and Development of a System of Political Institutions" (1988).

A few words about each of these concepts.

1. "Turnabout and Reform" was prepared by order of the Sociopolitical Commission of the Hungarian Fatherland People's Front as an alternative document on directions in economic reform and its relationship to political changes. This is the result of the collective efforts of a group of social scientists the coordinators of which were L. Lendel, L. Antal and M. Tardos. In October 1986, the concept was submitted for review to the MSZMP Central Committee in the aims of assisting in preparing the materials of the November (1986) Plenum of the MSZMP Central Committee. At that time the appraisal of it was terse: "The elaboration of a program is not a matter for the People's Front, but rather for the party."

But in 1987, the given concept gained a new lease on life. In the middle of the year, its abbreviated version was published in the economic journal *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* and along with this materials were published on the discussion of this document at a session of the economic work group under the MSZMP Central Committee. Finally, in June of the same year the party and, in September, the government worked out their own program of stabilization and emergence from the difficulties. In our view, in a number of its provisions one can rather clearly trace the influence of the economic and political ideas of "Change and Reform."

2. Working at the All-Hungarian Theoretical Conference in Szeged were several sections including an independent section on the questions of the effectiveness of the political system. Here, for the first time in a party environment, the thesis was officially recognized that there was a need for an essential modernization of the political system by rationalizing the decision-taking mechanism and its active participation in resolving arising conflicts by the prompt disclosure, coordination and optimum integration of various interests. The conference materials were a very valuable contribution to working out the questions concerning the functions and role of the leading institutions in the political system of socialism.

3. In 1987, a document appeared entitled "The Social Contract or Conditions of Political Development" and which had been prepared by a group of persons representing the liberal democratic course in Hungary. Along with interesting proposals on the structuring of the state of law, the solving of social problems and guarantees for the rights of man, the document contained a number of debatable, and, at times, naive proposals. Nevertheless, the very fact of its existence is of definite interest.

4. The document "Reform and Democracy" prepared by a leading Hungarian political scientist and head of the Chair of Political Science at Budapest University, M. Bihari, at the request of the Sociopolitical Commission of the Hungarian Fatherland People's Front is the political continuation of the document "Change and Reform." It has worked out in detail a broad range of questions related to political reform.

The given program aroused great interest, it was published in an appendix to the journal *Medvetanz* and the author spoke on it at a number of major forums of the Hungarian public. But all of a sudden an unexpected event occurred: at the peak of the discussions on the theses of the MSZMP Central Committee for the party conference, by a decision of the MSZMP Central Control Commission, M. Bihari and three others persons were expelled from the MSZMP "for propagandizing at non-party forums views running contrary to party policy."

What happened could be described as "Nina Andreyeva in Action" as these were the very weeks between the article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and the editorial in *Pravda*, a week of political timidity and bureaucratic attack on those who defended positions of the strength of arguments and not arguments of strength.

At the same time, the document "Reform and Democracy" merits attention. It sets out rather completely the main principles of political reform which would be capable of being a base for a broad social movement to renew the nation. This platform contains the following main elements: the politization of various subsystems in society, eradicating political voluntarism, reorganizing the over-centralized mechanism of distribution and redistribution, the moving from the exclusively monopolistic possession of power to a political alliance of various political forces and movements, the democratic self-organization of various political forces and their collective control of power on the basis of consensus and an ally policy, decisive decentralization of the decision-taking mechanism, the creation of a democratic system of representation and defense of interests, the guarantee of glasnost and freedom of press, openness for criticism and co-participation in the process of preparing and taking decisions, extensive social control over the actions of the administrative apparatus and so forth.

The measures proposed by "Reform and Democracy" have successfully generalized the ideological quests of sociopolitical thought in Hungary. According to the document, political reform should include: the establishing and strengthening of intraparty democracy; a reform of the status and activities of parliament; the creation of the post of a responsible head of state elected directly by the people; a reform in the electoral system; the establishing of an independent constitutional court; the strengthening of the independence and competence of judges; the strengthening of regional self-administration, legal guarantees for civilian individual and collective initiatives, referendums and petition campaigns; the

detailed setting down of the rights and freedoms of citizens in an independent law; the passage of a democratic law on the establishing and activities of social organizations; guarantees to increase the autonomy of universities and higher institutions of learning; freedom of choice in the systems and subjects of instruction; legal guarantees for the freedom of the press; broadening the democratic self-management of enterprises and cooperatives; restructuring the activities of the internal affairs bodies (including state security) on principles of legality and ensuring democratic public supervision of their activities and so forth. It is important to point out that many of the designated ideas are already being carried out, in having a positive impact on increasing social awareness and strengthening the democratic standards of civil conduct.

5. Finally, the fundamental document determining the strategic areas for the development of the political system in Hungary was the Decree of the All-Hungarian Party Conference "On the Tasks of the Party and the Development of the System of Political Institutions." The documents for the party conference were worked out by working commissions of the MSZMP Central Committee during all of 1987.

In the course of the discussion which began over the prepared documents, one could hear sensible criticism and constructive proposals were made. Although around 200,000 persons (one-quarter of the entire membership of the MSZMP) participated in the discussion of the theses, it lasted only several weeks. The final document adopted at the conference contains a whole series of clarifications in comparison with the initial version.

...

Beyond any doubt, the question of the renewal of the party and a new understanding of its role, functions and status is considered the central question in the political reform in Hungary. Beginning in 1956, the MSZMP viewed its democratization as the main condition for broadening socialist democracy and increasing the effectiveness of the entire political system. In actuality, under conditions of single-party rule, precisely the relations within the party determine the degree of democratization of social relations. For this reason it is clear that this question involves all the members of society and not just the MSZMP.

In November 1985 at a theoretical conference on the questions of intraparty democracy, it was correctly pointed out that "if there is a restricting of party democracy, then the elucidation of disputed questions will be confined to the leadership and to a group of experts; it will be difficult to select the correct decision, cracks will appear in the political and functional unity of the party, and the decision-taking practices will stumble. But if the collective experience of the party workers is involved and attracted to the elaboration of decisions, then this raises not only the soundness of the decisions but also

the responsibility of the communists." But in practice these dependable guidelines were more and more lost. For this reason, the forum of Hungarian communists with particular force came out for their strict observance.

Clearly, the enriching of the understanding of the party's status as the directing force of society must be considered extremely valuable in the decisions of the last All-Hungarian Party Conference. The Politburo member and secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee, J. Berecz, has pointed out that the party "should work as actually a political party, as a movement, under the conditions of democratic domestic relations which would simultaneously ensure the involvement of the party members in the elaboration of policy, as well as a tolerant attitude toward disputes and differences in views and work for their integration. All of this can serve as a good basis for a new type of party unity."

This new understanding of unity is being established evermore actively in the MSZMP. In his New Years' interview, the General Secretary of the MSZMP K. Grosz (at that time the nation's prime minister) pointed out that this concept should be rethought, for falsely interpreted unity and the fear of freely voicing one's opinion have led merely to a blandness of leadership. It is essential to take a calm attitude toward differences in views as a reflection of healthy political ambitions. J. Berecz in an interview with *Nepszabadsag* also confirmed the presence of "groups of opinions" within the new Central Committee. Nevertheless, the party conference decision stated that "party members outside the limits of competent party forums cannot voice opinions in a spirit contradicting the adopted decisions; they cannot organize factions for defending their opinion."

Here arises one of the most serious (and as yet one that has not found a standard solution in the practice of socialism) problems in political development, the problem of socialist pluralism. The MSZMP has emphasized that the main condition and means for realizing democracy is a socialist pluralism which is based on the leading role of the party. This creates an opportunity to express different interests, their reconciliation and embodiment in political will. But the specific mechanism for realizing this pluralism has still not been worked out and here there must be some difficult decisions.

The decisions of the MSZMP Party Conference point out that the guarantees for the irreversibility of the reform process are, on the one hand, the participation of the communists and all the non-party supporters of socialism in working out decisions, and, on the other, the renewal of the leading cadres, openness and glasnost in policy. Under these conditions it is demanded of the party that it become an openly politicizing force ensuring in principle the political leadership of society.

The party conference reinforced the idea on the need to hold internal party discussions on important questions and it recognized the right of organizations to initiate

discussion. In the course of preparing political decisions, the leading bodies should review the opinions and proposals of the social organizations, the bodies representing different interests as well as the positions raised at public forums and meetings. As many variations and draft decisions as possible should be drawn up ahead of time and from these a choice could be made. Special mention was made of the need for the complete treatment in the press of all variations of decisions arising in the course of preparing them.

The ally policy being carried out in the MSZMP merits close attention. The MSZMP, as the party of all the people, considers it an important task to unite all those who are concerned for the good of the motherland. Here the party intends "to take into consideration viewpoints which differ from its own." In this context a special role is played by the Fatherland People's Front which is supported by the MSZMP. The General Secretary of its All-Hungarian Council and Member of the Politburo of the MSZMP Central Committee, I. Pozsgay, has emphasized that it is the historic task of the People's Front Movement to assist in achieving a new social compact in the nation, in strengthening the new thinking in social awareness and in supporting the involvement of the citizens in building a socialist society "from below."

In the nation there is a widening movement of civilian initiatives and diverse clubs, unions and movements are becoming evermore active. The nation's leadership has noted the need for dialogue with responsible individuals who think critically and not always in accord with the official viewpoint. Such today are the Network of Civilian Initiatives, the Federation of Democratic Youth and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Indicative in this regard is the spirit of the appeal adopted by the Hungarian Democratic Forum at a meeting of representatives of the Hungarian intelligentsia in Lakitelek on 27 September 1987. "After disputes and debates we have agreed that social harmony is achievable only by the joint efforts of all the progressive forces in society. Only by social participation can the crisis be resolved, by the participation of both society and its political leaders. In the current system of political and social institutions, no provision is made for the expression of independent and spontaneous views. For this reason we propose the establishing of the Hungarian Democratic Forum."

The development of a system for representing diverse social-group and other interests in Hungary, generally speaking, has evoked particular interest.

The nation in fact has already formed a pluralistic structure of social organizations and interest-representing bodies. Here there are three levels: the mass social organizations and movements (People's Front, Komsomol and trade unions); bodies representing corporate interests which are under state control (Academy

of Sciences, Federation of Scientific and Technical Societies, Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Cooperatives, the Consumers Society and others); independent, informal social organizations and movements (ecological, pacifist, charity as well as various cultural and ethnic groups).

The intensifying of social independence has raised the question of lifting the restrictions on the constitutional principle of the freedom of unions and associations. In March 1988, the principles of the Law Governing Public Associations being drafted were promulgated. Its main provisions are based upon a very democratic position according to which it is possible to establish an association for any activity which is not contrary to the law. At the same time, there is a clear desire of the drafters of this law to split it into individual legislative enactments for social organizations, amateur associations as well as for clubs and circles. It is expected that the new draft law will be taken up by parliament at the end of the current year.

...

Hungarian society today has reached a new turning point in its history. This turning point is determined primarily by the reform process based on the experience and results of the three decades of the policy of change. Judging from everything, the political decision-taking mechanism is also beginning to undergo renewal. Under these conditions, it is extremely important to draw conclusions from an analysis of the Hungarian political process and extract all the essential lessons from it. Here, obviously, one can put the following.

It is impossible to carry out a reform without having an integral ideology aimed at the comprehensive and coordinated renewal of all spheres of society's activities.

One must not permit indecisiveness, delay and procrastination in the course of the reform as political faint-heartedness is fraught with the rise and deepening of crisis phenomena.

The key question of reform is the establishing of an effective and flexible economy. But this cannot be achieved without ensuring a flexible system for resolving contradictions and conflicts arising in the course of the changes and for this self-regulating mechanisms are required in the political system. Their main task is to transform the insufficiently democratic system of rule and abolish the uncontrolled monopolizing of power.

The subject of the reform should be society itself, that is, it should participate in working out alternatives for reform, in taking decisions on these, in other words, manifest collective political will. This is possible only within the context of a democratic movement which actively involves the citizens in the process of renewal and in real political life.



Thus, the Hungarian restructuring is valuable for us in the fact that it has in practice provided us with an example of realizing the principles of socialist pluralism. It is characterized by a balanced combination of different forms of ownership, management and administration, by a diversity of forms and methods of representation and by the defense and reconciliation of different interests. At present, a new stage is beginning in the development of this concept as socialist pluralism is becoming an evermore clearly defined aggregate of methods of political action whereby each citizen or group of citizens is capable of self-expression and self-organization and the free exposition of not only his opinion but also political will. Without this today, it is inconceivable to develop a society of democratic socialism.

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#### **Nepszava Editor on Criticism of Hungarian Trade Unions**

##### **Introduction**

18070184 Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jun 88 p 3

[Unattributed introductory article: "Always in the Thick of Life: TRUD Has As Its Guest NEPSZAVA, the Hungarian Trade Union Newspaper"]

[Text] Respected TRUD readers! We have today as our guest the central trade union newspaper of Hungary, NEPSZAVA (Voice of the People), one of the oldest of the worker publications in Europe; it will soon be 120 years old. Publication of this newspaper was started in 1872 by the Hungarian social-democrat F. Leo, a friend of K. Marx and F. Engels. It came out once a week and had a circulation of 7,000 copies. Beginning with the very first issue the newspaper appealed to the workers for unity in the struggle against capitalist exploitation. For a long time it was the only publication in the country which disseminated the ideas of Marx and Engels, and which came out in support of the social-democratic movement.

As early as the second day after the victory of the October revolution in Russia, NEPSZAVA called on the workers of Hungary to follow the example of the Russian proletariat. When the proletarian revolution took place in Hungary in March 1919, NEPSZAVA came out daily for 133 days as the official morning print organ of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

During the Second World War NEPSZAVA remained the official print organ of the social-democratic party of Hungary, actively defending the interests of the workers, supporting the democratization of life in Hungary and opposing fascism.

After the liberation of the country NEPSZAVA became the central newspaper of the Hungarian trade unions—the largest social organization in Hungary. In circulation (about 400,000 copies daily) it is second only to the newspaper NEPSZABADSHAG, the central print organ of the country's communist party.

In its 12-16 type pages (a format somewhat smaller than TRUD's), which are divided into 12 sections, NEPSZAVA daily recounts for the workers and their families the most important events of domestic and international life.

The story of the newspaper NEPSZAVA would not be complete without mention of its cooperation with TRUD, the newspaper of the Soviet trade unions. The Hungarian newspaper has established a flourishing program of interaction with their colleagues from Moscow: creative plans are discussed jointly; an exchange of journalists is taking place, and professional practicums are being organized on a reciprocal basis. A joint editorial council, consisting of representatives from the two fraternal newspapers, is coordinating this work.

##### **NEPSZAVA Editor's Remarks**

18070184 Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by L. Fodor, editor-in-chief of the newspaper NEPSZAVA]

[Text] Never in all their history have the Hungarian trade unions been subjected to such sharp criticism. The party and the state organs reproach them for not being active enough in the implementation of economic reforms, and for not contributing fully to the stabilization of the economy. The working people are coming out sharply against the passivity of the trade unions in the work of defending their vital interests. In short, the most massive organization in the Hungary People's Republic (HPR) has found itself caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.

This situation did not arise all of a sudden for the HPR trade unions. In the late 70s, due to the aging of equipment, the incorrect distribution of capital investment and mistakes in economic policy, the country's economic development began to slow down; prices crept upwards and inflation emerged.

At that time the HPR government resorted to foreign loans, which further exacerbated the country's economic position. After all, the credits granted by Western banks were at high interest rates, and their repayment was delayed due to a reduction in production volume and export earnings. As a result, the foreign debt grew; it now amounts to more than \$18 billion. It is true that the developing countries owe us \$3 billion, but their own situation is critical.

Today Hungary faces a choice—to raise labor productivity and bring production quality to world standards or to reduce domestic consumption. Based on this premise, the party worked out a concrete program for the renewal of the country at a conference which ended in May. It called for a 2.5 percent reduction in consumption and a 4-5 percent reduction in real wages. A new system of taxation was introduced, and many state subsidies were reduced. At the same time all of the country's resources were mobilized to accelerate the modernization of equipment in order to increase production volumes and output quality.

Hungary's trade unions decisively supported this party program; they appealed to the working people to actively join the struggle for its implementation. Most of society understands this and is trying with all its might to facilitate the measures aimed at the acceleration of the country's socio-economic development.

At the same time the HPR trade unions have their own viewpoint on a whole series of questions. In particular, in the process of fulfilling the plans for the stabilization of the economy efforts must be made to ensure that difficulties which emerge are resolved as infrequently as possible at the expense of the working people and that effective measures are worked out for the resolution of the acute social problems which are emerging.

What are we talking about? Even now in the course of the modernization thousands of people have found themselves without work. At the suggestion of the trade unions, an all-Hungary fund in the amount of 3 billion forints has been established for the re-grouping of manpower. It is being used for retraining and other educational programs for laid-off workers. Also, at the same time that prices were increased and the taxation system was introduced, payments to pensioners and large families were increased, and prices for medicines were lowered—at the initiative of the trade unions.

The Hungarian trade unions are taking the economic difficulties into account in their efforts to restructure their production-mass work and to increase its effectiveness. With regard to the protection of workers interests, for example, our positions are expressed not only in the fact that the trade unions defend the interests of the working person when his rights are violated. They must also look for and eliminate everything that predetermines the violation of these rights.

Daily contacts with communists working in the trade union movement play a large role in the development of the new work methods for the trade union organizations. The party organizations and the communists actively support all the initiatives of the trade unions; they are on the side of those activists who legally attempt to defend the interests of the collective or the individual worker. Nonetheless, we in the trade union movement have large

reserves for the improvement of contacts between the party organs and trade unions. After all, the Hungarian trade unions work independently but under the leadership of the party.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that in the struggle for the renewal of the country we have always attributed top-priority importance to cooperation with the fraternal Soviet trade unions. Perestroika in the USSR gives us strength and stimulates new thinking. We are following with particular attention the changing activity of the Soviet trade unions and their growing role in society. The recent Moscow meeting between the leaders of the AUCCTU and the VSP (Hungarian Council of Trade Unions) provided a good basis for studying the new experience of the largest organization in the USSR. This meeting undoubtedly will contribute to the further intensification of the friendship and cooperation of fraternal trade unions.

#### TRUD Commentary

18070184 Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jun 88 p 3

[Unattributed article: "What NEPSZAVA Is Writing About"]

[Text] Today the most important subject for NEPSZAVA, the newspaper of the Hungarian trade unions, is the life of the labor collectives, their successes and problems, as well as the process of renewal in the country.

In an article entitled "Renewal in Consumer Services" the newspaper analyzes the situation which has developed in the sphere of services for the country's population. As it reports, in the late 70s noticeable problems arose in the service sphere—the quality of services declined, and the time required to complete customer orders began to increase. At that time the Hungarian government carried out decentralization in a majority of the major enterprises and allowed private enterprise on a cooperative basis.

Today Hungary has more than 100,000 small independent businesses based on individual initiative and enterprise. They operate in the capital and other industrially-developed regions of the country. The most typical example of active socialist enterprise in Hungary is the introduction of private taxi service. After paying a tax to the state, professional drivers and individual citizens who are not professional drivers can engage in the private conveyance of passengers. They attempt to provide passengers with a number of additional services: they carry baggage, they reserve a hotel room from the car, they can provide information on the sights of the city, and, moreover, they can do it in foreign languages for overseas tourists.

In connection with the start of the summer season many articles in NEPSZAVA are devoted to the problems of organizing holidays for working people. In every issue

the newspaper publishes lists of those holiday homes and sanatoria which have vacancies. In an article entitled "Careful, Palaton!" the paper reports, for example, that a vacation by the famous lake not only brings pleasure but also can end in tragedy if the rules of water safety are not observed. The problem is that the "Hungarian Sea" is extremely treacherous. Last year during the strong storms which spring up here—unexpectedly as a rule—more than 300 people perished.

The newspaper also writes about the three most serious illnesses afflicting Hungarian society today: alcoholism (about half a million people in the country suffer from it), a high rate of suicide, which claims 80,000 people per year, and a high rate of divorce (nearly 20 percent among young families). The newspaper constantly focuses attention on these problems. Recently, for example, it published a report on the work of a permanent service to help those suffering from alcoholism, psychiatric disturbances and drug addiction.

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**Hungarian Economist on Reform**  
18070128b Moscow *RABOCHIY KLASS I*  
*SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian*  
No 1, Jan-Feb 88 pp 44-56

[Article by Kalman Pecs, doctor of economic sciences, professor, head of the Socialist Countries Department of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences World Economy Institute: "The Reform and Commodity Production"]

[Text] The economic situation in which the European socialist countries find themselves currently is seen as being quite adverse. It would be no exaggeration, possibly, to use the word "crisis" to describe it. The growth rate at the start-mid-1970's began to decline, and economic difficulties and disproportions intensified. The East European socialist countries and also the community as a whole have been unable to adequately resist the crisis of the world economy. It is a question, we believe, not only of a structural crisis but also of a crisis of the existing economic model.

The inauspicious phenomena in the economic sphere have been accompanied by hesitation and slowness in the ideological-theoretical sphere, which has contributed to the lagging of theory. The leadership of each country is seeking a way out of the current situation, but this search is being conducted, in our view, without an adequate theoretical base. Yet without a clear idea of the situation and without the appropriate concepts leadership of the economy becomes a chain of daily amplifications, corrections and surmountings of this specific difficulty or the other—no more.

In the first half of the 1970's the conditions of economic activity in the socialist countries changed fundamentally and have since that time changed repeatedly. Pronounced results have been achieved in the process of

adaptation of economic structures to the changing conditions, but negative results nonetheless predominate, on the whole. An undoubted achievement was the creation in the 1970's of a more modern structure of heavy industry (the updating took place thanks to the attraction of foreign resources). At the same time big new problems and disproportions arose. We shall cite the most important. The socialist community countries (primarily the Soviet economy) cannot achieve self-sufficiency in food and are constantly resorting to imports in this sphere. With the exception of Hungary and the CSSR, we may speak of one-sided dependence. The shortage of raw material and energy leading to an underloading of capacity, which is a consequence of the structural transformations, has assumed a systematic and general nature. The surmounting and elimination of these difficulties will take a long time for the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The decline in purchasing power has been accompanied by a growth in the quantitative and qualitative disproportions in commodity stocks. The extent of domestic and foreign resources has failed to meet the need for investments for modern structural transformations. The decline in the economic growth rate has reduced the possibilities of domestic savings, and the extensive attraction of foreign resources in all the socialist countries (except for the USSR) has proven impossible in practice owing to the strained balance of payments (we are talking here about the crisis in Poland and Hungary and the difficulties which are emerging in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia).

Qualitative indicators of the development of the economy may in all countries be seen as inauspicious. The use of manpower and other resources has deteriorated, social labor productivity is increasing very slowly, and it has in practice not grown at all for many years in a number of countries. The efficiency of the use of fixed capital is diminishing, and the quality of the export product is rising extraordinarily slowly. Competitiveness on the world market has declined.

The grim situation of the economy in individual countries has been attended by sociopolitical crisis (Poland). A growth of social tension has been observed in Yugoslavia and also in a number of other socialist countries. The foreign economic situation has also been unpropitious for the majority of socialist community countries. As far as CEMA is concerned, growth within its framework of commodity turnover has slowed, and in certain years there has been no growth at all in terms of certain items. Even more eloquent is the decline in the volume of bilateral payments, which points to an increase within the CEMA framework of trade for convertible currency. Partner relations have yet to become in CEMA an effective means of development of the economy of the states incorporated therein.

As is known, the world has experienced several abrupt surges in the price of raw material and energy, which has naturally led to a growth of the price of finished products. The changed conditions have accelerated S&T



progress in the developed capitalist countries. Simultaneously and partly as a consequence of this the international financial system has weakened and become disorderly, it may be said. Taking advantage of this situation, certain groups of developing countries and some other states have scored significant successes in the development of the economy and foreign trade. Unfortunately, there is among them not one CEMA state. Despite the proclamation of far-reaching goals, the CEMA countries have remained among the states of average economic development. In addition, if the hierarchy is viewed as a whole, they have slid back rather. In other words, they majority of them are among those which have found it hard or have been altogether unable to adapt to the new conditions which arose in the mid-1970's (it should be noted that the difficulties of adaptation arose largely owing to the system of reciprocal ties based on that same average development level).

Today it may be said that the period of relative smooth restructuring of economic development "levels" (based on the old economic structure) has already been completed in Europe. At the top level are the West European countries, and at the first of the "lower" levels such states as Austria, for example, have become firmly established, whereas the European socialist countries have formed an even "lower" and gradually sinking agglomeration. It even includes such countries as Czechoslovakia and the GDR which had earlier occupied a higher place in the European economic hierarchy.

Proceeding from the situation outlined above, we have to answer three questions.

1. Can we be satisfied with the results of development in the 1970's? The answer here is unequivocal: no. In keeping with the conclusions of political analysis, political economy evaluates the consequences of economic and social processes negatively. The balance of what has been achieved and what has been let slip in the economy is taking shape, unfortunately, in favor of the latter, which requires urgent and profound changes.

2. Should the current situation be considered a consequence of a structural crisis or does it reflect a crisis of the model? The nature and content of theoretical and practical tasks will depend on the answer to this question. All forecast assessments indicate that the inordinately centralized model of the socialist economy combining methods of direct and indirect control of an undeveloped commodity economy (albeit in varying proportion) which exists currently has resulted in a critical situation and is incapable of exercising fine-tuning and orienting itself toward real efficiency. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the crisis of the model is proceeding in parallel with a structural crisis. The cause thereof is to be found in the imperfect secondary industrial structure created in the 1970's: petroleum refining, chemical industry, ferrous metallurgy. It is a question of a crisis of a structure wherein priority has been given materials-intensive production.

Economists differ on this point. Academician A.G. Aganbegyan emphasized in one of his articles that the production structure and investment policy should be changed to surmount the present difficulties. Consequently, the Soviet economist sees the situation as a structural crisis. We, meanwhile, proceed from the other assessment, believing that the European socialist countries (including Yugoslavia) are experiencing a crisis of the model in parallel with a structural crisis.

3. What is the cause of the crises which are being observed—model or structural? What is determining here: internal or external factors? In our opinion, priority should be given in each country to internal factors.

Following the victory of socialist revolutions, the East European countries and China took as the basis the Soviet economic mechanism which had taken shape in the 1930's. It may be defined as the directive planned economy model. When this model was put to the test and the first results were obtained, it was clear that further steps were needed to create an efficient economic mechanism and effective system of control of the economy.

We have regarded any departure from the centralized directive planned system as part of the reform process specific for each country, despite the common content: it has been a question here of the radical nature of the attempts, tactical steps forward or retreats (in political resolve also, consequently) and of various foreign policy conditions. The main thing here, however, has been the following: modernization of the economic and political model of the 1930's has been conducted with the aid of centrally determined annual plans and centralized financial regulators. In all instances the reform has developed at the macroeconomic level. Influencing, however, the political mechanism and the economic policy of the central, regional and local authorities—this task has not been posed. The attempts to influence from the macroeconomic level the behavior of producers and consumers have not, as a rule, achieved their aim, and all has remained as before.

In the first postwar period, up to 1948-1949 approximately, the Hungarian economy scored pronounced successes in the restoration and general stabilization of agriculture, industry and so forth. Its mechanism was mixed, and economically it represented a controlled market economy, politically it had grown into a popular-democratic parliamentary republic. It was to this soil that the economic and political model of the Soviet Union was transferred without any changes in a very short space of time—in the period 1949-1951. This, I believe, is the root of many of today's problems. It is essential to understand and evaluate this model since only thus is it possible to understand and evaluate the Hungarian reform and find an answer to the main question: when, where and to what extent has the Hungarian reform deviated from the "maternal model".

The developed concept and practice of the economic model of the 1930's had a dual basis. Ideologically it was based on Marxism-Leninism, but a system which was common for all, closed and rigid, largely idealistic and exerting a negative influence on the development of theory was created within its framework. The methodological base of the model was a distinctive interpretation of the socialist mode of production whose main feature were a refusal to decentralize political authority and the establishment under the conditions of a developed commodity economy of centralized economic power. Another most important feature was the fact that the "concern from above" concept was introduced organizationally and realized in practice. This contributed to a large extent to the disappearance of diverse forms and levels of initiative in society and, consequently, of the readiness for settling contradictions and conflicts. It should be considered also that a source of growth under the conditions of the developed commodity economy, which was relatively independent and oriented toward economic efficiency and not the priorities of power, was eliminated simultaneously.

It may be concluded from all this that in sum economic thinking developed inconsistently, frequently wandering in an unreal world. We undoubtedly have to agree with the criticism expressed by M.S. Gorbachev at the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum of the social sciences, the essence of which was that in their development they are largely at the 1930's-1940's level.

The elimination of the independent sphere of commodity production led to the emergence of an economic system in which there were no factors of stimulation other than political ones. For example, in the period of the start of industrialization control of the economy was based on technical and organizational requirements and decisions which were external in relation to it, which predetermined a highly simplistic level of regulation. Real economic efficiency under these conditions was lacking.

If we attempt to summarize the existing analyses, it may be seen that this model, particularly the system of control of society and the economy, contains in concise form certain elements of precapitalist formations and that it lacks incentives for the achievement of efficient results under the conditions of developed commodity production and, even more, an orientation toward efficiency. In addition, the very nature of the model in the period that it was taking shape even made it uncompetitive in relation to the existing external conditions. Subsequently the situation deteriorated even more inasmuch as "the surmounting of the negative aspects of commodity production" and the "improvement of control" in the capitalist system progressed.

It should be emphasized that the model of extensive development is of world-historical significance: only on this path were the modernization and industrialization of a backward economy, victory in the war and the rapid

restoration of the economy after the war possible. However, the unsatisfactory nature of the state of affairs grew the more rapidly, the greater the lag in respect of such parameters as social and economic development, introduction of the achievements of the S&T revolution and innovations generally and competitiveness began to show.

The lag grew particularly as of the 1960's owing to factors the chief ones of which were:

the end of the accumulation process in the agricultural sphere;

the depletion of easily accessible reserves of raw material and energy resources (not least owing to long-standing predatory exploitation) and the transfer of the energy and raw material eastward;

an easing of the former very strict discipline and a lessening of the constant fear which had characterized the views and behavior of all those employed in the national economy.

The situation was made worse by the restrictive economic and trade measures of the West, which played, aside from all else, the part of stimulator of the Soviet Union's defense efforts. Throughout this period economic thinking, remaining within the framework of the above-mentioned closed ideological system, was extremely unprofessional, an inevitable consequence of which was the reduction as of the 1960's in the opportunities for the formulation of opportune and effective decisions. Even the maintenance of the necessary level of defense efforts was secured only at a price of a rapid growth in expenditure.

The period following the 20th CPSU Congress was marked in the Soviet Union by a persistent search for new paths and approaches in the management sphere. The result of the debate of the 1960's was the reform of the economic mechanism, which began as of 1965 and the essence of which amounted to a reduction in the number of obligatory indicators, a limited growth of enterprise independence and changes in budget policy (it was a question of a division of functions between the center and the enterprise). The system of prices and material-technical supply, planning and the formation of sources of financing (taxes, in particular) remained unchanged here. The reform left the macroeconomic level untouched, and the system of planning and control by sector was unchanged (it should be noted that N.S. Khrushchev attempted to unite sectoral and regional planning and management with priority given the regional level, but he was unsuccessful. Following the failure of the experiments, the sectoral system was reestablished).

The further upgrading of the mechanism in 1971, 1975, 1979 and 1982 was aimed at the fuller restoration of the system which had existed hitherto. It became clear after

the 27th congress that the economy needed to be reformed differently. A call for "radical reform" was formulated. Evaluating the results which had been achieved and analyzing the stage of the Soviet economic reform which had already been accomplished (from 1965 through 1986), the 27th CPSU Congress put the critical emphasis on the disproportions and difficulties which had appeared and stressed the need for the speediest eradication of shortcomings. However, it is still not entirely clear whether it is a question of a really all-embracing reform or, on the contrary, merely a further refinement of the evolved mechanism. To all appearances, there is no precise idea of the reform in managers' heads either. An exclusively preliminary assessment of the steps which have been taken encounters in some instances the idea of movement toward a refinement of the model, a strengthening of the role of the center and the direction into a single channel of the aims of the center and the aspirations of the enterprises.

To judge by everything, perestroika began without an all-embracing program drawn up in advance, at least, we are unaware of the details of its creators' intentions. One thing may as yet be maintained with certainty: it is a question of the stimulation and unleashing of initiative in society. If the purpose is really such and if the first results are to hand, this testifies to real progress, which contains, however, new elements of danger. Attempts are being observed also to extend the framework of the former approaches to economic problems. The deeply rooted way of thinking should be emphatically changed here—and sooner rather than later—and the fact of the emergence of a new ideological situation and the appearance of elements of a new type of socialist model understood. This would strengthen the materialist world outlook in Soviet philosophical science also and advance an analysis of economic phenomena.

Not only new approaches but also huge monetary resources will be needed to solve the problems of the Soviet economy. A shortage thereof could be a cause of the ideological failure of the perestroika program. Some of the necessary resources could be obtained from domestic sources, some from the socialist community, yet others from other countries, and it is necessary, consequently, to take into consideration the possibilities of the world capitalist market also.

For this it is necessary in place of confrontation and competition to create an atmosphere of international cooperation. If this is successful, if new economic thinking and new socioeconomic relations reign, the tremendous material and financial requirements of the Soviet economy will be a powerful "motor" for world economic conditions. The Soviet Union could undoubtedly strengthen its positions in world politics appreciably. This would on the one hand promote a stabilization of the Soviet economy and, on the other, would undoubtedly create a new atmosphere for the continued development of the Hungarian reform.

The time of implementation of the Hungarian reform should be dated back—after many attempts, upturns and retreats—to 1968. The essence thereof were ideas concerning the controlled socialist market and a return to the priorities of efficiency in the macro- and microeconomy. The price and tax systems, currency rules and exchange rates were geared to this. In the mid-1970's the reform had, as an analysis showed, come to a halt for various, primarily domestic reasons, political included. By the end of the decade the economic difficulties had led to inevitable socioeconomic limitations reducing the possibilities of further implementation of the reform.

New steps followed at the start of the 1980's after a number of unsuccessful attempts (among which had been the introduction of a competitive price system). By the mid-1980's it had come to be understood that the abolition of directive planning is not in itself true reform and that the measures adopted for progress had been based either on half-baked solutions or simply on the appearance thereof. The danger of bureaucratization increased. It was clear that the existing decision-making procedure and partial measures were bringing the reform to an impasse. In addition, a crisis of confidence between the departments and the masses on the one hand and between the control machinery and the intelligentsia on the other had arisen and intensified. The conclusion was unequivocal—the economy cannot be developed without changes in policy.

Before making generalizations, it would be expedient to sum up the results of the Hungarian reform. This has not been done as yet for a number of reasons. We will try to make good this lacuna, analyzing its positive and negative consequences from the economic viewpoint, and the latter, in the quantitative and qualitative aspects, we will attempt to offer social, sociological and, finally, political assessments.

As is known, Hungarian agriculture has scored considerable successes. Whereas in 1968 Hungary was importing grain and meat, by the mid-1980's it had reached second place in the world in terms of per capita meat production. The reform has contributed to the greater openness of the economy in relation to the outside world, which has been realized not so much in foreign trade as in the sphere of tourism. We have opened the country to foreigners and afforded our citizens an opportunity for unrestricted travel abroad. The revival of foreign tourism has made our society more open.

The reform has created incentives both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of consumption. New sources of growth have appeared in the infrastructure, crafts production, in services and in small business in general. Incentives to higher-performance and more efficient labor have appeared (and not necessarily in the sphere of social production, what is more). Consumption has increased, and the quality of services and consumer goods has risen (thanks to imports, in the main, of the



1970's). Among the reform's successes we may undoubtedly put the strengthening of the "multisector character" of the economy and possibilities (albeit limited) of competition between sectors which have appeared. The first steps have been taken along the path of the creation of joint ventures.

What are the reform's negative consequences from the viewpoint of the economy? The state of S&T progress, which is slowing down, coming to a halt and in terms of certain parameters going backward, calls attention to itself primarily. There has been no appreciable change in the direction of an improvement in product quality, and quality has deteriorated even in many sectors. Productivity both at the level of society as a whole and at enterprise level has declined, despite a certain regrouping of the work force. The attitude toward labor has not improved, and impediments to productivity growth are becoming increasingly noticeable, and its consequences increasingly significant. The efficiency of the use of fixed capital is not on the increase—all indicators point rather to the reverse.

The level of domestic cooperation has declined, and in the sphere of foreign exchange the opportunities for adaptation to the trends of the world economy have diminished; the capacity for responding opportunely to sudden changes in the economic situation is altogether beneath criticism. We speak not so much of regression as of utter bankruptcy here. A constant and invariable companion of the country's economic life has been inflation, the rate of which is higher than the rate of prices rises in the leading industrially developed countries. We have reached the threshold beyond which a reliable computation of profit and loss and, consequently, planning will be impossible. There has been a pronounced diminution in the trend toward economies in resources. Contrary to all expectations, the most characteristic feature of the current model—the expenditure method of determining costs—has persisted and strengthened even. A structural crisis, the outward form of whose manifestation has been the increased consumption of raw material and energy and in this connection reduced efficiency, has arisen also.

Examining the quantitative aspects, we may point to the following negative consequences of the reform. A diminution in the economic growth rate, stagnation and an absolute decline in production even has been observed for a long time. Shortages in producer goods and consumer items persist. Difficulties with the formation of social consumption funds, specifically for the development of health care, education and the S&T sphere, may be attributed to the quantitative indicators also. The export potential of the economy has diminished, and competitiveness on foreign markets has declined.

Switching to the balance of the positive and the negative from the socioeconomic viewpoint, mention should be made of the principal positive feature: Hungarian society

is on the move. From economic standpoints the direction of this movement may be evaluated as being virtually neutral, but from the socioeconomic viewpoint we may, in any event, consider positive the recovery of enterprise. Society has become more open in all respects—in relation to the world and in relation to its internal problems. A critical approach has strengthened in the assessments of economic processes, interest in these problems has grown and knowledgeability of economic issues has increased. Finally, a most important result of the reform is the differentiation of society which is beginning. Public consensus concerning tolerance of different, including very high, profits and income has already come about to a certain extent.

We also need to put among the negative consequences those such as, for example, the growth of corruption and a weakening of legality (tax morals have suffered particularly, which, however, may be seen as the result of the anarchic-liberal influence of the financial bureaucracy). An illegal ("third") economy has arisen. The most important negative consequence should be considered the decline in business morality, which has now reached the "Wild West" level. The first symptom of this has been an endeavor to obtain instantaneous and vast income. It would be a mistake to attribute this phenomenon solely to the small businessmen and their partners. The same, unfortunately, is happening with the state-owned major and medium-sized enterprises.

From the political viewpoint the growth of Hungary's international authority and trust in its policy, inasmuch as the reform is perceived outside as being a bold undertaking, should be assessed positively. From domestic policy standpoints instability owing to the imprecise understanding by the participants in the economic process of their roles and their place therein is observed.

Summing up the balance of economic and socioeconomic results of the Hungarian reform—negative and positive—it may be said that by the mid-1980's the first were predominant and, however regrettable, the trend toward deterioration was intensifying.

The studies of the situation conducted as of the present provide no grounds for conclusions of a directly practical nature. We shall attempt to make good this lacuna by an analysis whose results may briefly be expounded as follows.

1. It may be affirmed as clearly as can be that the roots of the present problems are to be found in the old economic model and the ideas concerning the essence of socialism associated therewith. Whole generations, including those which are working currently, which cannot imagine "real," "true" socialism outside of a particular, highly restricted, vision of this system, have grown up on this model and in the spirit thereof. The magnetic force of this model is on the one hand simplicity, complete exclusiveness and self-sufficiency and the possibility of providing an acceptable answer to any question (which is

typical of any precisely structured ideology), despite the fact that the answer might be valid solely for the given system. On the other, the main content of socialism organized in this way—when the leader leads, and the effectors effect, and they are all arranged in a single hierarchy—gives rise in the memory of the generations not only to the corresponding times and practices (which is in itself a factor of legitimacy) but also appears particularly expedient and beneficial to each part of society when it is a question of a change therein. The chief reared in these traditions becomes rooted to the ground if his executive omnipotence is disputed or abridged, and the led feels lost when left without a leader.

This model once extended to the whole world. But it is totally unrelated to the conditions of developed commodity production which arose with the establishment of capitalism. For the revelation of its possibilities in full the capitalist system has no need of all-embracing state power and the monolithic organization of society, this is why it created a three- or even four-tier structure—the state, capital, labor and executive power—with the constant confrontation of these tiers, while the function of coordination of interests came to be exercised by the democratic system of government. Society came to be more conflict-ridden, unstable and existential (which no one likes), but at the same time more flexible, firm and dynamic, which ultimately strengthened it exceedingly materially and spiritually.

Speaking about socialism, we recall primarily K. Marx, who defined it as the "post-capitalist formation" and simultaneously saw the advantages of capitalism compared with the preceding formations. For this reason K. Marx could not present the new system as a form of social organization based on some precapitalist mode of production for in this case it would forfeit its superiority in relation to capitalism. Had the Stalin model corresponded to the requirements of the "post-capitalist" formation, the socialist countries would with its help have surpassed—and economically, primarily—the capitalist system. As is known, this has not happened, in Hungary either. Despite such basic characteristics of our society as flexibility, steadiness, dynamism and material and spiritual potential, the change, which we have been effecting for many years now, points rather to a tendency to lag behind and not outpace the capitalist countries in development. Viewing this situation from another angle, the question may be posed thus: does the model by following which 10 or 12 countries, in spite of all their efforts, cannot achieve the goals which have been set, correspond to these goals? It is becoming clear that it is a question not of the specific mistakes of specific people working in the name of the achievement of these goals but of the properties of the model itself.

It is highly doubtful that the Stalin model could be a valid model of socialism. Consequently, it is necessary to create a new model and to paint a new picture of socialism, in which there will be more problems and

fewer "idylls," but which will in its potentialities be more fruitful. Economically it must correspond to the demands of developed commodity production and take into consideration social consequences which are not as yet entirely clear. In other words, it is necessary to return to the Marxist, Marxist-Leninist concept of socialism. And this work still has to be initiated.

2. The departure from the traditional model began in Hungary with the 1968 reform, but its ideology has lived longer, and this was its first difficulty. The second difficulty was the desire to switch at a stroke from this model to another, no less contentious, simply not formulated, it may be said even! The "shadow of capitalism"—the vestige of the model in the transitional phase from which we seemingly find ourselves—thereupon arose and began to persecute us. A further theoretical and conceptual difficulty is the frankly mystical horror in the face of the economic mechanism cultivated under capitalism. Ideological indecisiveness is being reflected at all hypostases of existence—from morality and pricing through relations in the economic and political spheres. Although, of course, useful, manifestly positive results have been observed, the set thereof has degenerated into crisis. In this situation of uncertainty Hungarian society could lose its reference points, and this is why it is essential to escape from it as quickly as possible, and escape forward, not backward, what is more.

3. Many factors, including incorrect economic and political decisions, have played their part in the slowdown in economic growth. Economic policy in Hungary has frequently been divorced from ideological rear support and at times inadequately coupled with reform of the economic mechanism. A weakness highly typical of it is an orientation toward the macrostructure, in which connection it does not in practice reach the microsphere, enterprise level, and does not influence commercial policy. Official economic policy should be elaborated and implemented not in an aggressive, entrepreneurial spirit but in a spirit of the increased requirements and a more humane understanding of the set tasks. This approach to economic policy would be supplemented by enterprises' commercial policy oriented toward the efficiency of capital investments.

The various failures of economic policy and the management system which have arisen owing to the absence of enterprises' real independence have led to the emergence of a dangerous gap between the "micro-" and "macro-sphere" which has acquired a political dimension. The initiatives displayed in the political sphere during the "intermodel" transition have exacerbated relations between society and the leadership. This has occurred owing to conceptual and ideological uncertainty preventing the opportune—in the period of the start of the "transition"—implementation of the appropriate political transformations and the necessary political work in the masses.

The situation is further complicated by the continuing deterioration in the state of the economy, which is making further reforms more difficult. We are experiencing a period of decline in the efficiency of various forms of state regulation: attempts at regulation are leading to "overregulation" and making the situation even worse, and the new deterioration is giving rise to a new wave of regulation and so forth. Under these conditions both the economic and political spheres could lose stability.

4. The external conditions which have taken shape are partially easing and partially intensifying the difficulties of the Hungarian economy. Among the first we should put the influence of the reconsideration of political and philosophical views under way in the Soviet Union and also the improvement in international political relations which is showing through. The ever faster pace of international, social, scientific and production changes, with which we are as yet unable to keep up, is exerting an influence in a relatively negative direction. These circumstances should be put among the reasons for our difficulties, but it is a fact that there are areas in which we can effect the necessary social transformations which could be a base for economic progress.

A critical analysis of the traditional management model shows that its shortcomings and intrinsic weaknesses are such that perfecting it is impossible and that it is essential to switch to a new model. It is important here to understand and clearly define what we want out of the new model and what its nature should be. We believe that it should be a model of the developed socialist commodity economy constructed on the following basic principles:

First, public ownership of the majority of most important means of production, together with which there exist cooperative and private ownership and various combinations thereof. In other words, it is a question of a diversity of forms of ownership.

Second, guarantees of full employment, which ensues directly from the nature of socialism. The right to work and full employment should not be perceived as a right to one and the same job—structural transformations presuppose a redistribution of manpower based on a system of improved skills, retraining and so forth.

Third, public consensus in connection with a differentiation in the working people's incomes in accordance with the quantity and quality of labor and its social evaluation, which could lead to the disappearance of poverty and the emergence of new social problems, is essential.

Fourth, the socialist economy of each country must be oriented toward the world market, primarily toward the socialist community. Thus will the economic base for realization of the "Workers of the World, Unite!" motto be created.

Finally, the basis for economic progress are political decisions implemented under the conditions of democracy. This could occur both within the framework of parliamentary democracy and on the basis of a single-party system.

A most important aspect of the new model is the formation and functioning of a diversity of forms of ownership and the interaction of various sectors of the economy. In our opinion, the following sectors might exist in the economy:

I. The nationwide ownership sector. Pertaining here are the nonmarket branches like, for example, energy supply, natural resources and their use, transport, defense industry, reserves and so forth.

II. The state (official) ownership sector. Pertaining here are industrial and large-scale agricultural enterprises which are owned by the state, but which are partially controlled by the market. The long-term interests of the proprietor are represented by the state, but the short-term interests of the superintendent, by managers, directors and so forth. In this sector property is leased to managers in the most diverse forms. Strategic leadership is exercised by a top authority representing the interests of the state.

III. Then comes the cooperative sector in its classical sense, when cooperatives are formed on the basis of the voluntary pooling of the property of their members. This sector, functioning on the basis of complete self-management, will depend fully on market appraisal, and the law of value will operate therein in full. This is a purely market sector.

IV. The next sector is a symbiosis of sectors II and III, that is, both state and cooperative forms of ownership are represented therein. This also is a market sector.

V. The family and personal property constitutes one further sector, and it is of a private nature. Accumulation here comes in the process of personal or group small business activity, and the law of the market operates in full also.

VI. A special sector formed from sectors V, IV and III within different legal frameworks, given the operation in full of the laws of the market, may be distinguished also.

VII. Finally, the last sector is foreign trade, whose main mission is providing for effective competition on the foreign market and increasing competitiveness. This independent sector would function with regard not only for the action of the law of value but also world economic conditions. It would influence sectors VI, V, IV and III to the full extent and sector II to a limited extent and formulate an evaluation of the efficiency of sector I.



It is this system, it seems to us, which is the model of the developed commodity production socialist economy. The management of such a system requires in sectors I and II centralized leadership, partial market relations in sector II and the domination of market relations in full in the other sectors. The law of value here, that is, in sectors III, IV, V, VI and VII operates without any limitations. This model may be described as a mixed economy of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism oriented toward the multiplication of social wealth. This would be not an economy of shortages but one of abundance and prosperity.

In studying the model it has to be considered that the different sectors must have within certain limits not only a right to exist but also assurances of complete equality of opportunity. The possibility of capitalization of some of the savings of the population and their conversion into production capital, as distinct from the current situation, when deferred demand creates merely additional pressure on the consumer goods and luxury items market, is very important.

As already said, the economy may consist of extra-market and market parts. The latter may be controlled only by market methods and also enforceable-type macroeconomic regulators such as the budget, taxes and so forth, given preservation of the complete equality of opportunity for each sector. For this reason the main question of the proposed model is the planning of money turnover and precise budget regulation. As far as the plan is concerned, it should be based on a political choice of alternatives and various options representing various interests competing with one another. A necessary condition of such a plan is the specific, detailed and comprehensible form of its elaboration affording an opportunity for democratic choice. Both production and consumption, with a detailed analysis and forecast of supply and demand annually, for 3 and 5 years and so forth, as V.I. Lenin said at the 11th Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Congress said, should be planned.

The key problem of the model is responsibility for fulfillment of the plan. It is proposed introducing equal responsibility at all levels of the economy, from the worker, foreman and director through the minister and government. Damage caused by incompetent planning should be reimbursed at all levels.

The functions of the budget in relation to social policy will have to change also. The social funds will be formed from the population's income, regardless of the social position of individual citizens, and in accordance with the quality and quantity of their labor. It will be possible to effect the necessary leveling of support and redistribution via a system of the imposition on families of a progressive income tax.

The financing of the construction of apartment homes, elements of the infrastructure and certain cultural measures will be handed over to the population. Enterprises'

job will be the organization of efficient production, and social funds will be formed and distributed mainly independently of them. It is obvious also that a corresponding reform and new understanding of the essence of wages will be necessary.

The new model incorporates the fundamentally new concept of international economic cooperation with the socialist countries and interaction with the world capitalist market. As far as the socialist countries are concerned, it is necessary to switch to the principle of mutual interest and economic efficiency in place of the principle of economic mutual assistance. In respect of the world market it is necessary to abide by a policy of openness. This means that initially in relation to the socialist countries and, after the transitional period, in respect of the world market enterprises will have the right of free outlet onto foreign markets, which will create the foundation for the development of normal competition. The state will influence enterprises' export-import transactions with the aid of currency exchange rates.

The new model must be accompanied by the complete renewal of the political economy of socialism. It is necessary to begin immediately the theoretical elaboration of the basic principles of the new model. It needs to be ascertained, for example, what is meant by price, currency rates, wages, profit, taxes, ownership, market, stock exchange, the principle of economic interest and so forth. We need to study the question of the role of the party in the economic process. In a multisector economy, where all sectors have equal opportunities and where there are assurances of full employment and the differentiation of society is recognized, different interests aspiring to self-expression arise. Under these conditions the party will perform a fundamentally different role than within the framework of the traditional model. Its most important task will be political (in the precise meaning of this word) work on multiplying social wealth. Its specific forms will be the creation of equal conditions for economic competition, struggle against attempts to monopolize production, assurance of the conditions for realization of the most effective decisions and so forth. The party will be the highest authority of the political system integrating the entire diversity of interests. It alone can create the basis for emancipation of all intrinsic driving forces of the economy.

The party will elaborate social strategy also. Resolving conflicts and contradictions of interests and integrating them for the achievement of social reference points of common value are only possible with the aid of public social and political work. Program decisions will also be drawn up by the party and extensively discussed at all levels of the democratic system.

The role of the unions will be particularly important. They must play an effective part at all levels of the new model. While struggling for an increase in their members' income they must conduct a constant struggle

against administrators and managers in all sectors, except for sector I. It has to be remembered that an increase in wages is possible only on the basis of increased productivity and reduced outlays. The situation in the private sector, where the party cannot play a directive part in economic processes, is a special one, but, operating by political methods, it has to provide for the achievement of the highest efficiency and the economizing of resources.

Even in such a cursory outline the incredible complexity and tremendous dynamism of the hypothetical model of socialist commodity production shows through. Elaboration of the problem of the transition from the traditional model to the new one, to a new vision of economic, social and political problems of the socialist

society, would seem all the more important. The social and political atmosphere which has come about in the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries since the 27th CPSU Congress is more conducive to this work than ever.

**Footnote**

\* See also B. Averchenko, "The Stride Could Be Longer," PRAVDA, 25 January 1988.

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**Noriega's Political Background Profiled**  
*18070206 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Aug 88 p 14*

[Article by Mikhail Baklanov, NOVOSTI correspondent in Panama, written for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA under the "International Life" rubric: "A Political Portrait: The Noriega Phenomenon"]

[Text] "Today at the hour of dawn, when our hearts commune with God, I made Tony Noriega's confession to the God of Panama and the Universe. I confessed my sins and begged that I be enlightened in the laws of morality so that I may follow them to the extent that this is humanly possible." With these words, General Manuel Antonio (Tony) Noriega assumed the post of commander in chief of Panama's National Guard. The ceremony took place on 12 August 1983.

Three years will pass, and the general will find himself in the epicenter of a political hurricane that is unprecedented even for Central America. Noriega's enemies call him a dictator. The list of charges against him begins with suspicions of corruption and elimination of political rivals and ends with complicity in drug trafficking and links with the secret services of foreign powers. The commander in chief's supporters are no less categorical: they call him "the general of peace," one who is steadfastly continuing Torrijos' work, an outstanding Latin American leader and the defender of national sovereignty.

The most intense political crisis in the past two decades broke out in Panama in the summer of 1987. The opposition parties and the "civilian crusade" supported by the U. S. State Department are trying to overthrow Noriega. The crisis is developing on a rising scale and tension is increasing. The American newspapers defame the general unceasingly and angry speeches are being made against him on Capitol Hill and in the White House. Last February President Delvalle (the day before he met in Miami with Assistant Secretary of State Abrams) said he wants to remove Noriega from his post—and he "flies away" from his post himself. They say that Delvalle is now hiding on an American base in the Canal Zone. In March, Macias, the chief of police and member of the General Staff, organizes a plot to topple Noriega. In the confusion, the head of the conspirators turns out to be locked behind the armored door of an ammunition depot, and troops loyal to the general crush the conspiracy itself in 18 minutes. The plotters were arrested.

Meanwhile, two American courts bring criminal proceedings against Noriega. Unmasked smugglers and Panamanian deserters, some of whom show up in court in black hoods with eye slits "for their personal safety," appear as witnesses. In the atmosphere of a medieval witch-hunt, the United States breaks practically all contacts with Panama, introduces economic sanctions, and begins conducting wide-scale military maneuvers in the

canal region. An American political figure who visited Panama during those days remarks with amazement: "Nobody sinks a ship to capture its captain." In spite of this elementary logic, the United States, in seeking to bring about the general's departure at any price, is continuing to sink the ship "Panama." But Noriega is not abandoning the captain's bridge, upsetting all the predictions.

The Americans' pressure on Noriega is unprecedented in the modern history of the Western Hemisphere. The correlation of forces between the continent's largest power and one of its smallest countries makes us think of the biblical parable about David and Goliath. "The last battle for the dignity of Latin America is under way in Panama," the general says. In this battle, Noriega is not only a real political figure, but a symbol as well.

The general himself, as if to help his future biographer, threw out a "life preserver," saying: "I believe quite sincerely that on man's path to the truth, the choice is never between black and white, but rather between different shades of gray."

#### THE RULES OF THE GAME

He is not very tall and is not heroic in appearance at all. He has a broad Indian face, covered with pockmarks (the signs of a childhood disease). He speaks slowly, often using rather coarse popular expressions which do not sound affected when he utters them; he comes from a poor family. I have had occasion to see Noriega on a rostrum many times and to chat with him several times in an informal setting, but I have never had the opportunity to interview him. He completely controls any display of feelings in conversation with an unfamiliar person as much as he is emotional at meetings. On the stage his emotional gestures are typical. He may pick up a basket and strew flowers in the hall, and his enthusiastic supporters elbow each other to catch the flowers. He may take a machete out its sheathe and wave it with all his might on the rostrum to emphasize his determination. In a personal conversation he reminds one of a blindfolded tightrope walker on a thin wire over an abyss. His every step is precise and all his attention is turned within, to himself.

Noriega is 55. He has worn a military uniform for exactly half of those years. Like the majority of Panamanian professional soldiers, he was educated abroad, in Peru and the United States. Not long ago, the United States considered Noriega a follower of American military doctrine and a firm ally, although inclined toward unexpected actions.

Few people have tried to define the general's ideological outlook. He is no assistance himself in this regard. His tradition comes from Torrijos, who struggled all his life against "the attachment of labels," not wanting to be grouped with either the "left" or the "right." Torrijos



liked to repeat that the Panamanians have "their own aspirin for their own headache." Noriega speaks of himself as a nationalist, "but this does not have an ideology."

Such are the rules of the game, like one that children play: do not call it black and white, and do not say "yes" and "no." The decades of dependence on the United States (but not one politician or another) established these rules. A person who wants to be himself never shows his cards. On the contrary, the less a politician speaks from the heart, the more flowery his propaganda is. This predilection for simple speech is a true sign: the general has not spoken his final word. He is firm in his own way, and possesses a quality rare for a Latin American—the ability to wait. "The only changes I see," he says, "are changes in the weather. Only the seasons change. Winter has passed and summer has arrived." In this same way, he regards the shocking accusations being made against him with outward calm. He does not defend himself. He does not make excuses. This sentence is attributed to him: "The best way to win a fight is not to get involved in it."

Within the framework of the rules we have designated, Noriega is no stranger to theorization. For example, he advocates participation by the armed forces in forming policy not only in Panama, where it traditionally plays a key role, but in other countries in the region as well. "It seems unrealistic," he believes, "to separate—specifically and consistently—the political sphere from the military. Those civilian and military leaders who attempt to do this would be deceiving themselves." In practice, this has meant that the Panamanian Armed Forces and their commander in chief have sought to exert a positive influence on the search for a peaceful settlement of the Central American conflict. Panama is the founder of the Contadora Group and has been an active participant until recently. Noriega's thesis has been that the efforts of professional politicians should be supplemented by contacts among military men. The general has actively put his doctrine into effect by making visits in Latin America and building bridges of mutual understanding among the armed forces. This has been interpreted in Washington as an open challenge to U. S. policy.

The question of Noriega's conflict with the Americans lies ahead, but in the meantime, there is one particular observation. When the Panamanian leader refers to the "blurring" of distinctions between the military and civilian spheres, this is a rather frank acknowledgment of Panama's political reality: the military govern here. To maintain diffident silence on this account is also that self-deception which Noriega warns about, especially since it is no secret to anyone in Panama or beyond its borders. The Americans are not a bit mistaken when they call Noriega a "strong man." Their mistake, in my view, is that they underestimated his strength when they took it in their head to remove him from the political scene.

Meanwhile, the power structure under which the military exert decisive influence on local politics took shape long before Noriega. It has existed in one form or another at least for the past three decades. In this regard, Noriega is no more of a "dictator" than the generals that came before him: Paredes, Torrijos, Vallarino, Remon. Anyone who makes an effort to familiarize himself with Panamanian history can be convinced of this.

In establishing its protectorate on the banks of the canal, the United States made sure that it was deprived of even the attributes of an independent state. The first Panamanian government was headed by the former employees of American companies. The new republic's flag was patterned on the American model by President Amador's niece. Under a special agreement, Panama was deprived of the right to issue currency. Its armed forces were dissolved. Panama was deprived forever of its right to the canal between the oceans and the zone adjacent to it.

The small local oligarchy organized this situation and derived considerable economic benefit from it. For this reason, those who expressed the interests of the liberation struggle turned out to be the military, not the oligarchic governments. The corporative interests of the military, who refused to resign themselves to the humiliating status of a gendarmerie, coincided with the objective interests of the nation: to restore sovereignty over the canal.

By the early 1950s, the conversion of police units into the National Guard—something halfway between a gendarmerie and an army—had been completed. Under the command of General Remon (he will become president soon after), the guard declared itself as a political force capable of defending national interests for the first time. Under a slogan which became famous—"Neither millions nor handouts; we demand justice"—Remon made a serious attempt to bring about a revision of the agreements with the United States. He was shot by a hired assassin.

But the process turned out to be irreversible. Under the shell of Panamanian "democratic institutions," a "fledgling" of great vitality, the armed forces, was maturing. The fledgling spread its wings: a military coup took place on 11 October 1968. It was bloodless, which once again attests to who was actually ruling Panama, incidentally. Torrijos made the army's power behind the scenes obvious, and the armed forces under him occupied the place in society which they have held until now.

#### THE CRISIS: "THE FRANKENSTEIN STORY"

Noriega was close to Torrijos. Their relationship began in December 1969 under tragic circumstances. Torrijos was away in Mexico (he had gone to a horse race). Conservative officers had organized a coup. At this moment the fate of the process and of Torrijos was hanging by a thread. The young and unknown Major Noriega, who commanded a remote garrison on the

Costa Rican border, refused to support the conspirators. With considerable difficulty, Torrijos managed to get to the city of David, where Noriega was waiting for him. Clearly Noriega was taking a chance. His loyalty could have been turned into a death sentence if the conspirators had gained the upper hand. But the future general made that first and most important choice correctly. Torrijos led a triumphal procession from David to Panama City, the plotters were arrested, and Noriega became the person empowered to act for the leader as head of the army's G-2 intelligence service.

According to American sources, Noriega was recruited by the CIA soon afterward. The accuracy of terms is important here, but the wording in U. S. newspapers is vague in this respect. Some write that Noriega carried out "individual assignments" for American intelligence, and others say he was a regular agent for many years.

Regardless of Noriega's links with the CIA—and he denies them—there is no question that as chief of Panama's state security service he had to work in close contact with the Americans. By the way, this also attests to the fact that Noriega's real or imagined vices should have been well-known to the U. S. Administration long before the crisis broke out in Panama through its efforts. Just as there is no doubt that the prosecution of a foreign leader, which is unprecedented in international practice, is primarily for political purposes.

The domestic situation was favorable. By the summer of 1987 the government of Panama was headed by the millionaire sugar grower Delvalle. The government had been formed from several parties, only one of which—the Democratic Revolutionary, or Torrijist Party—was supported by the military. The others reflected the interests of the same oligarchy as the opposition parties. The only difference was that the bourgeoisie in power had economic interests in production and commerce to a greater extent, while the opposition was oriented toward the banking circles. The contradiction between the economic interests of the two oligarchic groups formed the bases for the conflict.

The middle class has grown and become firmly established in Panama since 1968. The theory of social peace professed by the military contributed to an increase in the standard of living of the small and middle-level employers and the employees of private firms. The middle strata that had become stronger economically demanded their share in governing the state. It is precisely the middle class that is the medium for the opposition's growth.

However, the opposition's political leadership is made up of persons from the old and the new oligarchies. And of the new one even more so. Many of its leaders acquired capital after the military came to power. Access to American credits enabled them to stand on their own feet quickly. But their interests—financial ones, and political ones in the final analysis—proved to be firmly

linked with the United States. So the contradictory nature of the regime objectively created a force which was to come out against it sooner or later.

The "tactical" alliance between the military and the oligarchy weakened the support of the people, which the regime made use of in the first years after it came to power. Social power—one of the priorities of the armed forces under Torrijos—shifted more and more to the control of the civilian administration. Unemployment rose, the strong Torrijist trade unions collapsed, and the quality of the state system of education and medical service deteriorated. In contrast to what may be read in the American newspapers, it was the military's deviation from the original "desarrollist" (from the Spanish "desarrollo," development) plan, not their dominant influence, which became Panama's real problem.

All these factors were taken into account when the U. S. State Department decided to get rid of Noriega, of course. But here is the paradox: neither American influence in the country nor the existing internal contradictions which have been aggravated from outside have worked. "We were among those who hoped that the administration's political and economic club would be used carefully to achieve the desired results," THE WASHINGTON POST states in an editorial. "This is what happened, however: the American club is beating Panama while a smiling Noriega remains in power."

#### A POLICY OF MAGIC AND MAGIC IN POLITICS

"Noriega must have done something good, since they hate him so in Washington," Panamanian writer Jos de Jesus Martinez believes. This logic "of contraries" is very typical of Panamanians. In defining what is positive in Noriega's policy, you will more often hear what he has not done or not permitted, not what he has done. In the general's words, his problems with the Americans began at the point that he rejected the offer from the President's former national security assistant, Poindexter, to help in organizing anti-Nicaraguan actions. Noriega maintains: the real reason for the crisis is that the United States wants to prolong the stay of its troops in Panamanian territory by seeking to revise the canal treaty. Let us hear out the other side. U. S. leaders maintain that they do not intend to violate the treaties and that they are only concerned about stability and democracy in Panama.

At the same time, reports are being "leaked" in the press that the Nicaraguan contras have been trained in Panama with Noriega's secret approval. I have been attempting to clarify this aspect of the matter. As long as a year ago, Luis (Navas), a member of the Democratic Revolutionary Party in the National Assembly, stated in an interview: Yes, the contras are being trained in Panamanian territory, on the American Sherman base. He was basing this statement on conversations with peasants from his election district who live near the base. He had not seen the contras himself. I did not have occasion to

see them either, that is, I did not happen to see them during exercises. But I ran into Alvaro Altamirano, a representative of the Nicaraguan counterrevolution in Panama, more than once in the city here. Once we even sat at adjacent tables in a cafe...

It is not difficult to believe that the Panamanian military have made certain concessions to the Americans. Incidentally, these concessions need not have been sanctioned by Noriega personally. Recent events have demonstrated that there have been significant conflicts in the ranks of the armed forces. Noriega probably has had to maneuver not only under pressure from outside, but under pressure from within, unseen by the world, reflecting the struggle among different factions in the army. The entire matter, evidently, lies in the extent of the concessions. The commander in chief has shown "flexibility" up to a certain point, after which he has been adamant. And this relative independence by Noriega has also become the reason for the United States' dissatisfaction lately. The dissatisfaction turned into hatred when one of those who initiated the campaign against Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, was forced to admit that his calculation of the general's rapid downfall was not justified.

Even if such an explanation is not shown to be "folklore," the opinion exists among the people that Noriega remains in power because he has...magic which protects him from his enemies. This seems unbelievable only at first glance; in fact, it is fully in accord with Panamanian political tradition. Arnulfo Arias, one of the opposition leaders who was president three times (he has still not lost hope of heading the government in his 87 years) kept a personal astrologer at the palace as long as four decades ago. After breaking his oath in June last year, the chief of the General Staff, Colonel Diaz Herrera, declared that he should take Noriega's place in the army, for he had been prompted to do this by a voice from the beyond. Well, is it really hard to conceive of intervention by forces from another world when mysterious messages show up from the toppled President Delvalle, who is sitting it out "somewhere in a cellar," according to a White House official's statement, but who is on an American base, according to Panamanian newspaper reports, and when his pale face is shown regularly on television?

They say that Noriega is also inclined toward mysticism. With all the irrationality of such an explanation and the

apparent lack of seriousness, it has to be kept in mind. Noriega is a poor speaker, but he knows how to stir his supporters, because he speaks to them in language that they understand. And when he appeals to God and otherworldly forces, this meets with a greater response than the opposition's moralizing appeals.

If we are speaking about substance rather than form, Noriega's power has nothing to do with magic, of course. Everything is very simple; the general is a Panamanian. A Panamanian not only by birth and upbringing, but in his thought patterns. In the final analysis, Panamanians are ready to forgive his personal imperfections and even his vices, if there are any. But they cannot forgive the opposition, which is ready to call foreign aggressors into the country to achieve its political objectives. And what alternative does the opposition offer to Noriega? "Video-president" Delvalle, who associates with his people by means of videocassettes? Delvalle, who stated quite recently that every Panamanian will give his last drop of blood on the banks of the canal in the defense of sovereignty, but who now asks for American mercenaries to overthrow Noriega?

Absolutely, if someone is resorting to magic, it is not Noriega and his mysticism, but those officials of the White House' administration who assume that they can make their own hostage the president of a sovereign state at the end of the 20th century. Until the United States relies on otherworldly forces (but the opposition is really the "otherworldly" factor in Panama, because it lives on anything it pleases, only not on its interests), Noriega will stand firm on the captain's bridge, and the "Noriega phenomenon" will remain a secret shrouded in mystery.

"Nothing else remains for General Noriega but not to give in," says Jos de Jesus Martinez, "not to surrender, by defending the political model which guarantees that the Torrijos-Carter treaties will be carried out. As a matter of fact, the Reagan administration has not left Noriega any way out other than the chance to be a patriot"... Both the general and his supporters realize that something more than the fate and well-being of an individual person is at stake. The destiny of a nation is being decided at this moment. Everything else, including the leader's merits and shortcomings, is of secondary importance.



### PRC Efforts To Curb Inflation Through Market Forces

18070169 Moscow: SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Jul 88 p 5

[Article by A. Kirillov: "How Can Inflation Be Curbed"]

[Text] It has only been a year or two since my last visit to Peking, but the two or three new and architecturally daring high rises on the city's central Changanjie Boulevard gave me the feeling that changes were taking place and that the city was moving ahead into the future. Through the car window I see gaudy stores, bars, and restaurants all flashing by, as well as familiar—and recently repaired—streets: Wangfujing, Xidan, and Qianmen. Shop windows have begun filling up, ads have become more interesting, and even Peking's own residents are beginning to reject their depersonalizing green and blue uniforms and choose brighter colored clothes with a more modern cut.

But for some reason the taxi driver, who I attempted to question about Peking's rapid progress, did not share my excitement about China's sudden economic leap forward, and merely uttered laconically: "Bu wending." That is: "It's not stable."

On public transportation and in snack bars and food stores, you can hear people talking about high prices and shortages of certain food items, as well as other everyday problems. According to public opinion polls, the last official increase in prices for meat, fresh vegetables, eggs, and sugar pushed their cost up 30-60 percent and angered many of the city's residents.

The papers explain this reaction by attributing it to peoples' state of psychological unpreparedness for the previously unheard of events that have followed in the wake of the reforms. And it is true that the average person has not always been pleasantly surprised by such changes as competition between enterprises, the aggressive onslaughts of the private businessman, and the "vaulting" prices of goods. And if the truth be told, there is a lot more temptation than in the past: after years of asceticism, people want to dress up a little fancier, eat a little better (even if only once a week), and "drop a little cash" at the hairdresser's. At Maxim's, which is one of the most expensive restaurants offering European cuisine in the city, passers by shoot envious glances at clamorous entrepreneurial farmers, some of whom spend as much as a thousand yuan—almost the entire annual salary of a city factory or office worker—in a single evening, just "out of curiosity."

Statisticians feel this is the main problem. According to a PRC State Statistics Agency report: "Expectations are still growing faster than our output potential, and shortages and price hikes have resulted." And while nutrition experts advise people to observe their traditional diet regimen (that is, eat smaller portions of more modest food), rising expectations are part of a natural process.

So the next question is: "Has real income grown?" Although wages began going up this year (by about 10 percent), rising prices on consumer goods nullified the gains of the statistically average resident of the city, while the purchasing power of some people actually went down. Housewives, particularly those from families with limited means, have had to be more careful in choosing what their families eat and cut the amount they spend on supplies for knitting—a popular and necessary activity—because the price of wool yarn rose by 17 percent.

Many experts attribute the price increases to an overly liberal concept of inflationary processes. The direct cause of inflation is money supply growth not backed by goods or services. More simply put, the money loses its value, and it can purchase significantly less than, say, three years earlier. In 1976, according to Zhang Zhuoyuan, director of China's Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Economics, there were 21 billion yuan in circulation. Ten years later, this figure had risen to over 121 billion, and last year grew by another 20 percent. What is the cause of money supply growth in the PRC? Experts have blamed the following: unbalanced capital spending; the efforts made by various departments and parts of the country to take as much as they can from the State and invest it in their own growth; and the omnipresent tendency to award bonuses for quantity instead of quality.

Be that as it may, the problem of price hikes is central to the Chinese reform, particularly at this stage, which Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the reform, has identified as the "critical" determining factor in the success of the reform over the last decade.

In order to somewhat lessen the severity of the problem, some experts say banks should increase their money holdings, feeling that the supply in circulation will thereby be cut. They propose creating incentives to save, such as special purpose accounts for purchasing housing, securing medical and retirement insurance, providing compensation in the event of unemployment, etc. At the same time, these economists feel that many social problems can be solved faster, particularly in housing construction and health care. Success in this area would satisfy mounting expectations and free industry from non-productive spending.

To judge from the papers, the Chinese government feels it can slow the rapid economic growth rate artificially; that is, by cutting credit and implementing a tighter tax policy. This, it is hoped, will have the effect of enhancing its ability to affect the course of the economy and establishing a bridgehead from which the economic reform can forge ahead.

Towards evening, we left with our friend, an economist from Peking University, to see the city's economy "in action," that is, closer to the downtown area, where the

streets are packed with crowds. Garlands of fire pulled the endless rows of trader's stalls from the darkness and showed us sellers loudly praising their wares and trying to beat their buyers' price.

It would seem Peking's night markets have inherited all the problems of the great city and all the seething passions of this huge, just awakening country.

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#### PRC: Dalian Special Economic Zone Profiled

18070227[Editorial Report]Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian on 15 September 1988 carries on page 3 a 1000-word article by M. Bondarenko headlined "Invitation To Do Business" about the Dalian special economic zone in China. Bondarenko states that "Dalian, one of the 14 'open' coastal cities of China, is attempting to create for foreigners conditions close to the standards of their home countries." Bondarenko reports a meeting with Shui, not clearly identified but apparently a local government official of the Dalian special economic zone. He quotes Shui as saying, "If you decide to invest your capital in our special economic zone, then you will have made the right choice." Shui reportedly notes that "A special zone, open to the outside world, an area about 320,000 square kilometers, has been created to attract foreign investors to the coastal region of China. At present, the total sum of foreign capital investment in the PRC has grown to \$22.6 billion, out of which \$8.5 billion is invested directly in production. The number of enterprises, all around the country, with foreign financing has exceeded 10,000; among them are joint ventures with the participation of Chinese and foreign capital and cooperatives and enterprises belonging entirely to foreigners." Bondarenko portrays Shui as enthusiastically pushing Dalian's investment opportunities. Shui reportedly informs Bondarenko of what Dalian has to offer: five programs of joint construction of industrial enterprises and seven programs in the sphere of services and hotel business. Bondarenko points out that there are still

no Soviet foreign trade representatives in Dalian. "All the same, there is a great interest in China in our reform and in goods which our industry produces—in Liaoning Province, where Dalian is located, one can both buy and sell—thanks to the adjacent sea. The truth is that 'the ice has been broken.'" He quotes a Chinese official of a factory's department of foreign affairs: "We will be glad to cooperate even more closely with your country. We have assembled a special staff of Russian translators. Now business is after your orders."

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#### Soviet-North Korean Youth Festival in DPRK Opens

18070222[Editorial Report]Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 24 August 1988 carries on page 3 an article by DPRK Union of Socialist Youth Workers Central Committee Chairman Choe Ryon-hae noting the opening of the Second USSR-DPRK Festival of Friendship and Youth in Wonsan, Korea. "The festival dialogue expresses the aspiration of both countries' youth to develop glorious traditions of friendship between our parties and peoples, to conduct a joint struggle for peace and the triumph of socialism and communism."

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#### AIDS Afflicts Filipinos Living Near American Military Bases

18070223[Editorial Report]Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 11 August 1988 carries on page 3 a brief article by D. Kosyrev reporting from Manila. He quotes data presented by the Philippine Minister of Health A. Bengson to the Philippine congress: 60 percent of the 76 people in the Philippines afflicted with AIDS live in the vicinity of the American military bases. Kosyrev notes that "the cabinet member did not provide extensive commentary concerning this. It was not necessary."

### **Afghan Refugees Begin To Return From Iran, Pakistan**

18070226[EditorialReport] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 2 August 1988 carries on page 4 a 700-word article by TASS correspondent Oleg Kuzmin about Afghan refugees returning from Iran and Pakistan. Kuzmin reports that over a 2-day period about 700 Afghans have passed through three border points along the Afghan-Iran and Afghan-Pakistani borders. Local authorities reportedly rendered material aid and sent the refugees back to their native provinces—Herat, Nangahar, Qandahar, Kabul, Samangan, Parvan, and Ghazni. Kuzmin notes: "However, if you consider that today about 4 million refugees are living in camps in Pakistan and Iran, then the massive return to their homeland has still not begun. The situation in the camps remains tense, particularly on Pakistani territory."

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### **Secrets of the Mossad**

18070162 Moscow LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 9 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Yu. Grigoryev: "Secrets of the Mossad"]

[Text] He took a swallow of the very sweet tea, cast a final glance at his papers, and yawned deeply; it was 1:30 a.m. on 16 April: 53-year-old Khalil Ibrahim al-Wazir, whose nom de guerre was Abu Jihad (which, translated from the Arabic means "Father of the Holy War") prepared to go to bed. Silence reigned in the villa of the military leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The roar of waves came from nearby Sidi bou Said, a small town situated a few kilometers from Tunis. The scent of blossoming jasmine filled the room through the open window. This same pungent scent was also smelled during these moments by seven men and one woman who were seated in two cars—a Volkswagen and a Peugeot—parked just a few meters from Abu Jihad's house. These people (all dressed in Tunisian police uniforms) were hired assassins, sent by the Israeli secret service known as the "Mossad," to exterminate this Palestinian leader—the inspirational figure, organizer, and coordinator of the uprising taking place on the occupied territories of the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip.

The Israelis, who had arrived in Tunisia on board a submarine, had disembarked not far from their target. Two accomplices were waiting for them with the cars. These well-trained seven men and one woman were staff members of "Sayeret Matkal," a special-purpose subdivision.

Armed with pistols outfitted with silencers, and having thoroughly studied the floor plan of the villa which had been supplied to them by provocateurs, the landing party broke like lightning into Abu Jihad's study. Upon hearing the noise, he grabbed his revolver. The first shot

knocked the revolver out of his hand, and the second hit him in the arm. The third bullet struck him in the chest. And then they finished him off with a burst of automatic fire. That is how the Italian magazine PANORAMA describes the scene of the assassination of one of the Palestinian Revolution's principal leaders. Meanwhile, the assailants were in a hurry; a submarine was waiting for them. While their car was on the road to the coast, they sent the following message by means of a transmitter: "Mission accomplished. Goal achieved." It was sent to a Boeing-707 of the Israeli Air Force. With the aid of a complex electronic apparatus, the Israeli Boeing had put half of Tunis's telephones out of operation and cut Jihad's villa off from the outside world. Together with the technical specialists, the persons in charge of the operation—high-ranking officers of the Mossad and the Armed Forces—were also on board this airplane. One of the staff members transmitted the "good news" to Tel Aviv.

The idea of assassinating Abu Jihad had occurred to the chief of the Mossad at the end of this past January. The new strategy of a mass struggle by peaceful means on the occupied territories, as adopted on the initiative of the PLO, PANORAMA writes, was developed, in the opinion of the Israeli secret service, specifically by Khalil al-Wazir, a serious-minded, intelligent, and cautious political leader who had dedicated himself entirely to the Palestinian cause. The Mossad had been hunting Abu Jihad for 25 years. Since 1957 the computers at the Israeli spy service's staff headquarters on the northern edge of Tel Aviv had been keeping a dossier on Khalil al-Wazir and updating it constantly. Mossad's director bluntly declared the following to Prime Minister Shamir: "Abu Jihad must be assassinated." A session of the Council of Ministers, meeting with less than its full complement, adopted the appropriate decision.

Created in 1951 by the then-prime minister, Ben-Gurion, the Mossad secret service was of top-priority importance for Israel's existence. Its first director was a short, lop-eared man; like Ben-Gurion, he always wore dark trousers and a white shirt. He was called Isser Harel. Nowadays the Mossad has 500 engineering-technical employees and a network of agents numbering at least 2,000.

Extraordinary capabilities are needed in order to become a member of the Mossad service. First of all, a good military training. Preference is given to parachutists and Navy frogmen. Training continues for a year and is unusually rigorous, complicated, and dangerous. The first six months are devoted to studying the fundamentals of espionage: coding, mastering firearms, the technique of self-defense, the use of electronic devices, as well as the methods of shadowing and identification. And, above all, memory training.

At the end of the first six months those who have "made the cut" are subjected to even harsher experiences. The new agents begin a thorough study of the countries in



which, it is assumed, they will be operating. A Mossad staff member must know the mores, customs, way of life and habits, culture and art, cuisine and news items so as not to arouse any suspicions whatsoever. They must speak the native language of that country without any accent. The newly selected agents must become accustomed to strict discipline and be able to bear up under serious hardships and even torture.

Nevertheless, the Mossad has suffered a number of extremely painful setbacks. In 1973, for example, despite the presence of many agents in Cairo, it failed to foresee the attack by Egyptian troops in October 1973. The assassination of Abu Jihad was also almost intercepted.

Based on his personal impressions, General Ambrogio Viviani, former chief of Italian Counter-Intelligence, has talked about how the Israeli secret service is organized and how it operates. When people talk about the Israeli secret services, in mentioning the Mossad, they have in mind an integrated, pyramidal type of structure. In point of fact, the Mossad is an organization, a name of a firm which employs in cooperation, and sometimes even independent of each other, at least five equally important divisions. This structure was devised in 1952, and has remained basically the same since that time, except for a few, very minor changes.

The most important division is called the Division of Operational Planning and Coordination. It is directly responsible to the head of the government. Its staff members first organize, gather, and analyze the information which is necessary to successfully carry out a specific operation. Then they develop its plan, set deadlines and methods, and issue the appropriate orders. But they never take part directly in the operations; they merely select persons to conduct them from among staff members of the special-purpose subdivisions of the Armed Forces and the police.

Why is it that the secret-service staff members themselves never participate in the operations? This is a golden rule of every secret service, especially the Israeli one, Viviani notes, in answer to a question from the magazine PANORAMA. A soldier or an officer from the army or a special-purpose subdivision is less valuable than a secret agent, he says. Moreover, if an agent falls

into an enemy's hands, there is the risk that they will force him to talk, and then the entire espionage network would be threatened, or even worse, infiltrated by the enemy's agents.

But let's return to the structure. The second division is named AMAN, and, in contrast to the Division of Operational Planning and Coordination, is responsible to the minister of defense. It specializes in all types of interception—eavesdropping on telephone conversations, electronic and aerial reconnaissance. It was specifically this division, for example, which intercepted the communications which the Palestinians who had hijacked the diesel ship *Achille Lauro* were exchanging with their leading officials on land.

The third division of Mossad is the renowned Shin Bet, which politically, like the Division of Operational Planning and Coordination, is responsible to the prime minister. It controls all foreign and domestic counter-intelligence within Israel.

The fourth division is called the Division of Research and Evaluations; it is responsible to the minister of foreign affairs. Its tasks include espionage (except for military espionage) in all foreign states.

And finally there is the Division of Special-Purpose Police, under the supervisory control of the minister of the interior. This division is in charge of the fight against crime on the territory of Israel.

Coordination of the activities of all these divisions is entrusted to a special organ which is called the Committee of Information. Its chairman is the director of the Mossad, and he, in turn, receives his orders from the prime minister. The latter is responsible for all the successes and failures of the secret service solely to the parliament [Knesset].

In conclusion, let's cite one noteworthy item of testimony. It was provided by General Amnon Shahak, chief of the General Staff's Intelligence Administration. In an interview with a correspondent of the Tel Aviv newspaper HA'ARETZ he declared that, on a per capita basis, Israel is compelled to spend more funds on maintaining its intelligence services than any other country in the world. We know what kind of "compelling reason" this is. It stems from the aggressive strivings of the Zionist state, which is conducting a policy of annexing Arab lands. Israel's intelligence services comprise an extremely important tool for implementing this policy.

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**Benguela: Frontline Zone of Angola**

18070190 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian  
No 30, 22-28 Jul 88 pp 12-13

[Article by Vyacheslav Molev, under the rubric "Reports for ZA RUBEZHOM's Readers": "Benguela, Angola's Frontline Zone"; accompanying map of Angola reprinted from PEOPLE'S DAILY WORLD; first paragraph is unattributed source introduction]

[Excerpts] Under the difficult conditions of the racists' aggression and the counterrevolution's intrigues, Angola's people is continuing its determined struggle to strengthen its national sovereignty. Our correspondent, who visited Angola as a member of a delegation of the USSR Journalists' Union, tells about the problems it is encountering and what its concerns are.

Benguela, Lobito, Luanda and Moscow—The red and black flag was slowly being raised over the schoolyard. A light breeze was lazily playing with it, picking out of its folds fragments of the national emblem—a gold star and a machete crossed with the oval of a cogwheel. Two columns of children stood completely still, without taking their eyes from the flag.

The schoolyard, surrounded by a low fence, opened onto a relatively small street. Like all other such streets, it was living that ordinary life that possesses some sort of special property of escaping attention. And only something that disturbs its evenly paced order makes one take a close look at the way it lives. Watching the children, I suddenly felt that something was happening around me. I looked around, and the street had fallen silent. Pedestrians were standing still. A motorcyclist had dismounted. Vehicles had stopped. And everyone's gazes—those of the pedestrians, the drivers and the passengers—were turned to the flag that was being raised on a flagstaff in the schoolyard.

No, this was no ceremony on the occasion of an official holiday—an ordinary workday was beginning. Every morning the pupils of this school in the city of Benguela form ranks for the ceremonial flag raising, and every time the street comes to a stop for several moments, honoring the national flag.

I Looked into the faces of the chance participants in this scene. Nothing ostentatious, not a hint of insincerity, and I was deeply touched by the respect with which they regarded the flag. It came from the depths of their hearts, from the inner conviction that destiny had bound them closely to the regime whose symbol was the red and black flag.

In the extremely severe conditions in which Angola finds itself, it is no simple matter to maintain faith in the new regime, in its sincerity and its ability in the final analysis to accomplish its proclaimed goals—to provide all citizens with equal rights, including the right to participate in the country's government, and with a living standard

worthy of a human being. And the trials that the population of the city of Benguela, like that of the entire province of the same name, has been subjected to for many years now are by no means easy ones.

**City in the Center of the Country**

"The province of Benguela has importance, I would say, for the whole country, and not just by virtue of its industrial potential, but also for its potential for agricultural development," emphasized Damiau Sili Anda, second secretary of the province committee of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party, in a conversation with the delegation of the USSR Journalists' Union. The small office in which the meeting took place was located in the same building that once housed a merchants' association. "The province has two major ports, Lobito and Benguela. The fish and fish-processing industry, the textile industry and salt mining are developed. There are favorable conditions for farming and animal husbandry. The Benguela Railroad starts here; it links the coastal region with the country's inland regions, the country's main breadbasket, and with East Africa. The province is being assigned an especially important role at the present time—in the Program for the Recovery of the Country's Financial and Economic Condition that has been in the process of implementation since 1 January."

In these last words of Dimiau Sili Anda there was no hint of ostentatious optimism. In them one felt the concern of a man who fully recognized the complexity of the task. It was though he had taken measurements over and over again: will we be up to it?

Benguela is a frontline province. And this is primarily because military actions in the country's Southeast against troops of the Republic of South Africa [RSA] and bands of J. Savimbi's counterrevolutionary group directly affect its whole life.

In November independent Angola will be 13 years old, and during all these years it has never known a day of peace. But could it be that constant references to the war are just a seemly pretext for justifying mistakes in management of the economy, as many Western journalists importunately suggest, when they cannot find a can of beer or soda openly for sale?

**Under Conditions of War**

What we encountered personally during our stay in the province of Benguela were minor inconveniences that bear no comparison to what the local residents must strive to overcome.

In December 1982 Savimbi's bandits blew up the country's largest dam and hydroelectric power station, the Lomaum. Millions of acres of fertile land were flooded, the harvest was destroyed, and the supply of electric power to the industrial cities of Lobito, Benguela

and Huambo was cut off and their water supply sharply reduced. Intellectually you can understand the tremendous damage wrought by this act. But you can only come to know through personal experience what that means in daily life. In Benguela, languishing from the heat, my colleague V. Gribachev, editor of the international department of *ZHURNALIST*, and I fully felt this. But for local inhabitants the water shortage grows into a far more serious problem. There is not enough of it for production needs and food preparation. The reduction of irrigated areas has resulted in a decline in grain and vegetable harvests. Because of the war the Lomaum Hydroelectric Power Station has not been restored, and the province of Benguela is experiencing an acute shortage of electric power—factories and plants are working at less than full capacity.

There are more visible signs of the war, as well. Along the strategically important approaches to Benguela one can detect the gun positions of units of the Angolan army. Although the headquarters of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which Savimbi heads, are located in Jamba, near the border with Namibia, his bands operate actively in Benguela's neighboring provinces of Huambo, Huila, and Bie. And sometimes in the province of Benguela, too: one is reminded of that by a building of the city airport that they have damaged. On the streets of Benguela and Lobito one sees many young people in military uniforms on crutches.

Since the province of Huambo became the target of constant UNITA attacks, the role of the country's second most important industrial zone after Luanda has passed to Benguela. The province's increased importance in economic and strategic respects has not gone unnoticed by the republic's enemies. And they have been giving special attention to the Benguela Railroad, which is 1,348 km long.

"To what extent do UNITA's actions affect the railroad's work and the life of the city as a whole?" I asked Jose Manuela Moreno, first secretary of the MPLA-PT committee of the municipality of Lobito.

"The bandits have never succeeded in fully putting the Benguela Railroad out of commission. Of course, you wouldn't call its operation normal, either. If one is talking about today, isolated acts of sabotage on the Benguela Railroad have little practical impact on the daily life of the municipality of Lobito."

Indeed, since the time in 1975 when UNITA destroyed the bed of the Benguela Railroad on its eastern section, the province of Benguela has gradually adapted to this harsh reality. However, it was not simple: Many people lost their jobs, and finding a new one is not easy. As for the country as a whole, the loss of revenues from transit shipments of mineral raw materials from Zambia and Zaire has been extremely painful.

At the present time, only the 400-km Lobito-Kuito section is being used, but traffic is extremely irregular. Trains pass accompanied by military convoys. On the other hand, passenger and freight runs between Lobito and Benguela are made four times a day.

The war has also affected the operation of industrial enterprises and the volume of agricultural production. The Afrika Tekstil Combine, which is capable of producing 14 million meters of fabric a year, is operating at half-capacity. A cement plant, flour mill and nonalcoholic beverage plant in Lobito, a sugar refinery in Catumbela, a wood-processing plant in Benguela, and many others are operating at 30 percent of capacity. And there are also those that have been idle for years.

Prior to independence, Benguela fully satisfied its need for corn meal and basic foodstuffs. There, as in the provinces of Huambo and Huila, the conditions for livestock raising are favorable. Both a local breed of livestock, the zebu, and the best European breeds are raised. But there is a shortage of corn meal, meat and even vegetables and fruits—the province is meeting its needs for them only by 20-30 percent, and the rest is shipped in.

The drop in agricultural production is also, first and foremost, a result of the war. In 1975-1976 alone RSA soldiers drove away 150,000 of the total of 3 million head of cattle that the country had. Disruptions in the transportation infrastructure—80 percent of all bridges have been blown up, and practically the entire fleet of trucks has been destroyed—have resulted in disruptions in the operation of the trade system and the exchange of goods between city and countryside, as well. Even now the RSA is taking advantage of this situation, inducing the peasants to drive their livestock over into Namibia in exchange for industrial goods.

The "landmine war" has done even greater damage. It has assumed especially ominous dimensions in the province of Huambo. In an attempt to frighten the peasants and force them to give up the sale of foodstuffs to the cities, UNITA mines not only roads but fields. And people are giving up their land holdings and moving to the cities.

There is, to put it bluntly, something for Damiau Sili Anda and the other province executives to think about. They know very well that funds for imports are extremely limited.

The war has disorganized coffee and diamond production, which provided the country with more than two-thirds of its foreign-exchange revenues on the eve of independence. Today petroleum provides 90 percent of the income from exports. But because of the sharp drop in world prices, even increasing its production from 2.4 million tons in 1986 to 4.1 million tons in 1987 has not resulted in increasing revenues.



The shortage of goods has been accompanied by a furious inflation in the kwanza, the local monetary unit, and has led to a flourishing of the black market, where a dollar fetches 2,000 kwanzas, instead of 30 at the official exchange rate. With an average worker's earnings at 10,000 kwanzas a month, a kilogram of tomatoes costs 3,000 kwanzas in the market. In order to somehow relieve the population's situation, workers have been permitted to regularly buy their enterprises' products at state prices, products which they can then exchange for necessary goods in the market. After all, the ration received for coupons in the state stores is not enough for a month. How can people make ends meet? And for all that, not grow bitter, and maintain their trust in the authorities?

The war causes much suffering to the people of Angola. The losses from it have exceeded \$12 million, and defense expenditures swallow up 40 percent of the state budget.

#### With Hope for Peace

The country needs peace. That is why the discussion during our stay in Angola kept turning to the fighting at Cuito Cuanavale, and to the quadrilateral talks among representatives of Angola, Cuba, the United States and the RSA on achieving peace in Angola and granting independence to Namibia.

"The outcome of the fighting at Cuito Cuanavale was extremely important to us," explained Carlos Alberto Souza Mesquita, correspondent for ANGOP, the Angolan news agency, in the province of Namibe. "By seizing the city with its airfield, the RSA counted on obtaining operating space for attacking Angola's central regions."

Carlos is thin, of average height and 25 years old, although he does not look over 17. He has repeatedly been in the combat zone. That is why he was speaking with such a knowledge of the matter.

"Moreover," he continued, "the RSA offensive would threaten the 'recovery program' in the province of Benguela and its neighboring provinces."

"That operation had far-reaching political goals, too," said [Vasco Ruis], head of the ANGOP division in Benguela, entering the conversation.

"For all these years, in waging an undeclared war against Angola, the RSA has strived to destabilize the MPLA-PT government and force it to abandon its support for the UN Security Council Resolution No. 435 on granting independence to Namibia, and for the Namibian partisans who are defending their homeland's freedom against the yoke of the apartheid regime. Savimbi has become a tool in Pretoria's criminal political game.

"Angola and Cuba, which sent its internationalist soldiers to help in repelling the foreign aggression, have long proposed a just political settlement of the conflict. But the RSA—as long as it had military superiority—refused. The defeat at Cuito Cuanavale scrambled Pretoria's cards," continued Vasco Ruis. "After that, it had to reckon with our position. Moreover, for the first time it entered into direct negotiations with the participation of Cuba's representatives. And in addition, it was forced to agree to take the Angolan-Cuban settlement plan as a basis for discussion. As you know, it includes the ending of assistance to UNITA on the part of the United States and the RSA, the withdrawal of all troops from Angola, the fulfillment of Resolution No. 435 and, finally, guarantees of the fulfillment of the first three points. One component of it is a schedule for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola."

Luanda and Havana believe that only a comprehensive settlement signed by Pretoria and backed up by U.S. guarantees will put an end to the war in Angola and gain Namibia's independence.

The first round of the quadrilateral negotiations was held on 3-4 May in London. The very fact that R. Botha, the RSA minister of foreign affairs, stated that there could be no military solution to the conflict signified a certain positive change. In the course of meetings in Cairo in June and in New York on 11-13 July, the sides worked out the "Principles of a Peace Settlement in Southwest Africa." According to that document, as soon as RSA troops leave Angola, "the clock will be started marking the time for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the RSA's fulfillment of Resolution No. 435," concerning the granting of independence to Namibia and the holding of free elections there under UN supervision. The document must be approved by the governments of the RSA, Angola and Cuba. In the event that an agreement is concluded, Ph. Oakley, official spokesperson for the State Department has stated, the United States will cease financial support for UNITA.

Benguela is also a frontline province because its population, in addition to the consequences of economic warfare, experiences the consequences of psychological warfare.

#### The "BLACK COCK" Loses Its Voice

The central part of Lobito, where Independence Prospect begins. In the depth of a small square stands the relatively nondescript, six-story building of RADIO LOBITO. Its staff members are entrusted with complex and important work. In the first place, when 70 percent of Angola's population of 9 million is still illiterate, the radio remains an extremely important medium for conveying the party's word and the decisions and appeals of the people's regime to every person. And in the second place, RADIO LOBITO opposes the UNITA radio station, the BLACK COCK, "head to head."

In the struggle against the MPLA-PT, Savimbi is staking his bet on kindling nationality and tribal strife. Angola's population belongs to two main ethnic groups. Its north is populated by the Bantu Kongo (the Bakongo and the Bambundu), who make up one-third of the country's inhabitants, and the remaining territory is populated by the Western Bantu (the Ovimbundu and related nationalities). Even in colonial times the Portuguese, in order to keep the proud and obstinate tribes under their power, would provoke conflicts among the Africans, inflaming the rivalry that already existed among them for "habitat."

A member of the Ovimbundu nationality, which numbers 3 million persons, Savimbi has attempted to rely on his fellow tribesmen, trying to instill in them the notion that the MPLA-PT expresses exclusively the interests of the "northerners" and intends to carry out reprisals against "everyone from the South." No one knows exactly how many Ovimbundu, believing Savimbi, have followed him into the bush. But it is claimed that there are 25,000 of them in UNITA's bands alone.

A substantial part of Benguela's population belongs to the Ovimbundu and its related tribes. This alone has created a favorable soil for UNITA's actions. Moreover, for many years the country's central and southern regions have been under the strong influence, and even the power, of UNITA and RSA troops. In 1986 the United States resumed military aid to Savimbi, provoking a new wave of terror, accompanied by unbridled propaganda suffused with the spirit of tribalism.

It was necessary to neutralize it. To show that the illiterate and deceived Ovimbundu peasants had nothing in common with the small group of class enemies of the revolution and the people's regime—the former big landowners, colonial bureaucrats, collaborationists and political turncoats, like Savimbi himself.

"What are we doing to counteract UNITA propaganda?" asks Ilidio de Souza Calado, deputy director of RADIO LOBITO, repeating our question. He is a relatively short, athletic-looking young man of about 30. "First of all, we explain the government's policies. In order to give those who have gone astray a chance to involve themselves painlessly in peacetime life, in May 1986 it extended its 'policy of forgiveness' to UNITA members. To those who recognized their mistakes, the authorities offered housing, a job and land, and guaranteed rights equal to everyone else's."

The "policy of forgiveness" toward those who repented proved effective with respect to the members of H. Roberto's counterrevolutionary group, which operated in the North. And it is bearing fruit here, too. By the admission of UNITA Lieutenant Gilermo N'gola, this policy has resulted in dissension within UNITA's upper echelons. "In order to deliver an effective rebuff to the enemy, you must know him," continued Ilidio. "We analyze broadcasts of the BLACK COCK and then

prepare counterpropaganda material. Foreign journalists recently visited a refugee camp near the city of Lubango and were convinced that UNITA really does terrorize the population. And we told our listeners about that."

After returning to Moscow I saw in the British GUARDIAN a report from the settlement of Lufinda near Lubango. More than 300 of the refugees living in it are Ovimbundu from the municipality of Caloukuen (province of Huila). They all had turned up there in an effort to save themselves from UNITA terror. Juan Jiveng had six cows, two calves and four oxen. The bandits took away his livestock, clothing and food and burned his cabin.

We also discussed the question of who supports UNITA, and to what extent, with our Angolan colleagues who were accompanying us. "Savimbi's claims to represent the interests of other nationalities are groundless," said Paulino Mateta, well-known commentator for Angolan television. "Have you heard about the fate of the Luvale people, who are related to the Ovimbundu? They are ruled by a queen, a 'nyakatolo,' named Chissengo. Well, several years ago Savimbi declared southeast Angola to be his territory. He also decided to strengthen his control over the Cazombo region, where the Luvale Kingdom is located. But the queen and her subjects remained loyal to the Luanda government. Thousands of Luvale, together with their queen, fled to Zambia. Now this woman, who is no longer young, lives in Luanda."

But so far by no means everyone, either in Benguela or in the other provinces of the South, has ceased sympathizing with UNITA. Why? I think that this reflects the feeling, sacred for many, of tribal community and solidarity. Furthermore, with such a complex economic situation in the country, it is always easier to come out with attacks on the government's actions, which is what Savimbi does, than to propose constructive solutions. And there have been omissions, blunders and mistakes. UNITA also strives to take advantage of these.

"Of the 900,000 inhabitants of the province of Benguela, we reckon that 500,000 actively support the policies of the MPLA-PT, and under our conditions that is not bad at all," said Damiao Sili Anda second secretary of the province committee of the MPLA-PT, characterizing the military and political situation in the province. "Our party organization has 5,000 members, and the JMPLA, the MPLA Youth, has 6,000. Many inhabitants are members of people's vigilance brigades, the Organization of Angolan Women and trade unions. They are the activists. They, in turn, rely on the people who live near them or work with them. And by and large, the people support the government and our efforts to normalize the situation in the province and increase the production of foodstuffs and prime necessities."

The difficulties in the country are considerable and affect practically everyone. But, despite this, confidence in the MPLA-PT is getting stronger. Why? I was constantly seeking the answer to this question.

### The Pride of Baia-Farta

A serious test of the recovery program is taking place in Benguela. Overcoming the economic depression and further increasing support for the MPLA-PT's policies in the province depend on how it goes. And the consequences of that will unavoidably be reflected on the situation in the country as a whole. After all, as of today Benguela is one of Angola's most important economic zones.

It is hard to deceive people. Yearning for peace, a time when they could go out into the fields without fear or throw themselves completely into the restoration of a factory and know that tomorrow no one would destroy the fruits of their labor, these people have realized that it is the MPLA-PT that is striving to bring peace closer. And they see what is being done, and how, to improve the situation.

Tens of thousands of refugees, war victims, have settled in the province. But one sees no homeless. The authorities have seen to the establishment of temporary camps and are providing material aid. A system of free medical care has been set up. So far, everything is very modest: there are not enough personnel, equipment, medicine and buildings. But during an outbreak of cholera in recent months, Cuban, Soviet and Bulgarian doctors, working with Angolan colleagues, have saved thousands of people from the terrible disease. It is impossible not to notice all that.

The food situation is more complicated. I involuntarily compare it to what I saw in 1983, on my previous trip. Then there was no meat, vegetables or fruits in the markets. Now there is. They are expensive, but they are available. There is a shortage of sugar, corn meal and vegetable oil, and they have to be imported. But under Angola's conditions it is sometimes no less difficult to keep a plant operating than to build a new one. And what is now being produced did not spring up on its own, either.

But in order to reinforce the process of integration into the society of those who have repented and abandoned Savimbi, in order to gain a hold once and for all in the masses, that alone is not enough today. While they recognize the objective difficulties caused by the war and the shortage of personnel, people no longer are willing to tolerate the subjective factors interfering with the growth in production. And when the authorities speak openly of mistakes and shortcomings in management of the economy—excessive centralization of planning, the bureaucratization of the apparatus, poor management of enterprises, corruption and poor discipline—that only strengthens confidence in them. "We must," stated the country's President Jose E. dos Santos, chairman of the MPLA-PT, speaking in Benguela, "rectify what has been done or conceived badly, and carry out more realistic and active measures to accelerate restructuring in the country and the advancement toward socialism."

Baia-Farta is a small town 20 km south of Benguela. The air is acrid, saturated with moisture and salt, spices and the smell of fish. Little clay houses approach an asphalt street of stone buildings from three sides. On the fourth side is the ocean. Almost in the center of the town stands the fish cannery Empromar Atlantiko.

"The recovery program provides for the effective use of existing capacity, broad financial and economic independence for enterprises, and the attraction of private capital. And our hopes along these lines are linked primarily to Empromar Atlantiko." As first secretary of the MPLA-PT committee of the municipality of Baia-Farta, Jose Antonio Fernandes, a long-faced man with eyes as black as coal, is well acquainted with its problems and thoroughly familiar with the provisions of the recovery program.

"Fish processing is our main occupation here on the coast. Animal husbandry and farming are developed in the inland regions," he enumerates. "And it is very important that the program provides for giving assistance both to agricultural cooperatives and to individual peasants. After all, so far our main strength is the small producer."

By local standards, Empromar Atlantiko is a large enterprise: 800 workers.

"Increasing the production of products for export is one objective of the government's current economic policies," says Rui Manuel Lopes Enrikes, director of Empromar Atlantiko. "Our main product is canned fish, 2,000 tons a year, as well as dried and frozen fish. In monetary terms, that means \$12 million a year. Right now we are beginning the installation of new freezer units. Equipment for two new canning production lines is also starting to arrive."

While showing us the plant shops, Rui M. L. Enrikes described the production process in detail. And in everything that he said and did one sensed an excellent knowledge of production. And furthermore, a latent pride. Indeed, he had something to be proud of. That state enterprise is one of relatively few that have no financial indebtedness, and it operates at practically full capacity. Back in 1984 it produced only 200 tons of canned fish a year, and the very next year, after he had been appointed director, it produced 1,500 tons.

The problem of the management of state enterprises is a very acute one in the country. That is why it is planned to turn over unprofitable plants that are of no strategic importance to joint ownership with private capital, or turn them over completely into private hands.

How did the director of Empromar Atlantiko manage to increase production so sharply in such a short time?



"Exclusively by mobilizing internal resources and paying more attention to working conditions and the workers' everyday life. We set up record keeping and on-the-job training. In order to ease the supply of products, we set up a store at the cannery. We opened up literacy courses: it is easier for a literate person to master modern production.

"Where does the money come from to finance the cannery's development?"

"Broad financial and economic autonomy now permits us to use our own funds or resort to loans, without waiting for the state to allocate money. We have taken out loans with a Spanish firm. The equipment we have acquired with them will make it possible to double the production of canned fish and export it."

The recovery program is six months old. It is still hard to say how energetically it will be implemented. One thing is clear: under the conditions of peace, accomplishing that task would be easier. A bandit action can, in a minute, undermine many months of work by hundreds of people and thwart their plans. Nonetheless, the tendency toward creation, which is growing stronger in daily struggle, is outweighing the tendency toward decline. It is that tendency toward creation, above all, that nourishes people's faith.

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#### **South African Spy Network Allegedly Uncovered in Zimbabwe**

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[Article by V. Mikhaylov: "...Remove from the Payroll...—A Spy Network of Racist South Africa Uncovered in Zimbabwe"]

[Text] *The report coming in from Harare took the director of the South African National Intelligence Service [NIS], Neil Barnard, by surprise: the "Counter Punch" operation, carefully developed using the best forces, had failed. The chief of the spy department sat in his office on Skinner Street in Pretoria and reflected glumly on how he would report this to President Pieter Botha.*

When it became known that one of the South African spies arrested in Zimbabwe, 37-year-old Rory Bert Magir, had agreed to give testimony to investigators, Botha flew into a rage: "What kind of people do you have working for you?" he shouted, forgetting his carefully emphasized soft manner of address with his colleagues and spraying out saliva. "They are ready to betray our ideas and become witnesses against their own government at any time in order to save their own hide. Just look what the NEW YORK TIMES is writing: 'The impending trial, if the agents start talking, could be a trial of South Africa.' What do we care about dirty accusations on the part of so-called world opinion? We

don't care about it at all, of course, but Washington is saying that it is harder and harder to manage handle Congress and the press when reports are coming from here of such a negative nature. Any 'constructive engagement' could be torpedoed! And in general, our 'irreproachable' intelligence service has been suffering disaster after disaster lately..."

Barnard understood that the president was right: there had been more than enough failures recently. The most terrible thing was that even he, "the most educated of the leaders of the intelligence services," as the newspapers frequently called him, a professor, a doctor of sciences, the author of 25 works on intelligence problems, could not explain what was happening.

Yes, six years earlier the operation "Assegai," which was to have put an end to black rule in this blessed country and return to it the renowned name of Rhodesia, had been disrupted due to an unfortunate coincidence. It was a powerful blow, and the adversary was able to neutralize almost completely the South African agent network in Zimbabwe. But it had been developed, after all, under the old leadership, which had gathered up all sorts of good-for-nothings into NIS (it was till called BOSS then).

Barnard himself was engaged in resurrecting the network, or more correctly, creating a new and reliable one. Outstanding operatives were selected who found like thinkers among the whites and bought off the blacks needed for operations. And they began a simply sparkling operation. To eliminate at least one dangerous and elusive foe—a representative of the African National Congress (ANC), Joe Gkabi. They laid him out with bursts on the street in the light of day without losing a single person therein.

When a broad-scale hunt for the leadership of the ANC began on orders from on high, it was namely in Zimbabwe that a whole series of quite successful actions took place: several houses where these bandits and their representatives lived were blown up one after the other. And what a "refugee" we palmed off on them...

In recollecting the 27-year-old Odile Harrington, a charming green-eyed brunette, Neil Barnard became even more confused. He had personally conducted her interview, personally developed her legend. And Odile did not let them down. But there was one thing: when the judge announced the sentence—25 years in prison—she shouted to the hall, "I consider the African National Congress to be a terrorist band and am ready to do everything to put an end to it. Long live the white race!"

One could have been very proud of such an agent except for one thing—the shattering disaster. And moreover a stupid one. Having forgotten all instructions and relying on her charms, she at first began recruiting a policeman protecting an ANC house in Harare. He had already almost decided, it seems, when she decided to reinforce her "reasoning" by citing a striking sum that would be

guaranteed to the family of this not rich man. He then up and turned her over to the security service along with her stupendous and expensive kit that would have been the envy of James Bond himself. Without mentioning such trifles as tiny tablets with instant-acting poisons or scattered hidden pistols with silencers made of light metals with increased range and accuracy and equipped with special bullets, Harrington had a wonder of technology—a microtransmitter. Installed in an elegant ring, it had enough power so that its signals could be picked up by a retransmitter set up in the apartment of a conspirator and from there, amplified, directly to Skinner Street in Pretoria.

Everything started with Harrington. She was arrested in September of last year, and three months later she went to prison, to come out a quarter of a century later. On January 11 the boys arranged the regular salute—in her honor, you could say—they connived to put into the vehicle of their “comrades” a good dose of explosives. The driver checked all of his “secrets,” detected nothing and turned the ignition key. The explosion was heard in every corner of Bulawayo, and it was as if half the houses where the ANC representatives lived had never existed. It is a shame, true, that only the driver went to meet his ancestors. But it looks like security was on the trail, and the arrests soon began.

At first five whites were arrested one after another, including such a valuable and reliable person as Kevin John Buds. At one time he had served in Zimbabwean counterintelligence, he knew its affairs well and left there without agreeing with his colleagues’ views of state property and free enterprise. The last to be arrested was an African, but also reliable, from the old guard. No one guessed that the executive staffer and genial person Philip Masiz Konjvayo was an officer of a special police subdivision under the white regime. In those years his neighbors did not know where he served, he did not appear in uniform, while rebels with whom he had “conversed” were arrested; they saw nothing except the jovial mask always worn by their “interlocutor.”

And nonetheless one of the six—Magir—agreed to give testimony. It was not ruled out that someone else would start talking or already had: they were, after all, being accused of murders and crippling during the five explosions they organized. The death penalty was proposed for even one such instance, so the temptation to get in line with the authorities was quite strong. Could it be for that reason that they began taking others, even more conspiratorial: an Englishwoman and an Irishwoman, a citizen of Canada and two highly placed Zimbabweans? True, there was still only a suspicion of espionage, but it was hardly worth laboring under delusions...

After his dressing down from Botha, the director of the NIS vowed that matters would not reach a trial. The operation “Counter Punch” had been developed, it would seem, with a regard for everything unexpected. It was reduced in brief to the fact that the faithful people remaining free equipped hiding places with weapons not far from the special prison of Chikurubi, where the agents who had been seized were confined. A group of commandos specially trained for similar actions in various sectors penetrated one by one into Zimbabwean territory and concentrated in the region of Chikurubi. They had only to arm themselves and wait for the convoy to transfer the agents from the prison to the Supreme Court building—the exact time was known to South African intelligence.

At the appointed hour, Zimbabwean Air Force Capt Garry Cane, recruited some time before, dispatched a helicopter from a military base not far from Harare and landed alongside the commandos.

But... Zimbabwean troops appeared instead of a convoy. They advanced confidently, ringing the area where the uninvited guests were located. They had to take to their heels without wasting a minute. Those who were able loaded into the helicopter and were able to get to the environs of the city of Kwekwe, where a small Dakota plane was waiting for them. Shooting up the discarded helicopter with assault rifles and wounding an 11-year-old girl nearby, the commandos flew off in the Dakota.

That is all that could be learned of the disastrous operations. The Zimbabweans, naturally, reported none of the details, and contacts with the remnants of the agent network were lost. And it is not even known if these remnants were able to survive or whether they would have to sign another order which would contain the words “and therefore remove from the payroll...”

“Just think, heroes, they got out alive and unharmed,” thought Neil Barnard bitterly of the commandos. “Better had they all been killed along with the agents—at least there would have been no one to yap at the trial. But this way...”

He looked steadfastly at his office door for several minutes, literally waiting for a messenger to appear very soon with a miracle, but he understood that there would be no miracle, and in doomed fashion he lifted the receiver, which seemed terribly heavy, of the direct telephone to the president...

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